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No. 76-1621-CFX
McCLELLAN

Cert to CA DC (en bane with maj by
. Leventhal and dissents by Wilkey
and Danaher)

v.
Federal/Civil

Me SURELY
1.

SUMMARY.

Timely (by ext.)

This case presents the questiqn whether the

Speech and Debate Clause, article I, section 6,

~~ause ' l

of

the Constitution, provides immunity to a Senator .and his staff
against a private action for damages.

The suit alleges illegal

and unconstitutional conduct by the Senator and his staff during
a Senate subcommittee investigation.
2.

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW.

After a riot in Nashville, Tenn.,

in 1967, Kentucky officials seized allegedly seditious documents
from the resps pursuant to a Kentucky search warrant.

!
{

The resps

- 2 -

were arrested for violating the state's criminal sedition law.
A three-judge federal court enjoined the state prosecution
because it decided the sedition statute violated the first amendment.
The court also appointed the commonwealth atmrney, Thomas Ratliff,
as custodian for the "safekeeping" of the seized documents.

After

the appointment, Ratliff discussed the resps' activities with
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Government Operations of the U.S. Senate.

The subcommittee had

been empowered by the Senate to investigate violent

disturbance~,

to identify their causes, and to recommend appropriate legislation.
A subcommittee investigator, John Brick, was sent to Kentucky to
meet with Ratliff.
Ratliff permitted Brick to examine the seized materials.

t'::::;

After !tr ic}c had read the court's "safekeeping" order on October
9, 1967, he copied
234 ._..awe
of the documents
and took the copies to
,_
,.,
Washington, D.C.

Although Ratliff testified that one judge on

the panel approved the copying, neither Ratliff nor Brick received
formal permission from the court or notified the resps of the
copying and transport.

Brick, who is now deceased, testified in

a previous action that he knew that many of the 234 documents
did not pertain to the subcommittee's investigation.

~~~

They included

a love letter from columnist Drew Pearson to one of the resps.
After reviewing the copies, the subcommittee subpeonaed
documents pertinent to the Nashville riots.

The three-judge court

refused to prevent the disclosure and ordered the resps to
cooperate with the subcommittee.

This

Cou~t

ordered a brief stay

pending consideration of the validity of the subpeona.

Eventually,

-

G-

;:,

-

the Court refused to note jurisdiction in the appeal from the
district court decision rejecting the challenge to the subpeone.
When the resps refused to produce the documents, the

I

cit: d them for

-:ontem~ ;~ongress.

sub ~ittee

Their convictions: erereversed

by theCA DC, 473 F.2d 1178 (1972), on the basis that the subpeona
should have been suppressed as the fruit of the illegal seach and

--------------.
by Kentucky officials.

s~ure
~

The court declared the Kentucky

search invalid because the supporting affidavit was conclusory and
the warrant was overly broad.
On March 4, 1969, the same day they refused to produce the
documents, the resps filed the damage action that has now reached
this Court.

In their amended complaint they alleged that the

Senator, three of his aides, and Ratliff had violated their privacy
~

and their constitutional rights by examining the documents, copying
them, transporting them to Washington, basing the subpeona on them,
basing the comtempt proceedings on them, and giving them to unknown
persons in Washington.

\ ~S

~

IRS

Later, the resps discovered that the

been given access to the documents.

The Senator and his staff members filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing that the Speech and Debate Clause provided them
~nity

from the suit.

After a hearing and a 19-month delay,

the district court denied the summary judgment motion without
explanation.

Despite

t~e

refusal of the district court to certify

an interlocutory appeal, the Senator and his staff a

ealed.

A

three-judge panel of the CA DC reversed the district court (Danaher,
Leventhal (dis), and Wilkey).

Upon rehearing en bane, the court

reached the following elaborate decision:

(I

-

'to

-

--It reversed the refusal of the district court to grant
summary judgment on behalf of thefederal defendants
regarding the part of the complaint that challenged
the original search and seizure by Kentucky authorities.
--It reversed the district court's refusal to grant summary
judgment on that part of the complaint relating to the
use of the documents in congressional hearings.
--It affirmed by a ~ j Q~ty ~ the refusal of the district
court to grant summary judgment on the part of the
complaint that alleged dissemination of the documents
outside Congress. --It affirmed by an ~Y divi ded v~te the district court's
refusal to grant summary judgment on the part of the
complaint challenging Brick's copying and transporting
of the documents after the imposition of the "safekeeping"
order.
--It rejected the argument of Judge Danaher in dissent that
the doctrine of official immunity required dismissal of the
complaint.
-3.

CONTENTIONS.

The SG's office haR filed the petn for

the Senator and his aides.

It advances fourarguments to support

tbe grant of cert.
1.

The CA DC has improperly

eroded the protection provided

to members of Congress by the Speech and Debate Clause.

will seriously inhibit congressional action.

This

It poses a serious

separation of powers question because the independence of Congress
is subjected to review by the murts.

Despite the

absence o f

a split among the circuits, the CA DC decision should be reviewed

__

•

now because most challenges
to congressional action will be filed
__.--...,.
in the District of Columbia.
The petn submits that the CA DC concluded by a vote of 10-0
that the activities of the Senator and his staff occurred during

-

a legitimate legislative inquiry about the nature and causes of
~

---

violent· civil disorders.

--------------

Having made that determination, the CA DC

should have refrained from further review, according to the petn,

..

- ;)

because an absolute immunity attaches to conduct that "is part
'

of the sphere of legitimate legislative activity."

It cites

Eastland v. UniterlStates Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975),
which affirmed the refusal of a district ~ourt to enjoin the
issuance of a subpeona duces tecum by a Senate committee.

The

plaintiffs in Eastland had argued that production of membership
li~ts

in response to the subpeona would chill first amendment rights.

The petn therefore says the Clause protects unconstitutional conduct
from attack and prevents any examination of the propriety of the
method of "legitimate legislative activity."

...

/~

The resps

J ~~ot

conten~at

conduct during preliminary investigations

receive as complete protection by the Clause as basic

~~ legislative action like speaking, debating,
~ravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).

or voting.

Citing

Furthermore, they

hat activity associated with the legislative process receives
no protection if it is not
legislative function.

act~ally

and _legitimately a part of the

United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).

Here, the legislative function did not require the seizure of the 234
documents without court approval or

--

outside Congress.

~issemination

of the material

The resps therefore conclude that the Clause

does not protect these actions by the Senator and his staff.

2.

The petn contends that the CA DC opinion conflicts with

( Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).

The Court held in

Dombrowski that the Clause insulated an aide from liability for
taking possession of evidence illegally seized by state authorities.
After the aide had taken possession, the state courts ruled that
the search had not been justified by probable cause.

The Ccurt also

held that the Clause provided no immunity from the charge that the

I
f
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aide had participated in the planning of the illegal raid.

The

Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment
on the allegation that the Senator had participated in the planning
of the raid.

The Court found no facts on which to base the allega-

tion in the record.
facts:

The petn argues that this case presents identical

The aide merely

took

by the state authorities.

possession of evidence seized illegally

No facts connected the Senator to any illega:

conduct.
The respondent distinguishes Dombrowski on two bases.

First,

Brick seized the documents in violation of the court's safekeeping
order.

According to the resps, this constitutes a separate illegal

seizure, distinct from that of the state

authorities.

Regarding

the Senator, the resps submit that the record shows a factual

{~;

dispute about the extent of his involvement in the release of the
documents outside Congress.

They also suggest that the factual

development of their case should not be attacked before trial
on a summary judgment motion.
3.

Even if the Clause does not provide immunity, the petn

says the petrs committed no illegal or unconstitutional acts.

l

First,

the use of illegally seized documents by federal officials is not
'illegal.

United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), permitted

such use by the IRS in a civil tax proceeding.
did not violate the safekeeping order.

Second, the aide

The court ordered Ratliff,

not the aide, to keep the documents. Third, the copying and
'-------------- documents is permitted by Servicemen's
transport of irrelevant

---

Fund.

--

Blind alleys must be investigated.

To punish the seizure

of a few irrelevancies would severely hamper investigations.

- 7 Fourth, regarding outside dissemination, the petn interprets the
CA DC opinion as affirming a district court order requiring further
proceedings on the subject.

The petrs say this was improper because

the district court had announced no such order and because the
complaint had not alleged the disclosure of the materi&s to the IRS.
Furthermore, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), suggests that
the resps were denied no property or liberty by the petrs.

Finally,

the information was exposed not to the public but to a government
agency charged with enforcement of the law.

The Senator and his staff

had a duty to respond in this manner to suspected violations of the law .
The resps reply:

First, as Judge Leventhal explained, this

case is not Calandra or Janis.

The staff member seized these documents

in violation of a court order that had already declared the state's

~ --·

seizure to be unconstitutional.
the safekeeping order.

Second, the aide made a mockery of

He removed copies of the documents from fue

possession of the custodian,knowing that the court had declared
their seizure illegal and had ordered their safekeeping.
this is not a "blind alley" investigation.

Third,

The aide knew of the

irrelevance of the documents when he seized them.

Fourth,

the complaint does allege dissemination outside Congress.

By

refusing to grant summary judgment against this allegation the
district court decided to hear facts on the issue.

The CA DC

opinion merely allows this process to continue.
4.

In a footnote the petrs argue that official immunity,

as vaguely defined in the CA DC dissent, should preclude any
challenge to their conduct.

This argument .is not well developed,

and the resps do not address it.

- 8 -

DISCUSSION.

Even if Judge Leventhal has applied the holdings

of this Court correctly, the S.G. 's office has developed a persuasive
case for the grant of cert.

First, the separation of powers conflict

alone probably justifes review.

The CA DC has subjected a member of

Congress to the burden of defending the actiors of himself and his staff
in relation to a legitimate legislative investigation.

According to

Servicemen's Fund, the Clause is intended in part to prevent the
imposition of this responsibility.

Second, a grant would give the

Court a chance to clarify the difference at least in tenor between
Gravel and Servicemen's Fund.

Gravel revealed a restrictive attitude

about the scope of the Clause:
The [previous] cases reflect a decidedly jaundiced view
towards extending the Clause so as to privilege illegal
or unconstitutional conduct beyond that essential to
foreclose executive control of legislative speech or
debate and associated matters such as voting and committee
reports and proceedings.
On the other hand, Servicemen's Fund in dicta extended the scope
and
of the Clause to protect investigations/ "blind alley" searches,
and in fact extended it to protect the issuance 'of a subpeona that
threatened to chill first amendment interests.

The case also

included an elaborate discussion of the purpose of the Clause.
Even if the cases are distinguishable on their facts, the two
discussions may support inconsistent applications.

<
J

Third, the CA DC obviously does not discern a clear application
of this Court's previous holdings to the facts of this case.

The

majority and dissenting opinions have developed the issues at
length.

On perhaps the most critical issue, the Court split 5-5.

The fundamental nature of the separation of powers issues probably
deserves more certainty.

- 9 Fourth, the facts here present an unusually clear example of
j~dicial ~co

nd .3uess !_ng of the

~~thod

of congressional acti. on.

Previous cases have denied innnun:ity/ conduct that had nothing to do
with the legitimate functioning of the Congress:

taking bribes or

arranging for outside publishing of the Pentagon Papers.

Regarding

the copying and transport of the documents by Brick, however, the
CA DC has pierced a ooncededly valid investigation to review
a particular technique employed.
a review.

Gravel spoke in dicta of such

But this case clearly presents it.

The one argument against granting cert is that the opinions
that discuss the Clause most fully (Leventhal and Wilkey, JJ)
differ primarily about the application of the facts to the law.
;

Judge Leventhal argues quite sensibly that the seizure of obviously
private correspondence and the dissemination of material to the
IRS have no relation to the legislative investigation.

As the

three-judge court subsequently showed, the investigation also did
not require Brick to seize the documents without permission.
Nevertheless, the importance of the issue justifies reconsideration
of the factual dispute.
As a cross reference, the Court has granted cert in Butz v. ~
Economou, No. 76-709, which presents a question about
~unity

in administrative enforcement proceedings.

~
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To:

Bob

From:

L.F.P., Jr.

Date:

February 1, 1978

·-----No. 76-1621

McClellan, et al. v. McSurley

In this important and difficult case, I would like to
have a rather carefully written bench memorandum.
Based on a preliminary reading of the briefs, and
portions of the Appendix (Parts I and II), I am inclined to think
that Judge Wilkey's opinion is more persuasive than Judge
Leventhal's.
"winner".

Yet, either opinion standing alone looks ljke a

This case - like so many that reach us - illustrates

the overuse of summary judgment procedure, with the consequent
difficulty of appellate courts being sure as to the facts - both
as to what may arguably be in conflict and factual completeness.
This is a "Speech or Debate Clause" case.

The parties'

arguments, like the en bane opinions of a divided CADC (the court
split 5 to 5), seem at times to be talking about different cases.
The respondents (plajntiffs below) seems to predicate
their case on what they call an unlawful search and seizure.

2.

They argue that the Speech or Debate Clause does not reach - that
it does not protect - Fourth Amendment violations even if
authorized by a Senate committee.

Accepting this as correct (for

purposes of argument), the respondents gloss over the question
whether Judge Wilkey (and the four judges who agreed with him)
was correct in concluding that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation.
In brief summary, a Kentucky prosecuting attorney acting under Kentucky's Sedition Law - caused to be issued a
search warrant against respondents.

The execution of this

warrant resulted in the wholesale seizure of hundreds of
documents and records from respondents, who were thought to be
leaders in activities that had resulted - and might in the future
result - in riots and major disorders.

Some 200-odd of these

documents, including one rather private letter written by Drew
Pearson to "Dearest Cucumber" (Mrs. McSurley), were turned over
by the Kentucky prosecuting attorney to petitioner Brick (then an
investigator for the Senate committee but now deceased).
Respondents' case - in addition to averring a
wide-ranging and speculative charge of conspiracy against Senator
McClellan - is grounded on (i) the invalidity of the initial
seizure by the Kentucky state authorities under the Kentucky
Sedition Act that thereafter was held invalid by a 3-judge
federal court; (ii) the order of the 3-judge court that the
Kentucky prosecuting attorney (Ratliff) "continue [to hold] in
safekeeping [all of the seized documents] until final disposition

3.

of this case by appeal or otherwise"

(Petn. for cert., Opin of

Wilkey, 6la); (iii) an alleged violation of this safekeeping
order by Ratliff when he selected and turned over 200-odd of
these papers (including the Cucumber letter) to Brick, who had
been sent to Kentucky as an investigator for the Senate
subcommittee.
According to Judge Wilkey's opinion (and I believe not
refuted by respondents'), respondents' position with respect to
the Fourth Amendment is that there was a double violation:
first, by the Kentucky state officials in seizing the documents,
and secondly, by the investigator for the subcommittee (Brick) in
"knowingly" receiving a large number of these documents from the
state prosecutor contrary to the "safekeeping" order of the
3-judge court.
I am inclined to doubt whether, even if respondents'
view of what happened is accurate, that the acceptance by Brick
of documents found to have been illegally seized, itself
constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Admittedly,

neither Brick nor anyone connected with the Senate committee had
anything to do with the initial issuance of the subpoena or its
execution.
Judge Wilkey does not reach this question.

He concludes

on the basis of the sequence of events, including communications
by the Kentucky prosecuting attorney with Judge Moynahan of the
3-judge court, that the delivery of documents to Brick was not
in violation of the safekeeping order, but indeed had been

4

approved by at least Judge Moynahan.

Judge Wilkey's opinion

notes that

"The six orders (pertaining to these documents) and the
one opinion of the 3-judge United States District Court
and the opinion of the Sixth Circuit at no time
expressed disapproval of the Kentucky officials' actions
in cooperating with the Senate investigators." Petn.
68a.
Judge Wilkey then goes on to say that there is "not one word in
the language of the six orders, before or after Brick's
inspection and copying of the documents • • . which indicates that
this was in the view of those judges in any way unauthorized or
improper".

Petn. 68a.

I am no doubt oversimplifying this rather complex case,
but if Judge Wilkey is correct it seems to me that the foundation
of respondents' argument -and of Judge Leventhal's opinion- is
undercut.
I

have not undertaken in this memorandum to address the

"Speech or Debate" issue or to identify the various arguments
advanced by the SG and the parties.
I

would like the views of my clerk.

L.F.P., Jr.

0

BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Bob Comfort

Date:

February 14, 1978

As Judge Leventhal and Judge Wilkey frame the issues,
this is a close case. Judge Leventhal's opinion, however, seems
more sensible given the procedural posture of respondents' case.
An opinion upholding Judge Wilkey would, I think, be difficult to

/.~
The SG

write in a reasoned manner.

As framed by the Government, this case is easy.

is pushing for an extreme interpretation of Speech or Debate
immunity, one that far exceeds the founds of all the prior
decisions.

This memo first considers the Government's extreme

position, then investigates the Wilkey-Leventhal dispute.
I

THE GOVERNMENT'S EXTREMIST POSITION
The SG, departing from the views of all ten judges on
the court below, takes the position that a Fourth Amendment

2.
violation perpetrated by a committee functionary in the course of
....____.

-

-----

an otherwise legitimate legislative investigation is immunized by
the Speech or Debate Clause.

Examination of the relevant cases

demonstrates that this view - which would appear to immunize all
activity in any way related to a legislative function - is
untenable.

The SG begins by properly phrasing the inquiry under

the Speech or Debate Clause as "whether the actions of the
petitioners fall within the 'sphere of legitimate legislative
activity.'"

Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421

U.S. 491, 501 (1975) (USSF).

The SG goes astray, however, by
("h \ "" (

giving too expansive a reading to t h a t t -e-f.'iTl •

As used in the

A

cases, it has a rather limited though irnpr ec i &_e meaning.

,/

The SG

.

.
a 1 so vm1srepresents
the holding of Dombrowsk1 v. Eastland, 387
u.s.

82 (1967), a crucial case in this area.
The SG begins by quoting USSF to the effect that the
(

(

,,

"power to investigation . . . plainly falls with "' [the]
definition" of a legitimate legislative activity.
504.

421 U.S. at

He also cites Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-315

(1973), for the proposition that Members of Congress and their
staff are immune for conducting an investigation that uncovered
defamatory and irrelevant information.

Because Brick - the

investigator in this case - was involved in an investigation
properly initiated by the committee, says the SG, he was
performing "legitimate legislative activity."
"[O]nce it is determined that Members are acting within
the 'legitimate legislative sphere' the Speech or Debate Clause

3.

an absolute bar to interference."

USSF, 421 U.S. at 503; ' Doe

v. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 312-313; United States v.
U.S. 169, 183 (1966).

~ohnson,

383

Thus, the SG reasons that any

inf.'i_?mation-gathering activity, even Fourth Amendment violations,
are absolutely immune.

This supports the SG's prayer that the

judgment should be reversed insofar as it subjects petitioners to
any further proceedings.
The first problem with the SG's argument is that
Dombrowski v. Eastland stands in the way.

In Dombrowski,

plaintiffs alleged that the Chairman of the Senate Internal

~

~

~

Security Subcommittee and Subcommittee's chief counsel
participated in a conspiracy with Loui-siana o.f ficials to seize

~ plaintiffs' property and records in violation of the Fourth

tv

r

,Am'e_
"" n_d_m_e_n_t- . __A_ u_n_a_n_ i_m....o_u_s_ c_o_ u_r_t_ h_e_l_d_ (per curiam, Black , J. , taking
no part) that the action could proceed against the Subcommittee
counsel, but that the record contained insufficient evidence of
the Chairman's involvement to make out a claim.

Dombrowski,

then, appears to stand for the proposition that participation in

.

a Fourth Amendment violation in the course o£ gathering
~-

,....:::

-

information by either a Member or his staff personnel does not

-------~------------,-----------~fall
within Speech or Debate immunity.

-

The Government attempts to distinguish Dombrowski by
arguing that there had been no legitimate legislative activity:
Subcommittee Counsel conspired with state officials to carry out
a raid to gain records for use in a state prosecution, not to
gather information for the Senate Subcommittee.

In the first

/

4

place, that's inherently implausible.

Court nowhere says that.
v. United States, 408

Secondly, the Dombrowski
~

Thirdly, the Court declared in Gr9vel

u.s.

606, 619

(1972), that counsel in

Dombrowski had been charged with "conspiring with state officials
to carry out an illegal seizure of records that the committee
sought

f~!:_i~§_own

proceedings."

(Emphasis added.)

The

Government's feeble attempt to distinguish Qompiowski, then,
borders on misrepresentation.
Beyond the direct authority of Dombrowski, the SG's
proposition that Speech or Debate Clause immunity cloaks all
activity in the course of legislative information gathering flies

-

in the face of the basic principle of the
the cases.

-

Cla~se

as explicated in

II

That principle is as follows:

Speech or Debate

Clause immunity does not attach merely because granting relief
might frustrate the objectives of a legislative act; rather, it
attaches only where granting relief would require proof of a
legislative act or its underlying

m~tiyes,

a requirement which

would threaten legislative independence, Gravel v. United

State ~ ,

408 U.S. at 621, and "legislative acts" do not embrace "-all

conduct relating to the legislative process."

United States v.

Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 515 (1972).
The first case decided under the Speech or Debate Clause
illustrates this principle.

In Kilbourn v.

!hompso~,

103 U.S.

168 (1881), the House of Representatives held Kilbourn in

contempt for refusing to answer certain questions concerning the
finanacial affiars of Jay Cooke.

The Speaker issued a warrant

0

5.
directing the Sergeant-at-Arms to take Kilbourn into custody and
detain him until he purged himself of contempt.

The warrant was

executed, and Kilbourn sued the Speaker (and others) and the
Sergeant-at-Arms for false imprisonment.

The Court held the

arrest illegal, since the House has no power to punish for
contempt.

It held the Speaker immune, because voting for the

resolution authorizing the arrest and issuing the warrant were
legislative activities for which Members were not answerable in
any other place.

The action against the Sergeant-at-Arms was

permitted to proceed, however.

Thus, even though granting relief

to Kilbourn frustrated the aims of the legislative act (passing
the resolution of contempt}, no SpeecQ or

Deb~te

immunity

attached to the arresting officer.
In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), Brandhove
sued state legislators under

§

1983, alleging that a committee of

the California legislature summoned him before it in order to
intimidate him, silence him, and prevent him from exercising his
constitutional rights.

The Court, applying Speech or Debate

principles by analogy, held that calling and examining witnesses
were integral parts of the legislative process.

No actions

outside of the legislative chambers were implicated.

Moreover,

the only way to prove abuse of the subpoena power would be to
delve into legislators' motives.
In

Unit~Q_States

v.

~ghnson,

383 U.S. 169 (1966), a

former Congressman was convicted on several counts of violating
the conflict of interest statute and one count of conspiring to

r~~
l.

defraud the United States.

•

6.

The Government proved that, as part

of the conspiracy, Johnson had taken money to make a slanted
speech in the House.

The Court held that the Speech or Debate

Clause precluded inquiry into the motivation for any speech
delivered in Congress and forbade any proof of the circumstances
of the speech in proving the conspiracy, but permitted the
conspiracy of which the speech was a part t be proved otherwise.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), was quite
similar to

Kilbour~

v. Thompson,

supr~.

The Court held that

House employees, "acting pursuant to express orders of the
House," 395 U.S. at 504, in denying Powell his seat and salary,
were not immune under the Speech or Debate CJ...ause.

_Thus, even

though the employees were carrying out the purposes embodied in
an immune legislative action - the resolution denying Powell his
seat - the suit was permitted to proceed.

The only issue was

whether the resolution barring Powell was lawful.

The motives

for its passage were not called into question.

v

The year 1972 saw two Speech or Debate Clause cases.

In

vfunited States v. Brewster, 408 u.s. 501 (1972), the prosecution
of a former Senator for solicitation and acceptance of bribes was
held not prohibited by the Speech or Debate Clause.

The Court

emphasized that in "no case has this Court ever treated the
Clause as protecting all conduct relating to the legislative
process.

In every case thus far before this Court, the Speech or

Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was clearly a part
of the legislative process - the due functioning of the
,....,

-

7.

process."

Id. at 515-516.

Since the illegal conduct charged was

agreeing to take money in return for a promise to act in a
certain way, there was no necessity to question any legislative
act -

~~'

an actual vote - of the Member or its motives.

Id.

at 526.

c---

The other 1972 case was Gravel v. United
U.S. 606 (1972).

St~!~~'

408

That case took a bit of a leap by holding that

an aide was protected by the Clause to the extent a Member was

.....

---- --------------

protected for the same conduct.
all implied the opposite.

Kilbourn, Tenney, and Powell had

In any event, the Gravel Court

characterized Kilbourn, Dombrowski, and Powell:
The three cases reflect a decidedly iaundiced
view towards extending the Clause so as to
privilege illegal or unconstitutional conduct
beyond that essential to foreclose executive
control of legislative speech or debate and
associated matters such as voting and committee
reports and proceedings. In Kilbourn, the
Sergeant-at-Arms was executing-a- legislative
order, the issuance of which fell within the
Speech or Debate Clause; in Eastland, the
committee counsel was gathering information for
a hearing; and in Powell, the Clerk and
Doorkeeper were merely carrying out directions
that were protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause. In each case, protecting the rights of
others may have to some extent frustrated a
planned or completed legislative act; but
relief could be afforded without proof of ~
legislative act or the motives or purposes
undeLying such ~ act. No threat to
legislative independence was posed, and Speech
or Debate Clause protection did not attach.

I

408 U.S. at 620-621.

The question presented was whether Gravel's

aide was immune to a subpoena from a grand jury inquiring into
the acquisition and release of the Pentagon Papers.

The answer

8.

negative:

Legislative acts arc not all-encompassing. The heart
of the Clause is speech or debate in either House. Insofar as the Clause is cons'trued to reach other matters,
they mus e an integral part of the deliberative and
communicat_iye processes by w 1c
embers participate
in committee ana House proceedings with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. As ,
the Court of Appeals put it, the courts have extended
the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate
in either House, but "only when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations." United States
v. Doe, 455 F. 2d, at 760.
Here, private publication by Senator Gravel through
the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate; nor cfoes ques- tioning as to private publication threaten the integrity
or independ ence of the Senate by impermissibJy_ expo1t_
ing its deliberations to executive influence. The Senator
--------· - .
had conducted his hearings; the record and any report
that was forthcoming were available both to his committee and the Senate. Insofar as we are advised, neither
Congress nor the full committee ordered or authorized
the publication.16 We cannot but conclude that the
Senator's arrangements with Beacon Press were not part
and parcel of the legislative process.
-

408 U.S. at 625-626

(emphasis added).

Thus, questioning as to

such arrangements was not forbidden.
In Doe v.

~~Milla~,

412 U.S. 306

(1973), immunity was

extended to the introduction of material at committee hearings,
referral of a report containing the material to the House, and
voting for the report's publication.

There was no immunity,

9.
however, for the employees who published and distributed
materials that were irrelevant to the legislative issue before
the Members.
Finally, in
421

u.s.

491 (1975)

~astland

St~te§_Servicem~~~s _ Fund,

v. United

(USSF), the Court held immune the Members and

aides responsible for issuing a subpoena for respondent's bank
records to a third-party bank.

Even though the bank could not be

expected to object, thus leaving USSF with no means of contesting
the validity of the subpoena prior to disclosure, the issuance of
a subpoena was held to be a legislative act.
directly from

Ten~~.)

(This followed

Its motivation could not be investigated

for purposes of proving First Amendment violations.

-

-

Consideration of all these cases makes it apparent that
the Government's position is too extreme to be maintained
seriously.

The thrust of the cases is that a "legislative act"

is one which cannot be attacked without reference to the reasons

-

or motives underlying it.

It does not embrace every action

relating to legislation.

In particular, it does not encompass

more remote activities such as an arrest at the legislature's
behest,

~iJbourn,

~upra,

taking his seat, Powell,

physically restraining a Member from
~~ra,

or plotting to violate the Fourth

Amendment in order to gain information for a committee
investigation, Dombrowski,

~upra.

While the decision to gather

information and its sifting in committee are legislative actions,
see Doe v. McMillan, supra, a Fourth Amendment violation - like a
conspiracy bribe - can be shown without any proof of those

10.

legislative acts or their motivation.

It can be proved

independently of its role as a result of a legislative act (the
decision to seek information) , just as the arrest in

Kilbg~~n

could be proved independently of its role as the result of a
legislative act.

The legislative

their remote results.

moti~es

aren't questioned, only

Thus, Congressional actions are protected

from executive or other pressures, but excesses of Congressional
power do not go unchecked.
There are two ways of envisioning this circumscription
on Speech or Debate immunity.

The broader view would be that

field work simply is not "legislative activity," although it is
related to legislation.

This, I think_would have been the

holding of the Courts that decided each case up through
Indeed,

~e Gr~yel

-

Qf~~~1·

-

Court hinted quite strongly that field

--

investigation was not a legislative act. 408 U.S. at 620. With
•
Gr~yel, however., the focus of immunity widened to includ e aides

...

and a certain amount of preparatory investigation.

This was

broadened further in USSF.
.

The narrower view is that taken by Judge Leventhal and

accepted by Judge Wilkey.
(

In his view investigative field work

is, in general, a "legislative act" partaking of immunity.
[, l f.' \f(

~ceases

Field

to be a legislative act, however, when illegal means are

employed, for "the employment of unlawful means to implement an
otherwise proper legislative objective is simply not 'essential
to legislating.'

As with taking a bribe, resort to criminal or

unconstitutional methods of investigative inquiry is no part of

11.

the legislative process or
act.'" [Citation omitted.]
The Government objects that this view is
self-contradictory, since it calls field work an immune
legislative act, yet strips the immunity whenever there is
illegal conduct.

According to the Government, there is no more

reason to lift field work's immunity for a Fourth Amendment
violation than to lift a subpoena's immunity for alleged First
Amendment violations - which the USSF Court refused to do.
But when measured against the principle of the cases no immunity where a legislative act or its motivation need not be

-

proved - Judge Leventhal's principle
W hat it really says is this:

i~

not

s~lf-contradictory.

the reason we call things protected

"legislative acts" is because we will not delve into a Member's
motives for doing them.

Hence, subpoenas are immune because to

hold one improper would require asking why the Member "really "
issued the subpoena.

But with a Fourth Amendment violation in

the field, illegality is an objective, observable fact.
not be predicated on any inquiry into motive.

It need

So long as the

Members and their aids stick to objectively proper means, then,
no inquiry into motive can follow.

This principle flows from the
( Lj "''/ ; '1'.)

cases.
~erme~

I I,'

t

It can be rephrased more accurately il-f. field work is not
/,

a "legislative

blanket immunity.

-

act~"

I \,

\

t

I

which allows the Government to claim

,,

Instead, a "legislative act" would be one

whose legality cannot be judged apart from an inquiry into
legislators' motives.

Use of means in the field can be so judged.

12.

Whichever view is taken, the cases make it clear that
where legislative motive need not be shown in order to prove
illegality, there is no immunity.
The Government asks the Court to overturn nearly a
century of doctrine and hold that all remote actions advancing
the ends of any "legislative act" - in the sense of motive - are
immune, are part and parcel of the "legislative act."

Such a

holding would permit Congress and all its employees to violate
the Constitution and laws with impunity.

That is why it always

has been rejected.

II
THE GOVERNMENT'S FALLBACK POSITIONS
A.

McClellan Immune

The Government argues that the record shows nothing mo re
than that Senator McClellan "authorized in general t e r ms Br ic k' s
investigatory activity."

Br. at 34.

From this the SG argue s

that McClellan must be immune, because even if he had instruc t e d
B -:- i, l\
~k
,...

to violate the Fourth Amendment, he would be immune.

support, the SG cites KiJ.pourn, in

~11hich

As

Members were immune for

"instructing" the Sergeant-at-Arms to conduct an illegal arrest;
Doe v.

Mc~j.J-1 9-Q,

in which Members were immune for "instructing"

the Printer to print the defamatory report; and

~owell,

in which

Members were immune for "instructing" the Doorkeeper to keep
Powell out.
These citations seem rather disingenuous, for in each

13.

"instructions" consisted of a vote on the floor of
Congress - an archetype of the "legislative act" held immune
under the Speech or Debate Clause.

Here, in contrast,

respondents' complaint charges that Brick was acting at the

--

behest of McClellan alone, without a vote in or knowledge by the

...

~-

rest of the commi"ttee.

App. at 31

(1[ 19).

This alleged

individual action, taken outside the course of the "legislative
activity," would not appear to be immune.
~9stl9~Q, ~~p~~'

Dombrowski v.

strongly suggests that such individualized -

Le.!.., apart from the legislative process - conspiring to commit
r.J-1.5>

Fourth Amendment violations is not immune.
Fourth Amendment complaint as to the

e-:

That dismissed a
1\

S~nator,_not

because his

instructions were immunized, but because the record contained
insufficient evidence of his involvement.
B.

1nsufficiency of the Pleadings

The SG invokes pombrowski, which dismissed the case as

-----------

to the Senator because "[t]he record [did] not contain evidence
of his involvement in any activity that could result in
)

liability," 387 U.S. at 84, and argues that dismissal against all
McClellan, Adlerman (General Counsel), and O'Donnell (Chief
Counsel) is called for here as well.

The SG notes Judge

Leventhal's statement that "the record at present is silent on
the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman, and
,..--

O'Donnell."
controlled by

Petn at 45a.
~ombrowski

Thus, says the SG, the case is
and dismissal is called for.

14.

pombrowski is a bit Delphic on this issue.

Affidavits

concerning Eastland's involvement apparently were in the record;
probably they simply did not show explicit authorization of the
Fourth Amendment violation.
been any discovery.)
since

a~cSurely

If so,

(It is not clear whether there had
pomp!Q~~~i

might not control here,

affidavit alleges that the federal defendants

directly participated in the planning of the Fourth Amendment
violations.

App. at 55-56.

As in any case, establishment of

that fact would have to await discovery.
On the other hand, if Dombrowski stands for the
proposition that the plaintiff must attach some non-party's
affidavit or other "evidence" of his factual a!legations to his
~~foie

complaint in order to withstand a summary judgment motion

-

discovery, then dismissal would be called for here, since there
is no "evidence" of McClellan's, Adlerman's, or O'Donnell's
involvement.

I cannot believe, however, that

for such a proposition.

QQ~b!o~ski

stands

It would mean that even where Speech or

Debate immunity does not apply, a plaintiff is denied discovery
unless he can establish his case without it.

Surely _Dqmbrowski

should not be read as creating such a Catch-22.

If dismissal is

compelled at this stage, the holding of non-immunity will be a
hollow victory for plaintiff.
Judge Leventhal's approach seems more reasonable.
recognized that the allegation in the complaint made out a

-We
1\

non-immune violation and that since the case thus far had
revolved around the issue whether the Speech or Debate Clause

15.

permitted the action based on that allegation to go forward at
all, there had been no opportunity for discovery to substantiate
it.

Petn at 45a.

He cautioned, though, that discovery and proof

of the allegation could not involve "legislative acts" or the
motivations for them.

He also added that a renewed summary

judgment motion would be available if respondents failed to
adduce any supporting facts.
C.

~ricLDid No!__Vio]:a~Safe-Ke~ping _O!_der

The SG argues that any violation of the safekeeping
order - assuming one occurred - was Ratliff's alone, not
Brick's.

Hence, there was no Fourth Amendment violation by a

federal officer.

The SG emphasizes that

the selection of the copies, etc.

-

-

Brie~

pl qxed no role in

This issue will be considered

in more detail below, when Judge Wilkey's opinion is discussed.
The Government also contends that Brick could not be
held liable for transporting any materials, under Qoe v.
and USSF.

M~ ~i 1 Ja n

This point, too, will be discussed in connection with

Judge Wilkey's opinion.
D.

Release to IRS

The SG argues that CADC should not have remanded for
further proceedings on the allegation that documents may have
been shown to the Internal Revenue Service.

Resps filed two

affidavits to this effect five years after commencing this
action; they never amended their complaint to reflect these
allegations.

Hence, there was no distinct court order on the

issue on which CADC could act.

The SG insists that resps must

16.

amend their complaint before this issue will be in the case. ·
The amended complaint does contain an allegation that
Brick exhibited the documents to persons unknown, causing
embarrassment and damage, App. at 31-32, t 19, as well as an
allegation that McClellan used the subcommittee's investigative
power to harass respondents, App. at 35, t 28(b}.

Judge

Leventhal acknowledges, however, that there is no specific
allegation of dissemination outside the halls of Congress.
at 14a n. 25.

Petn

Apparently all ten CADC judges thought the actual

allegations sufficient to embrace the IRS claims.

There does not

seem to be any reason for this Court to second-guess them on this

)

pleading question.
Under

Do~;

Judge Leventhal seems clearly correct in

holding that dissemination outside of Congress - if otherwise
actionable - is not protected by Speech or Debate immunity.

(It

may be, of course, that release to the IRS was not actionable, as
the SG argues.

That question is not before the Court.}

III
WILKEY-LEVENTHAL DISPUTE
Judge Leventhal was willing to find that respondents'
complaint alleged non-immune acts because it made out a "more
~

than merely colorable" charge of Fourth Amendment violations by
the federal defendants.

Judge Wilkey rejected that conclusion,

declaring that no Fourth Amendment violations were charged.
fairly narrow dispute generated the 130 pages of

___,------------~--

~~ ~~~~

This

opinion

~~~~
~......... ,.e....._4,,c'" c:. • -c.L ~ 17
~~~~~~A~""""'- .
Everything hinges on the actions of the investigate ~

(

below.

Brick, since his activities are the only ones that could tie the
alleged conspirators into Fourth Amendment violations.
A.

Violation of the

Safekeeping _ 0~9er

Judge Leventhal held that Brick "took active steps to
access to the seized materials and cart back from Kentucky
copies of the McSurelys' documents . .
25a.

"

Petn at

Without deciding whether or not the facts established that

Brick did violate the Fourth Amendment, Judge Leventhal held the
claim "more than merely colorable."
~w

-

-

Petn. at 22a.

_,-.

With respect to the violation of the three-judge court's
safekeeping order, Judge Leventhal

not~d

that "we can state with

fair certainty that plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case
to the effect that the purpose of the 'safekeeping order' of the
three-judge court was to preserve the seized items both for t he
McSurelys' benefit and for the orderly administration of the
judicial process . . . , and that Brick's investigative activity
outside the scope of the channels established by the court
Petn at 28a.

Judge Leventhal points out

did not empower Ratliff, the state

when Brick showed up in Kentucky, twice visited the walk-in
vault, and examined and selected various documents, he viola t ed
the order.

~

'

Subsequent ratification by the three-judge court

could not eradicate the violation, since it appeared that Brick
initially had acted outside the law.

The same is true of the

18.

later Subcommittee subpoenas, according to Judge Leventhal.
Judge Wilkey rejects this whole analysis.

He reads the

order of the three-judge court as a "preservation" order, not a
secrecy order.

Petn at 69a.

Judge Wilkey argues that the order

has to be read as a preservation order, since it nowhere refers
to secrecy; moreover, the three-judge court never indicated that
it thought Brick's activity had violated its order.

That being

true, Brick violated nothing, since the documents were preserved
as ordered.
If the issue were before the Court for decision, I think

I

Judge Wilkey's view of the record would be more plausible.
is no indication that the three-judge court wQuld have

There

~onsidered

Brick's activity unlawful prior to its subsequent ratification.
The order itself does not speak to secrecy.

Moreover, as the SG

argues, Br. at 39-40, the safekeeping order may not have imposed
any duties on Brick.

Ratliff claims to have believed he had

authority to act as he did, so that Brick may have had no duty to
seek court permission.

Judge Leventhal, however, points out that

custodial permission, though obviating the use of force, may not
validate an unwarrantec inspection.
Judge Leventhal, however, is not deciding the issue,
while Judge Wilkey is.

Judge Leventhal merely holds that there

is a Fourth Amendm€nt argument to be made, one which is not
facially ridiculous, to the effect that the Brick inspection was
"unwarranted."

Discovery or trial would shed more light on the

issue of the scope of Ratliff's authority under the order.
holding does not seem unreasonable.

That

--,;:;;:::r~ r;;g;;c~
B.

~~14;~ ·

.!~~~_le~a!_lt Material ~~~

Judge Leventhal's second ground for concluding that

~

respondents had made out a "more than merely colorable" Fourth
Amendment claim was Brick's concession that he had inspected

a~

transported to Washington documents - including the "Dearest

-

Cucumber" letter - that were irrelevant to the Subcommittee's
inquiry.

Because of this concession, Judge Leventhal concludes

that Brick's activity with respect to the letter was not a
subject "on which legislation could be had,"
504 n. 15.

USSF, 421

u.s.

at

Judge Leventhal observed that concession might be

explained away after discovery or at trial, but that as it stood
it barred any need to second-guess a
what was relevant to the inquiry,
313.

legislat~ve

Do~

v.

Hence, the activity involving it was not immune.

Again Judge Wilkey disagrees.

I

412 U.S. at

Here, the legislator-aide had declared the material

irrelevant.

\

judgment as to

~cMillan,

First, he argues that a ny

action for transportation of the irrelevant matter would raise

-------

only privacy claims, not Fourth Amendment violations.
immunity would not be shattered.
a view of the immunity.

Doe v.

Hence,

I think this takes too sweeping
~cMi]..la!l

suys that

non-constitutional suits can be maintained as long as they do not

'

relate to legislat ive acts.

•

If the material is irrelevant to th e

legislative process, there is no immunity, and respondents are
free to bring any action they can.
Judge Wilkey's second, and stronger, arguernnt is that

v

He was in no

20.

position to determine the relevance of all the documents, so he
took all the agreeably relevant stuff to washington, where
subsequent issuance of subpoenas seemed to undercut hs
concession.

Moreover, personal letters, by indicating

respondents' contacts and activities, could well have been
relevant to Subcommittee inquiries into respondents' violent
activities, if any.

Since relevance could plausibly be imagined,

there is no basis for judicial second-guessing, under

QQ~

v.

McMillan.
Judge Leventhal points out, however, that no claim of
legislative need for the letter was ever raised, Petn at 53a,
implying that such a claim would end judicial Jnquiry.

Once

again, then, Judge Leventhal's position - that there is no clear
claim of immunity at the threshhold - seems reasonable.

The

effect of Brick's concession and claims of legislative relevanc e
can be evaluated and raised on remand.

As of now, only absolute

immunity to further inquiry is at stake.
C.

Calandra Doctrine

Judge Wilkey concludes that in any event there was no

1

search or seizure by Brick under United States v. Calandr?J., 414

U.S. 338 (1974).

His theory is that any harm was done by the

initial search and seizure carried out by state officials.
Subsequent legislative use of the illegally obtained materials,
like grand jury use of the material illegally seized in
does not work a second seizure.
\

"silver platter" cases,

~~g~,

~a~an9ra,

This point is reinforced by the

Weeks v. United

St~~ ~§,

232 U.S.

21.
383 (1914), holding that there is no illegality connected to

transfer of evidence from one jurisdiction, which illegally
seized the evidence, to another jurisdiction that did not
participate in the illegality.
Judge Leventhal seems to be correct in suggesting that
Judge Wilkey - in assimilating this situation to Calandra missed the point of respondents' complaint.

They allege, wholly

apart from the illegality of the initial state seizure, that
Brick's tmspection and copying amounted to a separate Fourth
) Amendment violation.

Your opinion in Calandra noted that the

wrong was "fully accomplished by the original search."
at 354.

There simply was no claim that the

g~and

414

u.s.

jury's passive

receipt of the illegally seized evidence amounted to a second
search, any more than it would have to be claimed that an atte mpt
to use illegally seized evidence at a 1£Ja1 was a second search.
In this case, however, respondents argue that Brick violated a
court order and the Fourth Amendment; there was more than passive
receipt by a grand jury or trial court.

1

committed by Brick.

There was a fresh wrong

Thus, Qal9ndra and the silver platter cases

are inapposite.
Judge Leventhal's view is supported by
distinction of
385 (1920).

§ilyertbQfD~LUmQ~r

Q~landra

Co. v.

~~1a~Qra's

Unit~Q_§1at~~'

251

u.s.

notes that in §ilverthorne a grand jury

subpoena, premised solely on a prior seizure already ruled
invalid was held to violate the Fourth Amendment.

Hence, the

legality of a subsequent use by a grand jury can depend on the

22.
status of the materials at the time of the subsequent use.
U.S. at 532 n.8.

414

So here, the validity of the subsequent use by

Brick and the Subcommittee depends on the status of the
materials, i.e., whether they were under a "protective" court
order.

Thus, there could be a fresh violation here,

distinguishing this case from Ca1andr9 and the silver platter
cases, which · involved no second round of violations by the
sovereign jurisdiction seeking to use the evidence, as did
Sily~~!bQrn~.

This also renders irrelevant United States v.

§perwin, 539 F.2d 1 (CA 9 1976).
Judge Wilkey's

~alandra

point really turns on his

conclusion that there was no separate
by Brick.

~ourth

Amendment violation

That question, in turn, hinges on the scope of the

safekeeping order and Brick's cooperation with Ratliff.
questions were considered above.

Tho se

As noted above, Judge

Leventhal's conclusion that they are matters for further proof
seems reasonable.

(Note, too, that the SG, who made an argumen t

similar to Judge Wilkey's in the cert petn, now raises the issu e
,· 'I:'J•,,t ''/

only in a footnote.

Br. at 38 n. 2.

This is because respondent s

1\

allege that there was more than a merely passive "takeover" of
documents from the state.

u.s.

Compare Dombrowski v.

Eastl9~Q,

387

at 84.)
In sum, Judge Leventhal seems to have the better of tbe

argument.

Respondents do seem to have alleged facts that - if

proven without resort to legislative acts - could suffice to
strip away the immunity under present Speech or Debate doctrine.

23 .
To deprive them of their opportunity to prove their allegations
because of that immunity would be Catch-22.

IV
JUDGE DANAHER'S OPINION
Quite frankly, I cannot quite figure •ut what Judge
Danaher is talking about.

He seems to be saying that there is

absolute official immunity for congressional investigations apart
from the Speech or Debate Clause, but the source of that immunity
is none too clear.

He appears to rely on Imbler, but

JmbJf-~,

of

course, left the question of absolute immunity for investigation
activity open.

No one advances Judge

~anaher~s

position here.
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:
RE:

Bob

DATE:

3/2/78

McClellan v. McSurely, No. 76-1621

I continue to believe that Judge Leventhal's
resolution of this case was more reasonable.

I can offer

no controlling considerations leading to this conclusion,
but I think it follows from the procedural posture of this
case.
Judge Leventhal does not purport to resolve the
issue as to whether there was a Fourth Amendment
violation.

He merely says that the

lo~

Dombrowski

2.

threshold of a more than colorable claim was passed, ana
that the question of violation vel non remains for retrial
or summary judgment.

c,,.,,·d~t'cll/,

~

7

Note that the panel of CA DC that

fn-o/

/_

the McSurelysAfor contempt of Congress

M

_1 ~ ..,

cone~ ~~~-

that there hao been a Fourth Amendment violation. Note,
~~~~~-~--~~~----~--------------too, that the Government has conceoeo for purposes of its
presentation to this Court that there was a Fourth
Amendment violation.
Judge Wilkey constructs his argument that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation largely from testimony
given in the three-judge court trial ana the contempt
proceeding.
yet.)

(There has been no testimony in this case as

Yet Judge Leventhal pointed out that the record o)

ana orders resulting

fro~

the three-judge court proceeding

were not even filed with the courts below by the parties.
Judge Wilkey obtained them after the oral argument en
bane.

Petn at 52a n.84.

Thus, the proposition that there

was no Fourth Amendment violation was not even briefed or
argued below.
Much of the testimony upon which Judge Wilkey
relies is, of course, that of the various defendants.

He

calls it undisputed, but the fact is that this litigation
has not reached a procedural stage in which Resps have
been called upon to dispute it.

They oio controvert the

tJ,wl- d,I-G

~~

~~
As ~...4~ ......

-19 ?Jf,tfo

3•

declarations in McClellan's affidavits to the effect that
neither he nor his aides participated in any conspiracy.
That was as far as the proceedings went below.

And they

also disagree with Judge Wilkey's (and the Government's)
assertions that Brick was a completely passive recipient
of the documents in question.

They argue -- as CADC found

in the contempt proceeding -- that he went to Pikeville as
part of a previously existing conspiracy with state
officials and took an active role in screening the
material, as well as in deciding to "violate" the
safekeeping order.
Resps' view.

Brick's testimony itself could support

Appendix 101-104.

It is possible to read the safekeeping order as
Judge Wilkey reads it, but that is an issue for proof.
Judge Wilkey seems to have taken it upon himself to put
Resps to their proof before Petrs did so.

Moreover, he

did it after they had an opportunity to rebut his
assertions.
As for the subsequent order of the three-judge
court denying Resps' motion for an injunction against the
Committee subpoena, it really does not speak to the
court's view of Brick's activities before issuance of the
subpoena.

Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,

421 U.S. 491 (1975), made it clear that the only way to

4.

resist a subpoena is by resisting a contempt charge.
Hence, the order connected with the subpoena could have
followed from the court's conclusion that regardless of
any prior illegal activities, no injunction could issue
against the subpoena.

We have only Judge Wilkey's

unlitigated arguments, constructed from evidence in other
proceedings, to establish the three-judge court's view of
the meaning of its own order and its response to Brick's
activities.

Resps should get a chance -- albeit it is a

very slim one -- to adduce evidence with respect to these
factual matters.
It is true that, in a sense, the testimony upon
which Judge Wilkey relies is "of record."

But its

significance in terms of the issues in ihis case has never
been litigated.

It seems a rather disorderly way to try a

case to have an appellate judge bring in pieces of
evidence from other proceedings and insist that plaintiffs
have been put to their proof, when in fact the litigation
has not reached the stage where even the defendants have
been able to make such a motion.
While there may be some additional expense
connected with forcing defendants to move again for
summary judgment, I cannot foresee any particular hazards
except those that ought to be imposed if justice is to be

5.

done.

That is, there is a danger that discovery will turn

up evidence that a conspiracy did exist, but if it did,
defendants rightfully will be held liable.
envision any other hazards.

I cannot

(Judge Leventhal was careful

to note that discovery was limited to areas not within
Speech or Debate immunity.)

As for the expense discovery

would entail, it is no greater than that faced by any
litigants who legitimately are subject to suit.
As a practical matter, I cannot believe that any
remaining discovery process would be protracted, or even
successful.

And there is no reason why the court below

could not set up an expedited summary judgment proceeding
to knock plaintiffs out of the box quickly.

I believe a

hint as to the use of such procedures is contained in your
approach to the Butz case.
In sum, disposition of this suit along Judge
Wilkey's lines does not seem to embrace an orderly -- or
even fair -- view of the presentation of a lawsuit.

lfp/ss

3/2/78

~·
•

76-1621 McClellan v. McSurely
(Preconference Notes
I cannot accept the SG's argument that the Speech
or Debate Clause (the Clause) affords absolute immunity for
deliberate constitutional violations outside of the
legislative process itself.

I therefore turn to what I view

as the real issue in this case:

whether the plaintiffs

(McSurelys) have stated a cause of action against the
defendants (McClellan and his aides).

I find Judge Wilkey's

opinion more persuasive on this issue than Judge Leventhal's.
It is important to bear in mind that the case is
not postured merely on the basis of complaint, answer and a
few supporting affidavits.

There are affidavits, testimony

of witnesses, and the record of the proceedings before a
three-judge District Court in Kentucky.
stipulation of the key facts.

There also is a

I see no issue for a jury on

a disputed fact that is material to my view of a correct
decision of the case.
1.

There has been no Fourth Amendment violation by

any of the defendants.
The complaint does allege such a violation.
the undisputed facts satisfy me to the contrary.
These defendants had nothing to do with the
initial, unlawful seizure of McSurely's documents.

But

2.

In the suit instituted by McSurelys in the federal
court (three-judge court in Kentucky, herein called the DC),
the Kentucky statute under which the documents were seized
was held to be invalid.

In addition, the court's order of

September 14, 1967, provided as follows:
" • • • All [records and documents] now in the
custody of [Ratcliff] . • • be held by him in
safekeeping until final disposition of this case by
appeal or otherwise."
It was not until after the judgment and order of
the DC that either Senator McClellan or his staff took any
action with respect to the documents.

Not until October did

Brick go to Kentucky, where he was then allowed by Ratcliff
to inspect and take photocopies back to Washington.
Ratcliff testified - without being disputed (as I understand
it) that he had "permission" from one of the federal judges
~

to allow Brick to have access to the documents (Pet. 63a).
On October 30, following a motion by McSurelys to
bar Senate subcommittee access to the document, the
three-judge court entered a further order (i) denying
McSurelys' request that the documents be delivered to them,
(ii) denying their motion for an injunction against the
release of these documents to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and (iii) providing, finally, as follows:
"The parties to this action and officers of
this Court are directed to cooeerate with the
Senate Committee in making ava1lable such of

3.

the materials, or copies thereof, as the Committee
considers pertinent to its inquiry: but until time
for appeal is expired, this will be done in such
manner as to keep intact those materials that may
be pertinent to the appeal of this case." (Pet.
64a-65a)
It defies all reason to suggest, in light of the
DC's order of October 30, that its prior order of September
14 imposed any duty on Ratcliff other than "safekeeping"
(certainly there was no order of "secrecy"), or that the
three federal judges who were intimately familiar with the
entire situation thought that Ratcliff had violated their
order.

It would be even more absurd to argue that these

judges thought Brick had violated the Fourth Amendment by
making copies of documents in the official custody of the
Commonwealth's Attorney of Pike County.
I agree with Judge Wilkey that wholly "new law"
would have to be made - without precedent or logic to
support it - to hold that "the transfer from one
investigative agency to another [of these documents] is a
'separate, independent search and seizure'".
In these circumstances, I would view it as a
substantial miscarriage of justice to put these defendants
to the expense and hazards of a trial of this frivolous
case.

To be sure, Judge Leventhal stated that following

discovery depositions, it would be open to defendants to
move again for summary judgment.

But the facts upon

4.

which I rely already are of record.

They frame the legal

question as to whether or not there was a Fourth Amendment
violation.

L.F.P., Jr.
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FROM:
RE:

Bob

~STICE ~OW~LL

DATE:

3/2/78

Final Salvo in McSurely, No. 76-1621

After re-reading Judge Leventhal's opinion and
puzzling over Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967),
last night, I think that I have been converted to your.
view as to the defendants other than Brick.

That is, with

the making of the summary judgment motion based on
immunity, it was incumbent upon the McSurelys to come
forward with some evidence of the other defendants'
involvement in the Fourth Amendment violations, aside from
mere information and belief.

2.

Judge Leventhal's view of Qombrowski, wh:i.ch I
have followed up to this point, seems to be that the
summary judgment motion as to }mmunity did not give rise
to any duty on the plaintiffs' part to adduce evidence as
to liabili!Y.

Thus, Judge Leventhal notes at Petn 45a

that the case has thus far revolved around the issue of
immunity, and that defendants are now free to make a
summary judgment claim as to the evidence of liability.
In Judge Leventhal's view, then, the mere allegation was
sufficient to survive the summary judgment motion because
the allegation went to liability and was not called into
question by the summary judgment motion on immunity.

See

also Petn at 5la-52a.
I puzzled over Dombfpwsk.!. for some time last
night, and I now believe that Judge Leventhal's apparent
view of that case is incorrect.

From all that appears in

Dombrowski, the summary judgment motion there also went
only to immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause.
Nevertheless, the Court reached the issue of the amount of
evidence tying Eastland into the alleged Fourth Amendment
violation.

It appears to have done so, not because there

had been a questlon on summary judgment as to liabillli,
but because Eastland's im!f1unity could not be lifted unless
there was a plausible allegation that he had participated
in the use of unlawful means to gather information.

This

3.

explains why, in discussing Eastland's involvement, the
Court reverted to discussion of the scope of Speech or
Debate immunity, rather than dweJ l i.ng on the usual summary
judgment considertions of material dispute, etc.
If the issues of immunity and liability do
converge to this extent, then Judge Leventhal's belief
that the motion grounded on immunity did not raise the
issue of the substantiality of plaintiffs' claim of
McClellan's involvement was incorrect.

When McClellan

filed his mot.ion and affidavlt denying the conspiracy and
rai.sing the immunity issue, it was incumbent upon the
McSurelys to respond with more than a mere allegation of
involvement in the use of unlawful means;

otherwise, the

claim of Speech or Debate immunity -- which obviously was
squarely raised by the summary judgment motion -- would
have to prevail.

(I checked back over the record last

night, and it does not appear that plaintiffs filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment.

Thus, it would not be

possible to say that they themselves had put the
substantiality of their liability claims at issue.)
This is not Judge Wilkey's view of the case.

He

does not touch upon the correct reading of QQmbr2wski, but
seems instead to accept Judge Leventhal's.
confident, however, that my reading of

I am fairly

Dombro~ki

is

4.

correct, and the moreso because it 1.s supported by your
"judge's intuition" that the McSurelys' bare allegation is
not enough to keep the defendants other than Brick in the
case at this stage.

I still do not see a way to get Brick

out of the suit, however, except by pursuing Judge
Wilkey's approach.

And I adhere to the view that his

approach is incorrect.

TO:

LFP, Jr.

FROM:

Bob

DATE:

3/2/78

Attached is a copy of two pages from the three-judge
court opinion, McSurely v. Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky.
1967), which may bolster somewhat the surface plausibility of
the McSurelys' claim that the safekeeping order could be
read as a secrecy order.
The underlined passages suggest that the court was
vitally concerned with the chilling

effect ~{he

speech worked by the seizure of their documents.

McSurelys'
It could

plausibly be argued that any court so concerned about the
worked by
chilling effect/the initial seizure
would
believe that its order to "keep safe" entailed a duty to
refrain from showing the illegally seized stuff to other
governmemt agencies.

Moreover, as Judge Leventhal points out,

Ratliff himself must have thought some sort of perrnssion

was

necessary for release, since he attempted to obtain such
permission.

PETN at 50a.

(f~ a:f ?l~-S4.~ ~~~~)

And to repeat once again, CADC in the contempt case
interpreted the order exactly the way the McSurelys do in
this case.

Hence, I do not believe that this Court is

in a pos.tion, at this stage, to say that the McSurelys are out
of court.

All the arguments on that point have yet to be made.

It is true that the October 30 order was a public record,
but as I have indicated before, it does not necessarily undercut the McSurelys position.

More importantly, until Judge Wilkey

made it a point of contention, they were not aware that the time
had come to argue its significance.

lfp/ss
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
DATE:

March 9, 1978

FROM:

Bob

RE:

Proposed Per Curiam in McSurely, No. 76-1621

Attached is a very rough draft of the analysis
section of a proposed per curiam.

I thought it better not

to spend a lot of time fashioning the facts section until
we had decided if the opinion would work out.

I'm

submitting the analysis to you at this point to see if you
approve of the approach and to point out potential
problems with this disposition.
I think that II.A., the section dealing with the
Fourth Amendment violation, holds together pretty well.
Dombrowski is strong authority for dealing quite harshly
with unsupported allegations, even after virtually no
discovery.

It should be noted, however, that reaffirming

Dombrowski along these lines will make it virtually
impossible for a plaintiff ever to maintain a suit against
the Member or the staff in Washington.

As soon as the

action is filed, a motion for summary judgment can be
made, and plaintiff will be put to his proof.

Unless he

has the cooperation of a "whistle blower," it is hard to
see how, at that stage, he could adduce sufficient facts

2.

to hold defendants who were not out in the field actually
committing the violations.

Of course, since plaintiff

will be able to test the legality of the action -- and
recover any damages -- by suing the aide who was out in
the field, this result may not be undesirable.

The old

theory of the Speech or Debate Clause was that aides were
not immune, so that the legality of all action could be
tested by making the executing aide the "hostage of the
law."
To take the three Washington defendants out of
this case, it is also necessary to dispose of respondents'
claim that their documents were disseminated to the IRS.
This issue is covered in II.B., and there are more serious
problems with respect to it.

All ten judges of the Court

of Appeals agreed that this claim could go back to the
District Court, so that even following Judge Wilkey's
approach would not avail us anything in this regard.

He

spoke only to the Fourth Amendment claims, and we really
have no problem there, as indicated above.
I've tried to use the Dombrowski approach for the
dissemination claim, and it works on the surface.

If you

stop to think about it for a minute, however, it is not as
tight as the Fourth Amendment analysis.

The point is

supposed to be that if the plaintiffs cannot come forward

3•

with some evidence linking a particular defendant to the
alleged wrongdoing, the immunity is not lifted as to that
defendant, and he is not exposed to the burdens of the
litigation.

(Thus, since there are no facts linking

McClellan to the alleged Fourth Amendment violation in
Pikeville, legslative immunity precludes taking his
deposition--forgetting for the moment that he is dead.)
Hence, summary judgment must be granted.
The problem with applying this analysis to the
dissemination claim is that respondents could take
potentially fruitful discovery (of IRS) without having to
depose the defendants, who are covered by the immunity.
There are a few answers to this point.

First, since on

the strength of the facts as they stood before the
District Court (where the respondents had not yet
discovered the IRS connection) , summary judgment should
have been granted anyway.

But it seems quite harsh to

hold this Court's direction of summary judgment
retroactive to the time of the District Court hearing and
to treat the record as though only the facts known at that
time appeared in it.
Second, one could say that respondents should
have instituted a separate Freedom of Information Act
proceeding to see whether the IRS had any of their

4.

Pikeville documents in its files.

It seems a bit unusual,

however, to set up a Freedom of Information

Ac~

suit as a

substitute for discovery.
Finally, one could say that even permitting
discovery to go forward as to non-immune persons, i.e.,
the IRS, is a burden of litigation -- further expense,
delay, etc. -- that the immune parties should not have to
bear unless there is some evidence in the record tying
them into the alleged violation at this point.

y

This seems

to be the most promising view, but for some reason it did
not occur to any of the judges below.

They apparently

believed that there was enough on this claim to let the
case go on just a bit longer.

And to hold that a summary

judgment motion cuts off the right to depose or

-

--

interrogate non-immune persons means that the plaintiff

....

will have to do all his investigation and collect all his
affidavits before filing his complaint.

If he cannot find

individuals who will cooperate without the compulsion of
the discovery rules, he will never be able to pierce the
immunity of the defendants.

If you conclude that it is

not a bad result for only the man in the field to be held
accountable for any violations, this may not seem a bad
result.

lfp/ss
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March 9, 1978

No. 76-1621 McSurley

This memo will comment on your draft of March 8,
of the "analysis section" of a proposed opinion.

I agree

enthusiastically that II.A. "holds together pretty well".
I will comment below on II.B.
First, some general comments and suggestions.
Now that we are reasonably confident (I am quite
clear) that the analysis in II.A., relying on Dombrowski,
is sound, I would like to expand the rough draft into a
memorandum.

I would like the memorandum to be written in a

form that could readily be converted into a Court opinion.
As I was the only Justice who advanced the Dombrowski
resolution of this case, I have no great optimism that we
will win a Court.

But there was no Court for any other

resolution, and I would like to try to educate my Brothers.
The loose talk of a two or three page PC simply
will not wash, so far as I am concerned.
Thus, let us proceed with a draft along the
following lines:
I.

The facts and proceedings below, stated with

appropriate conciseness.

2.

II.

Address, and d i spatch, the SG's claim to

immunity even for deliberate unconstitutional conduct.
This section of the memorandum need not be over two or
three paragraphs, but it should be crisp and explicit with appropriate citations.

I would introduce the

paragraph with a quotation from the SG's brief that shows
how extreme his position really is.

This should be

buttressed by a footnote quoting one of more of
Easterbrook's statements in oral argument.
To be sure, responding to this outlandish argument
is almost like kicking a baby.
III.

But this baby deserves it!

This can be your present II.A., subject to

these observations:

~In

jL

view of the heavy reliance on Dombrowski,

if there is any quotable language from the opinion that can
be added to the present discussion, it might be helpful.

I

have not reread Dombrowski, but I do recall that it is not
exactly expansively written.

~ In

United States Servicemen's Fund we held,

as you note, that a facially proper subpoena is an
indispensable part of

leg ~ating.
A

My recollection is that

McClelland's affidavit makes clear that the subpoenas he
authorized in this case were facially proper.

Indeed, I

think this was recognized by the Court of Appeals.

Perhaps

it would be helpful to include, in a note, recognition of

3.

what the record shows with respect to the propriety of the
subpoenas.
(iii)

Similarly, on page 4, in the final

paragraph of II.A., concluding that the three Washington
defendants should have been dismissed, do you think our
memorandum would be more persuasive if we quoted - in the
text or a note - from McClelland's affidavit and from
respondent's answering affidavit.

If we do this in a note

(which I am inclined to favor) I also would like to repeat
the concession by counsel for respondents that the only
answer he had was "on information and belief", with a cross
reference to note 3.

~With

respect to whether there was a Fourth

Amendment violation by Brick, the draft refers to what a

pane~~1tA~said about
" equal billing to
should give

different

Brick's activity.

We

also

what the three-judge

court said on October 30 that several of us at the
Conference (Chief Justice, Stewart, Rehnquist and I) think
only can be read as exonerating Brick.

In other words, I

would like to give Brick a "fair shake" on this issue,
especially since I would accept the three-judge court's
view as to what was intended by its September 14 order
rather than that of CADC several years later.

4.

IV.

I am inclined to leave the IRS claim in the

case, provided we can do so without weakening the holding
as to the washington defendants.

There is a difference

between interrogating nonimmune persons and interrogating
Senators and their aides, but I think we should make this

"

quite clear.

Although I am inclined to doubt that there is

substance to the IRS claim, I do view it differently from
the main claim.

L.F.P., Jr.
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MEMO~NDU~

FOR MR . JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

Bob

RE:

Proposed Per Curiam in

DATE:

March 9, 1978

~cSur~.!Y,

No. 76-1621

Attached is a very rough draft of the analysis
section of a proposed per curiam.

I thought it better not

to spend a lot of time fashioning the facts section until
we had decided if the opinion would work out.

I'm

submitting the analysis to you at this point to see if you
approve of the approach and to point out potential
problems with this disposition .
I think

t~at

II.A., the section dealing with the

Fourth Amendment violation, holds together pretty well.
Dombrowski is - strong authority for dealing quite harshly
with unsupported allegations, even after virtually no
discovery.

It should be noted, however, that reaffirming

Dombrowski along these lines will make it virtually
impossible for a plaintiff ever to maintain a suit against
the Member or the staff in Washlngton.

As soon as the

action is filed, a motion for summary judgment can be
made, and plaintiff will be put to his proof.

Unless he

has the cooperation of a "whistle blower," it is hard to
see how, at that stage, he could adduce sufficient facts

...·•

2.

to hold defendants who were not out in the field actually
committing the violations.

Of course, since plaintiff

will be able to test the legality of the action -- and
recover any damages -- by suing the aide who was out in
the field, this result may not be undesirable.

The old

theory of the Speech or Debate Clause was that aides were
not immune, so that the legality of all action could be
tested by making the executing aide the "hostage of the
law."
To take the three Washington defendants out of
this case, it is aJ.so necessary to dispose of respondents'
claim that their documents were disseminated to the IRS.
This issue is covered in II.B., and there are more serious
problems with respect to it.

All ten judges of the Court

of Appeals agreed , that this claim could go back to the
District Court, so that even following Judge Wilkey's
approach would not avail us anything in this regard.

He

spoke only to the Fourth Amendment claims, and we really
have no problem there, as indicated above.
I've tried to use the Dombrowsk.!. approach for the
dissemination claim, and it works on the surface.

If you

stop to think about it for a minute, however, it is not as
tight as the Fourth Amendment analysis.

The point is

supposed to be that if the plaintiffs cannot come forward

3.

with some evidence linking a particular defendant to the
alleged wrongdoing, the immunity is not lifted as to that
defendant, and he is not exposed to the burdens of the
litigation.

(Thus, since there are no facts linking

McClellan to the alleged Fourth Amendment violation in
Pikeville, legslative immunity precludes taking his
deposition--forgetting for the moment that he is dead.)
Hence, summary judgment must be granted.
The problem with applying this analysis to the
dissemination claim is that respondents could take
potentially fruitful discovery (of IRS) without having to
depose the defendants, who are covered by the immunity.
There are a few answers to this point.

First, since on

the strength of the facts as they stood before the
District Court (where the respondents had not yet
discovered the IRS connection) , summary judgment should
have been granted anyway.

But it seems quite harsh to

hold this Court's direction of summary judgment
retroactive to the time of the District Court hearing and
to treat the record as though only the facts known at that
time appeared in it.
Second, one could say that respondents should
have instituted a separate Freedom of Information Act
proceeding to see whether the IRS had any of their

"

4.

Pikeville documents in its files.

It seems a bit unusual,

however, to set up a Freedom of Information Act suit as a
substitute for discovery.
Finally, one could say that even permitting
discovery to go forward as to non-immune persons, i.e.,
the IRS, is a burden of litigation -- further expense,
delay, etc. -- that the immune parties should not have to
bear unless there is some evidence in the record tying
them into the alleged violation at this point.

This seems

to be the most promi.sing view, but for some reason it did
not occur to any of the judges below.

They apparently

believed that there was enough on this claim to let the
case go on just a bit longer.

And to hold that a summary

judgment motion cuts off the right to depose or
interrogate non-immune persons means that the plaintiff
will have to do all his investigation and collect all his
affidavits before filing his complaint.

If he cannot find

individuals who will cooperate without the compulsion of
the discovery rules, he will never be able to pierce the
immunity of the defendants.

If you conclude that it is

not a bad result for only the man in the field to be held
accountable for any violations, this may not seem a bad
result.
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
FROM:
RE:

Bob

DATE:

March 14, 1978

First Draft in McSurely, No. 76-1621

Attached is a first draft in this case.

I tried

to follow through on the various points we discussed.
There were two major exceptions.
First, a more detailed look at the record made it
even harder than ever to give Judge Wilkey's view of the
October 30, 1967 order a "fair shake."

On this record it

appears that at the time of that order, the three-judge
court was not even aware

nor were the McSurelys -- of

the extent of Brick's activities in inspecting and
transporting the documents.

Thus, the order cannot be

read as a retroactive ratification of Brick's actions.
This does not mean, as the draft points out in various
places, that there was a Fourth Amendment violation.

It

means only that it would be premature to jump aboard Judge
Wilkey's band wagon.
Second, I was unable to write the dissemination
point so as to keep that claim alive as to the Washington
defendants, while not undercutting the grant of summary
judgment in their favor on the Fourth Amendment claim.

It

is true that respondents could verify their dissemination

2

claims without deposing immune parties, but it's at least
conceivable that they could do that on the other claim,
too.

Moreover, if we are going to look at the record in

as harsh a manner as we did on the Fourth Amendment claim,
footnote 22 should end the ball game.
While ruminating about this problem, however, it
occurred to me that there was a genuine question whether
the Court of Appeals even had the issue properly before
it.

It certainly is not clear from reading the Leventhal

opinion.

Therefore, I decided to try writing this section

to follow the Government's suggestion of a vacate and
remand as to the dissemination claim.

That approach seems

to get us out of the hole, if you agree that there is some
doubt as to whether the Court of Appeals regarded the
issue as actually before it.

If you do not, we can go

back to the original version I gave you last week.
I gather from talking to clerks that other
Chambers think we are in the process of writing a DIG
memo.

They're certainly in for a surprise.
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MEMJRANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
FROM:
RE:

DATE:

BOB

March 22, 1978

McAdams v. McSurely, No. 76-1621

Jim has finished his edit of the Chambers Draft in this
case.

Attached is a marked-up copy containing both Jim's

changes and mine.

Also attached is the copy that Jim marked

up.
I feel considerably better about this piece now that
Jim has gone over it and agrees that our handling of the
-l'

I\

dissemination claim is above board.
that most concerned me, as you know.

That was the section
After Jim's thorough

r .

delving into the opinions below and the record, I am now
confident that

we

have dealt fairly with CADC.

1st DRAFI'

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'lES
No. 76-1621
Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States
of the Estate of John L. McClellan,
et al., Petitioners,
Court of Appeals for
v.
the District of Co·
Alan McSurely et ux.
lumbia Circuit.
·[March -, 1978]
Memorandum to the Conference from Ma. JusTICE PowELL.
I
In 1967, Alan and Margaret McSurely were field organizers
for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., in Pi~e
County, Ky. Alan McSurely also had served as a field organizer for the National Conference of New Politics and
distributed litera.t ure for Vietnam Summer. On the night of
August 11, 1967, under authority of a warrant charging seditious activities against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and
the United States in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 432.040
(1g.,.._), Pike County officials arrested the McSurelys and
seized a quantity of books, pamphlets, and letters found in
their home. Shortly after the raid, Thomas Ratliff, Commonwealth Attorney for Pike County, announced publicly that the
seized material would be made available to any Congressional
Committees interested in the McSurelys.
On September 14, 1967. a three-judge District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, one judge dissenting, declared
the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional on its face and
enjoined state prosecution of the McSurelys. M cSurely v.
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 1967). The court ordered
that all th~ e_ei~~d materi(l-1 "be h~ld by [Ratliff] in safekeeping;

I
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until final disposition of this case by appeal or otherwise."
App. 78.
Soon after issuance of the District Court's order, Ratliff
received a telephone call from Lavern Duffy, Assistant Counsel
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations. · The Subcommittee, which was headed by Senator McClellan, was investigating the causes of various riot.~ across the Nation, including
one that had occurred in· Nashville, Tennessee, in April 1967.
Some of the Subcommittee's information showed that the
organizations with which the McSurelys were affiliated might
have been involved in the Nashville riot. Hence, Duffy
asked Ratliff whether the materials seized from the McSurelys
were in his custody. Ratliff replied that they were, and on
October 8, 1967, a Subcommittee investigator, John Brick,
arrived in Pikeville, the county seat.
That same evening Tha.deus Scott, a Commonwealth detective, visited Brick's motel room and gave "Brick photocopies
of 234 of the seized documents. The next morning, Brick
spent an hour examining the originals in a ·locked room at the
Pike County courthouse. Apparently, Ratliff tried to reach
the members of the three-judge court before permitting Brick
to enter the locked room. He succeeded in reaching the dis.senting member of the court, but what transpired is not clear. 1
Brick also visited the Clerk of the District Court, who
allowed him to inspect the case file of the McSurelys' threejudge court action. Brick arranged to have the Clerk send
1 At the McSurelys' subsequent trial for contempt of Congress, see n. 5,
infra, Ratliff testified that "I had my permission" before he allowed Brick
access to the stored materials. DefPndants' AppPndix 407, United States
v. McSurely , Nos. 24,812, 24,813 (DC 1971) . The implication of this
statement was that the dissenting judge gave "permission," but that is not
· clear. Moreover, the scope of any permission remains unexplained . Ratliff
conceded that he had not communicated with the cocustodian of the
materials, United States Marshal Archie Kraft., before permitting Brick to
inspect the materials. Id ., at 407-408.

{I
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him a copy of the court's safekeeping order and the inventory
of seized items. On October 12, 1967, Brick again entered the
locked room at the county courthouse and spent four hours
taking notes on the materials. He then returned to Washington, taking with him the 234 copies that Scott had given him.
This material included one personal letter addressed to Mrs.
McSurely, which concededly had no relevance to Brick's investigation. At Senator McClellan's direction, Brick prepared
subpoenas duces tecum for some of the mate·rial in Ratliff's
possession that Senator McClellan concluded would be relevant to the investigation of the Nashville riot.
The McSurelys moved before the three-judge court to
prevent Ratliff from releasing the subpoenaed materials.2 On
October 30, 1967, the court denied the motion and directed the
parties to cooperate with the Subcommittee. 3 Further litigation ensued,4 culminating in an order of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in July 1968, holding that since the time
for appeal from the judgment of the District Court striking
2 The McSurelys did not premise their opposition to the subpoenas upon
any alleg'edly unlawful activity on Brick's pa.rt in inspecting and transporting the documents. Indeed, they testified that they did not even become
aware of Brick's actual role until December 5, 1967. Id., at 655-656,
681-682, 704-705, 707-709.
3 That order read in part as follows:
"The parties to tills action and the officers of this Court are directed to
cooperate with the Senate Committee in making available such of the
materia.!s, or copies thereof, as the Committee considers pertinent to its
inquiry; but until time for appeal is expi11ed, this will be done in such
manner as to keep intact those materials that may be pertinent to the
appeal of this case."
I cannot sa.y whether this may be read as a retroactive ratification of
Brick's inspection and transportation activities. There is nothing in the
record before us to indicate that the three-judge court was apprised of
those activities. See 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 117 n. 59, 553 F. 2d, at
1293 n. 59.
4 For a synopsis of that litigation's course, see the opinion below of
Judge Wilkey, id., at 132-133, 553 F. 2d, at 1308-1309.
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down the sedjtion statute had expired. there was no basis for
continued court custody. The court ordered the seized materials returned to the McSurelys. McSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F. 2d
817 (CA6 1968). and noted that questions as to the validity of
the subpoenas still were open. According to Brick, the Sub·
committee's photocopies were returned to Detective Scott on
August 14, 1968. The originals and copies were returned to
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968. Upon receipt of these
materials. the McSurelys were served with new subpoenas.
On March 4. 1969, McSurPlys appeared before the Sub.
committee and refused to comply with the subpoenas. Their
refusal resulted in a conviction for contempt of Congress,~ but
in December 1972. the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the subpoenas were
the fruit of two Fourth Amendment violations: (i) the original
seizure by Kentucky officials. and ( ii) Brick's "unauthorized
search and inspection of the documents" in violation of the
three-judge court's safekeeping order. United States v.
McSurely, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 154-155, 473 F. 2d 1178,
1191-1192 (1972).
On the same day that they appeared before the Subcommittee, the McSurelys filed this action," alleging that Senator
McClellan. Brick. Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's
General Counsel). Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's
Chief Counsel). and individual Members of the Subcommittee
had conspired to violate the McSurelys' constitutional rights.
They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $50,000
damages from ea.ch defendant. The action was stayed to permit the contempt trial to proceed. McSurely v. McClellan,.
138 U.S. App. D. C. 187. 426 F. 2d 664 (1970). In Septem5The variom: testimony refPrred to in thi~;
was given at the·
contempt, trial. See. e. g.. n. 1, supra.
6 Listed with the i\IeSurel~·s as plaintiff,: in this initial complaint werethree :u;sociat.iom: with which they were connected: the Southern Conference
Educational Fund, the Southern Stud"ent Organizing Committee, and the·
StW"flent-:; fQI' it Democr.atjc Society.
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her 1971, while the appeal of their contempt conviction was
pending, the McSurelys filed an amended complaint, naming
Ratliff, McClellan, Brick, Adlerman, and O'Donnell as defendants. The amended compl&int alleged in essence that the
federal defendants had conspired with Ratliff to carry out an
illegal raid in 1967, and to inspect, tran,sport. and use the seized
materials in violation of the McSurelys' constitutional and
other rights. On October 26, 1971, petitioners moved to
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the
basis of legislative immunity, failure to state a claim, and
collateral estoppel by virtue of the contempt conviction. 7 The
motion was denied and petitioners appealed. 8
In 1974, while petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, respondents obtained
documents thought by them to indicate that the Subcommittee
Ratliff did not join this motion.
Normally the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not. appealable because it is not a final decision for purposes of § 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
See genera.lly 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 56.21 [2], at 56-1275 to
56-1286 (2d ed. 1976). The Court of Appeals, however, adopted the
reasoning of the panel opinion, wl1ich held that this particular denia.I had
"sufficient indicia of finality," 172 U . S. App. D. C. 364, 371, 521 F. 2d
1024, 1031, quoting 81'own Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 308
(1962), to qualify as appealable, even t.hough it was not a decision that
ended the action. The panel observed that. the Speech or Debate Clause,
upon which the summary judgment motion was focused, protects Members
of Congress and their aides from the burdens of defending themselves as
well as from the consequences of the litigation. 172 U.S. App. D. C., a.t 372,
521 F. 2d, a.t 1032, citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 (1967).
Reasoning that the asserted right to be free of the burdens of a la.wsuit
would be irretrievably lost if the case proceeded to trial, the panel concluded that an appeal from the final judgment would come too late to pro-·
vite meaningful review of that claim. Hence, as to the assertion. of immunit.y from inquiry, the denial of summary judgment. was held a "final
decision" for purposes of § 1291. 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 372, 521 F.
2d, a.t 1032. Neither side challenges tha.t analysis here, and I see no reason
to depart from it. See also Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
(1949);.
7

8

,r

76-1621-MEMO
McADAMS v. McSURELY

had established an information-sharing relationship with the
Internal Revenue Service. These documents were lodged with
the Court of Appeals, together with affidavits suggesting that
petitioners might have exhibited the allegedly wrongfully
seized materials to agents of the Internal Revenue Service.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, en bane, a.ffirmed in part,
reversed in part, and rema.nded. 9 Judge Leventhal wrote for
himself and four others, as did Judge Wilkey. Senior Judge
Danaher, who had sat on the panel, joined Judge Wilkey's
opinion, but wrote a separate opinion as well. The court
unanimously reversed the refusal to dismiss that part of the
complaint relating to the original seizure of the McSurelys'
materials by Kentucky authorities. The court also agreed
unanimously that summary judgment should have been
granted as to the portion of the complaint charging unlawful
use of the material within Congress itself. 180 U. S. App.
D. C. 101, 104, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (1976). Respondents do
not dispute those actions here.
·The Court of Appeals, again unanimously, affirmed what it
designated as the denial of summary judgment as to those
portions of the complaint alleging dissemination of the material outside of Congress. lbid. 10 By an evenly divided vote,
9 While the case was in the Comt of Appeals, Brick and Adlerman died.
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 104 n. 1, 553 F . 2d, at 1280 n. 1. The Court of
Appeals did not decide whether the act.ions against them survived, leaving
that. issue for the Dist.rict Court on, remand. In August 1977, respondent
moved in the District Court to substitute the survivors or estates for Brick
and Adlerman. Petitioners oppose that motion, arguing that respondents'
delay caused· the action to abate. They nevertheless named Brick and
Adlerman as pet.itioners in case this oppoSition should fa.il. See Fed. Rule
App. Proc. 43 (a.). We need not pass on the questions e.ither of survival or
aba.t.ement of the a.etions.
Sena.tor McClellan died while the case was pending before this Court.
His executor was substituted under Rule 48 ( 1) of this Court.
10 Judge Leventhal's opinion and the short per curiam opinion stating
the judgment both indicated that the dissemination claim was to proceed
\tpon ter.mmd. Judge Wilkey's opinion agreed with that disposition_
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it affirmed the denial of summary judgmen.t on the allegations
that Brick had violated the McSurelys' rights by inspecting
the documents subject to the safekeeping order and transporting copies back to Washington. 11 Judge Leventhal, writing
for himself and four others, concluded that the allegations
and facts of record stated Fourth Amendment and invasion
of privacy claims. Judge Wilkey, writing for the other five
members of the court, disagreed and would have reversed and
remanded only in the allegation of dissemination outside of
Congress. Judge Danaher would have ordered the case dismissed on the basis of official immunity. We granted certiorari. -U.S.- (1977).
II

A
In this Court, petitioners have chosen to rely principally
Although Judge Danaher joined .Judge Wilkey's opinion, his sepa.ra.te opinion seems to call for a different resolution of the dissemination claim, since
he would have directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint. entirely,
on the basis of official immunity.
11 All 10 judges below appear to ha.ve agreed that the McSurelys alleged
seven categories of wrongdoing:
"(1) The unlawful search and seizure of the McSurelys' books and
papers by Kentucky authorities;
"(2) the inspection by Brick of those unlawfully seized materials;
"(3) the transport. by Brick of copies of 234 documents to Washington;
" ( 4) the inspection of some or all of the::;c> 234 copies by the staff of the
Subcommittee;
"(5) the usc of the copies, as the basis for issuance of subpoenas for some
of the documents ;
"(6) the procurement of Contempt of Congre8.s citations against. the
plaintiffs by consciously withholding from the Senate the facts relating to
the challengc>d subpoenas;
"(7) the dissemination of ::;orne> or all of the 234 copies obtained by Brick
to persons or agencies outside of the Subcommittee--particularly the
Internal Revenue Sc>rvice." 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 108, 553 F. 2d, at
1285 (footnote omited) .
At issue here :ue allegations (2), (3), and (7).
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upon an argument that was rejected by all 10 judges of the
Court of Appeals. They contend that the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause extends "to [the use of] unlawfui
means to achieve legitimate objectives." 12 In their view,
unlawful activities carried out in the course of an otherwise
legitimate investigation should be completely cloaked by a
legislative immunity tha.t "precludes judicial inquiry even into
conduct that would be illegal or unconstitutional if performed
by private persons." u Indeed, for purposes of this argument,
petitioners concede tha,t Brick's conduct was "a violation of
the Fourth Amendment." 14 They insist, however, that legis-lative immunity from suit is meaningful only when a Member
or a legislative aid is alleged to have engaged in conduct that
would be actionable if engaged in by a private citizen. since
an "immunity that would protect only when no wrong was
alleged to have been committed would be no immunity at
all." 15
While this extreme position may have some superficial plausibility, its logic would lead to acceptance of untrammeled
legislative power-. 16 Moreover, it has been rejected by prior
12

Brief for Petitioner::; 15.

18

!d., at 14.

14

At oral argument, petitioners made their concession on this issue quite
explicit:
"QUESTION: Aren't ~·ou eoncrding for thr purpose of argument that
therr was wrongdoing'?
"MR. EASTEHBHOOK: Wr art' roncrding for thr purposes of this
argument that rBrick's activity] wn,: nctionable in ~;orne way.
"QUESTION: That.'~ what T thought..
"QUESTION: And nl~o a violation oft he Fourth Amrnclmrnt.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Yr~, we are conrrding for purpo~es of this
ttrgument." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See also id., at 29 .
15 Brief for Petitioner 15.
10 In petitioner::; ' view, legi,;lative immunity "probably" rxtends even to
tlrlibernte theft and murder, ~o long as the~· occm in the coun;-e of [(I
t'ongre~;;ional inve;:;tigation. This was made clear at oraJ a.rgument:
"MR. EAS'fEHJHWOK: ..••

l

l
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decisions of this Court. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387
U. S. 82 (1967), this Court squarely held. that legislative
immunity did not shield a congressional aide cha.rged with
violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amen,d ment rights in the,
course of an otherwise legitimate investigation. 17 Similarly,
"But essentially our :lpproach reHts on the contention that the immunity
is triggered by the purposes of the activity in which the Senator or the
Senate a.ide was engaged. We believe that this approach was consistent
with a11d indeed required by the considerations that led to the establishment
of the constitutional privilege.
"QUESTION: How far does tha.t. reasoning ta.k~ you? Let.'s say its
purposes were very clearly to aid the legislative process by aiding the
congressional committees, and in pursuance of that pristinely protected
purpose he simply burglarized n house and stole things out of a locked
drawer or srtfe. Is he protected under the Speech or Debate Clause for
that? I am talking now, by "he" I mean an aide to the committee.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Mr. Justice Stewart, that question raises a
number of complexities. My answer to it ultimately is, yes, probably he
is protected.
"QUESTION: Including murder, I suppose. Well, maybe not there.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: That, too falls within my yes, probably
answer, but I would likP, if I ca:n -this one, the an:;wer is not intuitively
appealing, I must concede." Tr. of OraJ Arg. 14-15. See aJso id., at 16-17.
17 Petitioners attempt to distinguish Dombrowski on the ground that
the congressional aide involved in tha.t case was n.ot enga.ged in investiga"
tive activity on behrtlf of Congress. They argue tha.t he merely "conspired with state officials to plan and carry out a. raid to gain evidence
for use in a sta.te prosecution." 'Brief for Betitioners, at 29·. In their
view, summa.ry judgmPnt in his favor was reversed simply because the
Speech or Debate Clause furnishes no prqtection to activities not. ca.rried
out in t.he course of a, congressional investigation. Petitioners' characterization, of the facts in that. case is erroneous. As we observed in Gravel v.
United States, 408 U. S. 606, 620 (1972), the aide in Dombrowski "was
gathering information for a hearing." Moreover, the record in, Dombrowski makes clea.r that the aide traveled to Louisiana at the behest of
Senator Eastland · and in pursuance of the investigative functions of a
Senate Subcommittee. Record in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0 . T. 1966,
No. 118, pp. 35, 40-41, 87, 91-94.
Dombrowski can be read a:; suggesting that the scope of legislative
immunity for a.icles i::; narrower than that for the Member. 387 U. S., at 85.
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our decision in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 628629 ( 1972) , held that the Speech or Debate Cla.use did not
immunize an aide from grand jury questioning concerning pos~
sible criminal conduct in the course of Senate information~
gathering activity. As we declared in Gravel, "no prior case
[has] held tha.t Members of Congress would be immune if
they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a
hearing, themselvee sei~ed the property or invaded the privacy
of a citize~. Such a.cts are no more essential to legisla.ting
than the [conspiracy] held unprotected in United States v.
Johnson, 383 U. S; 169 (1966)." Gravel, supra, at 621 (foo~
note omitted). Conduct in the course of informal investiga~
tive activity simplY'<Jbes not fall within the Speech orl5ehate
Cia.use if it clearly exceeds the lawful powers of Congress.
Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) . is not to the contrary. There the
Court addressed the "power to investigate and to do so through
compulsory process." !d., at 504 (emphasis added). We
refused to recognize an action to enjoin implementation of a
facially proper subpoena, holding the subpoena "an indispen~
sa.ble ingredient of lawmaking," "8 id., at 505. We had no
This suggestion , howevE'r, was laid to rest in Gravel v. United States, 408
U. S. 606 (1972) , which held "that the Speech or Debate Clause applies
not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as t he conduct of the
latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member
himself." Jd. , at 618. Our decision in Eastland v. United Stat es Servicemen's F-und, 421 U . S. 491, 502 (1975) , viewed the distinction in
Dombrowski between Member and aide not as one deriving from a
difference in the scope of their legislative immunities, but as one relating
to the activities in which they were alleged to have engaged by the
complaint.
18 In this case the Court of Appeals reversed the denia1 of summary
judgment as to the cla.ims relating to the issuance of subpoenas:
1
' The Subcommittee here employed proper process for information 'on
which " le~isla.tion could be had ." ' We note t hat t he subpoenas called for·
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occasion, however, to consider the effect of lawless activity in
the course of informal investigative conduct. Such activity
simply is not a part of "thB due functioning of the [legislative]
process." United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516
(1972) (emphasis in original).
In arguing that an immunity which evaporates with the
allegation of actionable conduct is no immunity at all, petitioners misapprehend the sweep of our prior decisions dealing
with investiga.tive activity. When Congress employs facially
proper means of information-gathering-such as the subpoena
in Servicemen's Fund-the Speech or Debate Clause precludes
both inquiry into legislative motive and lawsuits for damages
resulting from the investigation. But when Members of
Congress or their aides resort instead to crfrcii;a"I or oth,.W'wise
unlawful methods of obtaining informa.tion, they exceed the
power duly vested in Congress and can expect no condonation
by virtue on the Speech or Debate Clause. ·This ''focus on
means permits the court to afford relief 'without proof of a
legislative act.' " 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 112, 553 F. 2d, at
1288 (opinion of Leventhal. J.), quoting Gravel, 408 U. S., at
621. I therefore conclude that legislative immunity does not
shield a Member or his aide from being called to account for

tl,;

/

~~~-:tr

material,; that. were at l~ast arguably r~l~vant to it:; investigation, but did ~ A
not call for th~ production of Mr~. ~lcSur~ly',; l~tter or any other
demonstrably irrelevnnt privatP corr~spond~nc~ . Und~r thel;e circumstances Servicemen's Fund prrvrnts fnrthPr inquiry into plaintiff'~; charge
'tha.t the Subcommitter's purpose was to hara:;s and intimidatr them in the
exercise of their First Amendment. rights. Th~ Subcommittee's issuance of
subp~nas is privil~ged activity, notwithstanding plaintiff':; bare allegation
that the real purpose b~hind th~ subp~na;; was to 'cover-up' the earlier
improper conduct by Brick, and th~ further ~~~~rtion that had there b~en ""l~~~i!i
full disclosure the Subcommittee would not have i~,;ued th~ subpoenas, and ..
the Senate would not. have approved th<> contempt cita.tion." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 122, 553 F. 2d, at 1298 (footnotes omitted).
No question is raised here conceming the correctness of ihe Court of
~ppeals' judgment. on this is:;ue.

(~
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Fourth Amendment or other violations committed m the
course of their investigative work in the field. Dombrowski,
supra; cf., Gravel, supra.
B
Petitioners further contend that on the record in this case,
respondents' complaint should be dismissed because they have
not made the requisite showing of liability. It is clear that
when a defendant entitled to invoke Speech or Debate immunity moves for summary judgment on that basis, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to adduce evidence affording "more
than merely colorable substance" to allegations of actionable
conduct. Dombrowski·, 387 U. S., at 84. Otherwise, the
cloak of immunity is not lifted, and summary judgment must
be granted for defendant. This follows from the established
doctrine that Speech or Debate immunity protects Members
of Congress and their aides "not only from the consequences
of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending
themselves." !d., at 85. Since petitioners moved for summary judgment on the basis of the Speech or Debate Clause,
the courts below were required to determine whether the Dombrowski threshold-evidence affording "more than merely
colorable substance" to the allegations of unimmunized conduct-had been passed with respect to each defendant? 0
10 Respondents were put on notice quite explicitly that by making the
summary judgment. motion petitioners were calling upon them to adduce
some evidence tending to connect each defendant. to the alleged wrongdoing. The petitioners made that. point repeatedly at the hearing on the
summary jndgmf'Ilt motion. For example, counsel for petitioners declared
at ono point as follows :
" ... [P]art and pa.rtia.l rsic] of t.he defense of legislative immunity, is the
immunity of having to suffer the burden~; of extensive litigation.
"This is what. the Supreme Court held in Dombrowski against Eastland, . . . . And the only reason that Dombrowski against Eastland was
permitted to go into some discovery-and I under:stand that case has been
dismis;;ed for want of prosecution-the only reason was, there was on the

fI
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Respondents have satisfied the Dombrowski standard as to
allegations of Brick's misconduct. It is stipulated that Brick
inspected the documents subject to the safekeeping order in a
locked vault in Pikeville and that he transported copies of
selected ones to Washington. The court below divided evenly
as to whether, in light of the three-judge court's safekeeping
order, the stipulated facts state a claim under the Fourth
Amendment. On the present state of the record, however,
record a discrepancy of factual evidence. The documents seemed to show
some discrepancy about a date on some subpoena which lent some support
in argument, and the Supreme Olurt said , in view of this factual dispute,
we need to resolve it a little further before we can consider whether or not
legislative immunity is sufficient to protect [the Member's aide] ." Tr. of
Hearing Oct. 28, 1971, &t· 15-16.
More succinctly, counsel for petitioners stated:
1
' • • • I think the burden should be placed on the plaintiffs to come forward
with any evidence they may have to suggest and demonstrate that these
defendants were not acting within the scope of their legislative duties.
That would present an issue in which we were forewarned . That is the
function of the motion for summary judgment." /d., at 18.
Counsel for respondents indicated that he under&
tood the burden petitioners sought to cast upon him, although he disputed their right to do so:
"Now comes Mr. Goldbloom [counsel for petitioners] and says, prove to
me by facts disputing Senator McClelland's [sic] affidavit that it is not
true, before you can take depositions. How can I do that? And this is
what the trouble is with this whole posture. I am going to file an affidavit
which says he is wrong. I have to say it on information and belief. And
then he is going to come into court and say, it is just on information and
belief." /d., at. 43-44. See also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Oct. 26, 1971, at 3-4; Supplemental Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or
in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Nov. 23, 1971 , at 4--5; Reply
of Defendants McClellan, Adlerman, O'Donnell, and Brick to Plaintiffs'
Letter to the Court, Dated Sept. 12, 1972, Oct. 13, 1972, at 10.
Thus, there can be no question that respondents were on notice as to the
importance of adducing such evidence as they had with respect to eac.Q
defendant.
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there is no basis for concluding that respondents failed to
state a claim, if only for invasion of privacy. 20 Some of the
facts at issue in the dispute as to the validity of the Fourth
Amendment cla.im were obtained only after oral argument en
bane. 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 126 n. 84, 553 F. 2d, at 1302
n. 84. There has been no opportunity to weigh the various
characteriza.tions of Brick's activity or the meaning of the
three-judge court's safekeeping order. Moreover, the record
also contains testimony by Brick that he carried to Washing~
ton a copy of at least one document that he believed to be
of no relevance to the Subcommittee's investigation of the
riots. 21 Congress possesses no general power to investigate
2o At oral argument., counsel for petitioners acknowledged the possibility
that the complaint may state a. cause of action under state tort law:
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . . . There is the po._<:Sibility that under District of Columbia or Kentucky law there is a common-la.w tort lurking in
the background of this case. That's the reason why we elected not to
make strongly here any argumc,nts about the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, precisely because there may be allegations of other bases of
liability based on common la.w." Tr. of Oral Arg. 21.
2 1 Brick testified as follows:
"Q. Did you tell Mr. Dotson or any of the folk with whom you met
there that there was some of that stuff that you didn't. think tha.t you
needed?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Did you give it back to them?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you need that letter signed Dea.rest Cucumber or address
Dearest Cucumber?
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant.
"THE COURT: He may a.nswcr the question.
"THE WITNESS: No. Didn't you say signed Dearest Cucumber and
when in fact it says addressed to De::trest Cucumber.
"MR. STAVIS: No, I didn't.
"THE WITNESS: Was the question, did I need that letter? ·
"BY MR. STA VIS:
· "Q. Yes. For the performance of your duties.
"A. No sir.
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private affairs, even by subpoena; the subject of the inquiry
must always be one on which legislation could be had. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S., at 504 n. 15. Therefore, Brick's
copying and transportation of concededly irrelevant material
· is sufficient to lift legislative immunity for purposes of a summary judgment motion. Brick's testimony on that subject
ultimately may be explained away, or the inclusion of a single
irrelevant letter may be deemed de minimis. But his testimony, together with the other factors mentioned above,
is sufficient to carry respondents across the Dombrowski
threshold.
The posture of the other three federal defendants, however,
is decidedly different. The opinion of J~u.thaJ. noted
that although "plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement in
possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity
to permit trial to proceed as to him, the record is silent on

--

_,

_.)

"Q. As a ma,tter of fact, in respect to the performance of your duties,
you didn't need most of the items in tha,t list, did you'?
"A. Some of them. There were many others in the locked vault in
the Court House that I would have obtained under the subpoena.
''Q. That wha.t ?
"A. That I would have obtained under the subpoena had not the Subcommittee stopped all action when the defendants went into Court.
"Q. Did you-when I was asking my questions about this list of 234
items, there were lots of these items that you didn't need at all, correct?
"MR.. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant.
"THE COURT: I believe he has already answered the question.
"BY MR. BRESS:
''Q. Wlmt was your answer?
11
A. Some, yes.
1
'Q. Some that you did?
"A. It was"Q. Lots?
"A. I object to the use of the word lots.
"Q. A great many, a great many?
"A. Oh, I will say many. Let me explain. I didn't select any of these
ttii I told you." App. 101~102.
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the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and
O'DOili1el 1in a1ry activity that could result in lia~ility.' "
180 U. S. App."D. C., a.t 123, 553 F. 2d, at 1299, quoting Dombrowski, supra, at 84. I agree. In response to defendants'
summary judgment motion and Senator McClellan's affidavit
denying any conspiracy or activities outside the scope of legislative- activity, respondents could aver only on information
ana 5elief that the defendants joined in the conspiracy to drive
respondents out of Pikeville and exceeded the bounds of legislative activity. 22 Dombrowski teaches that mere allegations
are not enough. 28 There must be facts of record tending to
connect the defendant to the alleged misconduct. Having
found, properly, that the record was silent as to the involveSenator McClellan's affida.vit denied "any conspiracy, collaboration or
any other pnrticipation of any sort in the allegedly illegal police raid
allegedly planned and conducted by dE'fendan,t. Ratliff." App. 49. He also
denied that he or his aides had exceedoo t.he legisla.tive authority of the
Subcommittee. ld., at 50. While his affidavit contains no specific denja]
of a Fourth Amendment. violation by Brick with respect to the inspection
of documents in fikE'ville, the gE'nE'ral deninl of exceooing legislative autl)prity must be read as embra.ci~ JS"'5ihy fair to read the affidavit
that way,~ sihce' the specific theory of a separate. Fourt.h Amendment violation by Brick-t.hough supportable on the allegations of the amended'
complaint-a.pparently did not emerge clearly until the case reached the
Court of Appeals.
To this denial, respondE'nts could reply only "on information and belief
[that] the defendant· McClellan, together with defendants Adlerman,
O'DonneU, and Brick, joined in the conspiracy of the defendant Ratliff'
to force us out of Pikeville . . .. " App. 55-56. See also n. 19, supra.
Tnef also 'Contested McClellan's genE'ral denial of exceeding legislative·
authority, App. 56, but again no facts were adduced.
28 Nor may the involvemenJQft.he Member or some of his aides be·
inferred solely from the involvement of other aides. In Dombrowski, smn-·
mary judgment. for Sena.tm Eastland was upheld despit~ an allegation
conspiracy and the existence of facts linking his Subcommittee's chief
counsel to possible Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the mere fact
. that Brick may have engaged in conduct outside the l:!cope of legislative·:
~ i~~~-n.it:y does not suffice to link the other: defendants to that conduct,
22

of
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ment of McClellan, Adlerman , and O'Donnell in any activity
that could result in liability, it was the duty of the court
below to reverse the denial of their motion for summary
judgment.
I recognize that this standard imposes a not insubstantial
burden upon plaintiffs who seek to lift the veil of legislative
immunity. This is justified, however, by the purposes served
by the Speech or Debate Clause. As noted above, it is intended to protect Members of Congress and their aides from
"the burden of defending themselves a.gainst unsubstantiated
claims." Dombrowski, supra, at 85. Even where an injunc-.
tion is not sought, Members are forced "to divert their time,
energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend
the litigation." ld., at 503. Thus, the Clause requires that
motions founded on legislative immunity @ "be given the
most expeditious trea.t ment by district courts because one
branch of Government is being asked to halt the functiohs
of a coordinate branch." Servicemen's Fund, s~pra, at 511
n. 17.

III
I turn now to respondents' claim that petitioners made
available some of the seized materials to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). The Speech or Debate Clause does not
immunize the dissemination of allegedly actionable material
"beyond the reasonable bounds of the legisla.tive task." Doe
v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 315 (1973). Again, however, a
motion for summary judgment grounded on Speech or Debate
immunity requires a pla.intiff to adduce evidence lending
"more than merely colorable substance" to an assertion of
unlawful dissemination. Dombrowski, supra, at 84.
Respondents argue that they have carried this burden with
respect to their claim that petitioners exhibited to the IRS
the documents Brick obtained in Pikeville. In 1974, they
lodged with the Court of Appeals recently obtained material.
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establishing that the Subcommittee had permitted agents of
the IRS to inspect portions of the Subcommittee files. Specifically, respondents pointed to a letter of March 5, 1969/4
in which Renator McClellau informed the Secretary of the
Treasury that the Subcommittee had taken certain steps in
September 1968, toward arranging meetings with Intenfal
24

This letter reads as follows:
"UNITED S'l'A'l'ES SENA'l'E

Committee on
Government Operat.ions
Senate Permanent. Subcommittee
on Investiga.tions
Washington, D. C. 20510
March 5, 1969
"Dear Mr. Secreta.r y:
"In accordance with Execut.ive Order 11337, dated March 27, 1967, a
resolution was duly adopted by the Committee on Government Operations on September 18, 1968, with regard to the organizations listed on th~
attached pages. It. should oe nokd th~tt this request. was made on December 16, 1968, prior to the expiration of Executive Order 11337. This iS'
to reaffirm the same request. pursuant to Executive Order 11454 dated
February 7, 1969, and Treasury Decisionu133.
"Pursuant to this resolution, I hereby designate the following individuals, members of the Subcommittee i't<t.ff, to make such examinations: Mr·.
Philip R. Manuel, Mr. John E . Drass, Mr. Fred P. Miller, Mr. Perman
H. Clay, Mr. James H. Dillon, ::md Mr. Walter S. Fialkewicz. Il1 this·
connection, it will be appreciated if tho files could be assembled in the'
district office of jurisdiction. In order to facilitate the work of the staff;.
it would be further appreciated if the staff designeR.~ be permitt.cd to con•·
suit with Internal Revenue Agents and Auditors familiar with the contentt
· of the respective files.
"Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated.
"Sincerely yours,
John J . McClellan
Chairman
"Honorable David M. Ke1medy
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.'.'
A~p., at 70 ..
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Revenue agents for the purpose of exchanging information
about organizations under investigation. Respondents also
emphasized an IRS memorandum 25 showing August 28, 1968,
as the date on which the possibility of a cooperative relationship between Subcommittee and Service was first explored.
Respondents argue that these materials tend to establish that
the defendants exhibited to the Internal Revenue agents the
Pikeville documents, which were not returned to respondents
U.ntil November 8, 1968.26
2

~

The memorandum reads in pertinent. part as follows:
"FACT SHEET
EsTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL SERVICE STAFF

"Allegations have been made that the Internal Revenue Service established the Special Service Staff from instructions received from White
House officials. This simply is not tnte. The facts are these:
"August £8, 1968. Mr. Philip Manuel, an investigator with the Permanent Committee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government
Operations, contacted the Service to say that he had a group of seven
investigators working for him on mattrrs pertaining to certain organizations and other groups; that he had prepared a letter for the Chairman
of the Committee, Honorable John J. McClellan; and that he expected
the request to be signed shortly. His call was to alert us to the fact that
he wanted the Committee investigators to be permitted to discuss these
matters with our District officials rather than to conduct inspection of
returns in the National Office." App., at 73.
26 Although the documents were not returned to the McSurelys until
November, Brick testified that he returned the Subcommittee copies to
Kentucky authorities on August 14, 1968-two weeks before the initial
exploration of possible coopera.tion between the Subcommittee and the
Service. He also declared that the Subcommittee had made no additional
copies:
"Q. And did they-did there come a time when you returned those
documents?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. During the time that you had possession of the documents, were
they publicly-publicized, distributed or seen by anybody outside of the
'Committee?
"A. No, sir, and not by anybody inside of the Committee, either:.
'-'Q.. Wh~~ wete· the docwnents maintained.?
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The Court of Appeals, however, apparently did not view
respondents' amended complaint as presenting this belated
claim of dissemination outside the Subcommittee:
"The claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234
documents to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was
not made in the amended complaint. This claim arose
because of the disclosure of certain IRS documents,
obtained as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit,
which indicated contacts, beginning on August 28, 1968,
between members of the Subcommittee staff and the IRS
concerning formal access to each other's files." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25 (emphasis added).
The court noted further, ibid., that the complaint "also" made
two other allegations that could have been related to the
"A. In my personal file undE>r lock and key and the key was always
in my pocket and that was by ordE>r of Senator McClellaJJ,.
"Q. Did Senator McClellan look at those records?
"A. No, sir. He looked at one.
"Q. Did therE> come a time when you-aJter the expiration of certain
litigation betwec'n the McSurelys and the officials in Kentucky, did you
then return that batch of documrnts to the authorities in Kentucky?
"A. I did. I ~E>turned thrm to Thadeus Scott on August. 14, 1978.
"Q. And is the receipt that has been markrd listing the 230-some documents, is that the recE>ipt that you got whrn you returned them?
"A. That is the receipt I prepared and he signffi, yffi.
"Q. Did you retain any of the documents thPrr.aftN or did you make
any copy of any documrnts and retain them in your file?
"A. I never made a single copy of those documents. I retained none.
I have not now and the SubcommitteE> has none. All thE> documents were
returned to Mr. Thadeus Scott. I have never used a Xerox machine on
those documents, although it has been said here a number of times that
I did. I did not." App. 97-98.
This testimony wa:; incorporatffi in Senator McClellan's affidavit accompanying the summary judgmE>nt motion . /d .. a.t 50. Respondents dispute it, although they have adduced no facts tending to disprove it. Seen. 27, infra.
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dissemination claim. First, there was a charge that Brick had
exhibited the McSurely documents "to persons whose names
are unknown to plaintiffs." App. 31-32. Second, the complaint alleged that McClellan has "used the instrumentality
of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal
vendetta between himself and a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private correspondence of the
plaintiff Margaret McSurely." App. 35. The court pointed
out, however, that there was "no specific allegation that Brick
embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his purported
'vendetta' by dissemination outside the Subcommittee itself.
The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress
apparently rests on access by the IRS officials." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25. 27 In sum,
27 The Court of Appeals' discussion of the parties' dispute and the two
allegations in the amended complaint is as follows:
"On November 25, 1974, plaintiffs filed a supplemental affidavit lodging
these recently disclosed materials with t.he court. The federal defendants
countered on January 24, 1975, arguing that even if the IRS had gained
access to the Subcommittee files at ~orne point after August 28, 1968, the
McSurelys could not have been harmed· thereby because the 234 copies
were returned to Commonwealth betective Scott. on August. 14, 1968 (and
received by the McSutelys on November 8, 1968), and Brick had testified
at the McSurelys' contempt trial tha.t he made no copies and that neither
he nor the Subcommittee retained nny of the documents, D. A., II, 730.
Plaintiffs, in their reply to defendants' response, filed January 31, 1975, dispute both that the documents were turned over to Scott on August. 14,
1968, and that no copies were made. Since we affirm the District Court's
denial of summary judgment on this claim, we leave the resolution of this
que<:.tion to the District Court on remand.
"Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copies
of the 234 items to unknown pel'8ons causing plaintiffs damage and embarrassment, and that McClellan 'used the instrumentality of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal vendetta between himself and
a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private correspondence of the plaintiff Margaret McSurely.' Amended and Suppf.
Com pl. ,.f~ 19, 28 (b) (ii), App. 45, 50. However, there is no specific alle@iation that Brick emba,rrassed plajn,tiffs or that McClellan pursued his pur-
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the court's conclusion that the dissemination claim "was no~
made in the amended complaint," its distinction between that
claim and the other two claims actually made in the complaint, and its ultimate conclusion that the claim of dissemination rested solely on the newly developed theory indicate that
the Court of Appeals did not believe that the amended complaint encompassed this claim.~
In light of this apparent conclusion, it is difficult to understand the court's declaration in the same footnote that it was
affirming "the District Court's denial of summary judgment
on this claim," as well as the sta,t ement to that effect in the
per curiam opinion announcing th~ judgment. If the complaint did not encompass the new dissemination claim, there
had been no occasion for the District Court to pass on its
sufficiency, nor for the Court of Appeals to affirm any judgment thereon. Respondents' belated injeetion, of the dissemination theory into the case. standing alone, would not amount
to an amendment of the complaint, and no motion to amend
was made. Because there had' been no trial', there had been
no admission of evidence to which the pleadings could be held
to conform under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 (b). Thus, it is
unclear whether any issue regarding dissemination of the
McSurely materials outside Congress was properly before the
Court of Appeals.
For this reason, we must vacate the judgment of affirmance
as to that claim. We need express no opinion as to the merits
of the dissemination theory. 29 On remand, the Court of
8

ported ' vendetta~· by d1ssemination outside of the Subcommittee itself. The
claim of dissemination outside of the Halls of Congress apparently rests on
a~cess b;¥ IRS officials."' 180 U. S. App. D . C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d,
at 1285 n. 25.
28 The panel opinion was no cl<>ar<>r on this issue.
See 172 U. S. App.
D. C., at 373-374, and n. 29, 521 F . Zd , at 1033-1034, and n. 29.
29 Nor is there any r<>ason for u:s to address the question whether legislative immunity or some other form of immunity would protect Members
of Congress and their aides from inquiries concerning the sharing of infor~ation with executive agencies.
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Appeals may determine whether the dissemination claim is
embraced by respondents' amended complaint, or it may take
such other steps with respect to this claim as it deems proper.

IV
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it reversed the refusal of the District Court to dismiss the
portions of the complaint relating to the original seizure of the
McSurelys' materials. I also would affirm the portion of the
judgment directing the entry of summary judgment for petitioners as to claims concerning use of the materials within
Congress. With respect to the claim concerning Brick's inspec..
tion of the documents and transportation of copies, I would
affirm as to Brick, but reverse as to McClellan, Adlerman, and
O'Donnell, and remand with directions to enter $Ummary
judgment for them on that claim. Finally, I would vacate the
Courl of Appeals judgment insofar as it purports to affirm the
denial of summary judgment on the dissemination issue and
remttnd for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It'

MEMORANDUM. TO THE CONFERENCE:
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''",,·~~hi~ is the Speech or Debate ' c J ause case that.,,[v,

d 1 scussed,~~. at,\J ength ill. . our March 3 Conference.
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As you "wil, '~ remember, there ' was no "Court" for any
final reso1ut5.on of' the case. Indeed, the last entry in my
notes reads as foJlows: "We discussed this case for nearly
two hours without any two of us agreeing as to a basis for "''.
its disposition". Against that background, ,,_I was not
enchanted when the Chief asked me to write · Per Curiam.
But someone had to write something.
It

..

f

~if~

'<>'

~

••

··"·~ '~ In the absence of anything approaching a
consensus, I concluded that it was best for me to write a
memorandum that reflected DIY own considered judgment afte
a more careful examination of the opinions below, the
'
record, and briefs. For the reasons stated in footnote
I think there is no serious question of appealability.
Part II-A, I address, ~ and dispatch with brevity, the
Solicitor General's ~ rather remarkable argument - indeed
principal one·,~:.. that' even murder is protected under the
Speech or Debate clause. We all were in accord on this
issue.
~{ll.,
·~
,1
·
:t~iit'·:.:'\
·~ ~·

,,

:(;:

,,J;

~
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>!f.if

In
I consider the Solicitor General'~
fall-back position - it really should have been his primary
position - that summary judgment should have been granted
for failure to make "more than a merely colorable" claim of
liability. Further study fully confirms {at least for me)
the view I expressed at Conference to the effect that the
case should have been dismissed as to McClellan, Alderman
and O'Donnell. I think Dombrowski compels this ln view of
the fact tha·t the only substantive allegations against
these three defendants i were made solely on "information
belief"
·

I_,

r··

Li' l'.

As to Brick, I reached a different conclusion.
Although I think the question is quite close, there appears
to be sufficient evidence in the record to justify an
affirmance of CADC with respect to him. Putting it
differently, there is enough to carry respondents across
the Dombrowski threshold.

-~

'

'{!...._

,t,~4~

--

,.:~~'

There · \t7as some sentiment at" the Confe ~ ence to DIG
this case. ~ This controversy commenced in J 967 f~. thi . s i.s the .··1'l.··
third '·case . ';lr.ising out of t~e. seizure C?f McSurely. .'s ·";1 .,. "It:!':J 'if",·};,
documents.; 1.t has ~ been in l1t1gation s1nce 1969, and )~··
~¥1
already several '''of ·the parties have died {leaving questions
of survival, •as well as proble~s in the ' settlement of .
estates). It therefore ~ is desirable to settle as much of
the law of the case at this time as we can, rather than
allow CADC's judgment to stand with the consequent remand
for continued litigation as to all parties.
~
~

,,

r•· '•
~if·

·

'\!i~',.

I·'vlll

·

'\' in any event, the memorandum '·'(,reflects my views. ·
If they ~re not received hospitably · the ~case should be
assigned to someone else.
' •'
~~
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
FROM:

Bob

DATE:

April 3, 1978

RE:

Justice White's Ruminations in McSurely
This afternoon you mentioned to me that Justice

White had said that Brick should not be entitled to Speech
or Debate immunity, but that he might be entitled to
official immunity under a. Barr v. Matteo analysis.

This

did not jibe with my recollection of Justice White's
opinion in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), so I
checked back.
Attached is the penultimate page of the White
opinion in McMillan.

As you can see, it equates the scope

of official immunity with that of Speech or Debate
immunity, holding that the official immunity -- like
Speech or Debate immunity -- applies only when the
congressional employees are engaged in protected
legislative acts.

Hence, I see no basis for a different

theoretical approach to McSurely springing from the White
opinion in McMillan.

From all that appears in that

2.

opinion, the two inquiries are functional equivalents.
It would be possible to declare that informal
investigative activity is simply not a legislative act, so
that Speech or Debate immunity does not apply.

That idea

does not find support in anything said in Doe v. McMillan.

Opinion of the Court

412 U.S.

shadow of BJard of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U. S. 564 (1972), and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U. S. 433 (1971), where the Court advised caution
" [ w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him .... " !d., at 437. We conclude that, for
the purposes of the judicially fashioned doctrine of im;
munit}:. the Public Printer and the Superintendent of
Documents are no more free from suit in the case before U§_
than would be a legislative aide who made copies of the
materials at issue and distributed them to the public at
the direction of his superiors. See Dombrowski v. East- .
land, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), The scope of inquiry becomes
()quivalent to the inquiry in the context of the Speech.
. or Debate Clause, and the answer is the same: The
business of Congress is to legislate; Congressmen and
aides are absolutely immune when they are legislating.
But when they act outside the "sphere of legitimate
legislative activity," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at
376, they enjoy no special immunity from local laws protecting the good name or the reputation of the ordinary
citizen.
Because we think the Court of Appeals applied the
immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause and of the
doctrine of official immunity too broadly, we must reverse
its judgment and remand the case for appropriate further proceedings. 1 5 \Ye are unaware, from this record,
of the extent of the publication and distribution of the
report which has taken place to-date. Thus, we have
little basis for judging whether the legitimate legislative
needs of Congress, and hence the limits of immunity,
15

With respect t o t he Distri ct of Columbia respondents, t he Court
of Appeals found that they were acting within the sr.ope of their
authority under applicable law and, as a result, were immune from
suit. We do not disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
this respect.
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CHAMBERS OF

April 4, 1978

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely

Dear Lewis,
This is an initial effort to respond to your Memorandum
in this case and in so doing to arrive at my own conclusions.
At the outset, it is important to recall that the questions
presented in the petition for certiorari filed by the United
States did not include an attack on the judgment of the Court
of Appeals that because the record sufficiently supported a
claim of a Fourth Amendment violation by Brick, his motion for
summary judgment was properly overruled insofar as it rested
on a denial of any constitutional violation.

Assuming the

constitutional infraction by Brick, however, the United
States nevertheless insists that he and all of those alleged
to be in concert with him are absolutely immune from liability
under the Speech or Debate Clause for any damages caused by
the constitutional wrong.

Re: 76-1621
Page 2
April 4, 1978

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Government that
investigative activity in the field, as well as the more formal processes of hearings and subpoenas, may properly be
deemed legislative and within the protection of the Speech or
Debate Clause.

But the court went on to hold that the employ-

ment of unlawful means to implement otherwise proper legislative objects is not essential to legislating and that if Brick
violated the Fourth Amendment, neither he nor anyone who conspired with him in such illegal conduct was immune.
I am not completely sure how much practical difference

-

it makes, but I prefer the view that the Speech or Debate
.,......,_

Clause does not cover field investigations at all.

Although

I see no reason why Brick would not enjoy the protection of
official immunity while engaged in his investigative duties-and that defense still remains open to him in this case:::

l'

resist extending the Speech or Debate Clause beyond the formal \
investigative mechanisms.

Perhaps it is tenable to construe

the Clause as reaching investigative activities in the field
but to stop short of protecting illegal conduct; however,
this is not the line this Court has drawn in other cases, and
it does not appear to be the line the Court of Appeals adhered
to in this case when it reversed the judgment of the District
Court and entered summary judgment with respect to the internal
use made by the Committee of the documents delivered by Brick.

Re: 76-1621
Page 3
April 4, 1978

It may be difficult to imagine many kinds of unlawful
conduct that might be deemed a protected part of the legislative process, but it is clear that a Senator guilty of such
otherwise illegal activity would be immune.

Under Eastland v.

United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), the
Clause protects formal means of investigation such as hearings
and the use of subpoenas to require the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence.
immune from liability for damage
such procedures.

Senators and their staffs are
that may be inflicted by

If a witness refuses to appear or answer or

to produce the specified documents and then successfully defends a contempt proceeding on the grounds that the subpoena
or the questions propounded exceeded the power of Congress
under the controlling statute or resolution, or under the
Constitution, his subsequent damage

suit should be immediately

dismissed once it is determined that the complaint charged
I

---

,,

seeks to impose liability for a legislative act.

-

It is also

pertinent to recall that Senator Gravel was not subject to
prosecution for having put into the public record a classified
document, the publication of which the law forbade.

Re: 76-1621
Page 4
April 4, 1978

I do not think that informal investigations have such
inherent connections with the legislative process and would
prefer not extending legislative immunity to congressional
investigators.

I see no reason for their having any more

immunity, or any less, than that enjoyed by other federal
investigators.

If a Senator or his aide is sued for breaking

into a house and seizing evidence for use in an otherwise
proper investigation authorized by the appropriate committee,
he is entitled to an early ruling on his Speech or Debate
Clause claim, if such a claim is presented, as it was here.
But if it is then decided that he is not immune---as on such
facts I think it should be, because the Clause does not protect investigative conduct--the policy of the Clause has been
fully vindicated and has no further role to play in the case.
Under the view of the Court of Appeals, however, the
determination of the Speech or Debate Clause immunity issue
depends on whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation.
The issues at least overlap, if they are not wholly congruent.
(The same would be true in this case of the defense of official
immunity if the conference vote in Butz v. Economou stands up.)
I take it that neither you nor the court of appeals would grant
judgment on the motion of any defendant as to whom the record

Re: 76-1621
Page 5
April 4, 1978

demonstrates a genuine issue of fact with respect to the
constitutional violation.

But you would insist, and so would

I, that if the defendant's summary judgment affidavits contain adequate denials of the alleged conduct (and I don't
think it inconsistent with immunity policies to require the
defendant to at least deny the conduct that would remove his
immunity and subject him to liability), the plaintiffs must
respond with first-hand proof in affidavit form that lends
more than colorable substance to the claim of constitutional
wrong.

This amounts to nothing more than a careful application
_......__....,_~

of F. R. Civ. P. 56.

The Court of Appeals thought this stan-

dard had been satisfied with respect to Brick; but because
the proceedings had concentrated on "whether or not the Speech
or Debate Clause erects a complete barrier to this action,"
the court was unable to rule that the other federal defendants
were entitled to summary judgment.

The court left it to them

to "make a renewed motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the McSurelys have failed to adduce substantial facts
'which afford more than colorable substance'---to the assertion
of concert with Brick in conduct that survives the legislative
immunity bar."

553 F.2d, at 1299.

I

Re: 76-1621
Page 6
April 4, 1978

The argument becomes

ery

fact-b~~is

point; but

--

to get the matter on the table, I would for two reasons be
content with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that at this
juncture none of the federal defendants were entitled to
summary judgment.

Because you would affirm as to Brick, my

remarks will be directed to the other three federal defendants.

-

First, it is doubtful that plaintiffs were ever on notice
hat they had to present evidence that the Senator, Alderman,
and O'Donnell were accessories to Brick's actions or risk dismissal of the action.

This is because the Government's argu-

ment and affidavits were to the effect that the undisputed
facts demonstrated that all of the defendants were acting
within the scope of their legislative functions which, in the
Government's view, encompassed even the inspection and transportation of documents in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
There is nothing in the documents filed by the Government in
support of its motion which should have put plaintiffs on notice that they had to meet the additional point that even
assuming that Brick was not engaged in legislative acts, the
Senator and the other defendants nevertheless were not in any
1 •

way responsible for their commission.

This was the primary

reason given by the Court of Appeals for this aspect of its
judgment.
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ery

point; but
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to get the matter on the table, I would for two reasons be
content with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that at this
juncture none of the federal defendants were entitled to
summary judgment.

Because you would affirm as to Brick, my

remarks will be directed to the other three federal defendants.

-

First, it is doubtful that plaintiffs were ever on notice
hat they had to present evidence that the Senator, Alderman,
pnd O'Donnell were accessories to Brick's actions or risk dismissal of the action.

This is because the Government's argu-

ment and affidavits were to the effect that the undisputed
facts demonstrated that all of the defendants were acting
within the scope of their legislative functions which, in the
Government's view, encompassed even the inspection and transportation of documents in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
There is nothing in the documents filed by the Government in
support of its motion which should have put plaintiffs on notice that they had to meet the additional point that even
assuming that Brick was not engaged in legislative acts, the
Senator and the other defendants nevertheless were not in any
way responsible for their commission.

This was the primary

reason given by the Court of Appeals for this aspect of its
judgment.

Re: 76-1621
Page 7
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econdly' even assuming that the Government's motion
did put in issue the factual basis for plaintiffs' allegations concerning the roles of the Senator, O'Donnell and
Alderman, these defendants still were not entitled to summary
judgment because they failed to present facts which would constitute a defense to the charges.
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-160 (1970).

See Adickes v. S. H. Kress
No affidavits of any kind ,,

were submitted in support of the motion by O'Donnell, Alderman or Brick.

The only affidavit was that of Senator McClellan,

and it basically did no more than state that the acts complained
of were done as part of a properly authorized investigation.
1 Significantly,

the Senator did not dispute plaintiffs' alle-

gations that he was responsible for and involved in Brick's
allegedly illegal inspection and transportation of the relevant documents as well as the subsequent dissemination of
copies of the documents.

All that he denied was "any con- Jlv-,_
~~

spiracy, collaboration or any other participation of any sort ~
in the allegedly illegal police raid allegedly planned and
conducted by defendant Ratliff."

App. at 49,

~[

11.

As a

result of the Court of Appeals' decision, however, no question
1(~

concerning the federal defendants' complicity in the initial
)

police seizure of the documents remains in the case, but
only issues relating to their complicity in the subsequent

Re: 76-1621
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(

inspection, transportation, and dissemination of the documents.
As to these matters, Senator McClellan was completely silent.
Nor does Senator McClellan's affidavit say anything concerning
the involvement of Alderman or O'Donnell.
As I understand your Memorandum, you would construe the
Senator's denial of any activities outside the scope of legislative authority as encompassing a denial of plaintiffs'
allegations of Fourth Amendment violations or other illegal
conduct.

But it has been the contention of the federal de-

fendants throughout this action that all the misdeeds charged
in the amended complaint were within the scope of their investigative functions and accordingly, under this erroneous
view of the law, protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.
Thus, the Senator's assertion that he acted within the scope
of his legislative functions is consistent with the commission
of Fourth Amendment violations charged by plaintiffs.

Against

-~

this background, I would not read his broad assertion of immunity for illegal acts occurring in a field investigation as
a denial that any of the alleged conduct actually occurred.
Furthermore, since the entry of summary judgment precludes
further factual development and clarification by means of
examination of witnesses, I am not sure that affidavits submitted in support of such motions should be so broadly construed.
so read.

In ordinary summary judgment practice they are not

I:.
~~~

Re: 76-1621
Page 9
April 4, 1978

With respect to Part III of your Memorandum, I hold a
somewhat different view of the dissemination issue.

As I

understand it, you would remand the claim of dissemination
to the IRS to the Court of Appeals because it failed to pass
on the question of whether this claim was within the scope of
the amended complaint.

But I doubt that Judge Leventhal con-

cluded that such a claim should not be dismissed on grounds
of Speech or Debate Clause immunity while at the same time
believing that the claim was wholly beyond the scope of the
complaint.

Although the matter may not be entirely free from

-- ---- --

doubt, I believe that the opinion below is better read to con-

-

strue the complaint as including the claim of dissemination
to the IRS.
Paragraph 19 of the amended complaint alleges that Brick
"exhibited [the McSurely documents] to persons whose names
are unknown to the plaintiffs . . . . "

Footnote 25 of the Court

of Appeals opinion, which I agree with you is the key to the
matter, begins by stating that "[t]he claim of dissemination
of some or all of the 234 documents to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) was not made in the amended complaint."

I think

it is reasonably clear, however, that the court was not stating

---.
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that the complaint did not encompass dissemination to the IRS
but only that it did not mention the IRS in haec verba.

In-

deed, this very same footnote goes on to state that "[p]laintiffs'
amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copies of
the 234 items to unknown persons . . . . The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress apparently rests on access
by IRS officials."

The conclusion I draw from this, particularly

the last sentence, is that the Court of Appeals did not view the
claim of dissemination to the IRS as being outside the scope of
the complaint, but rather as being the only specific claim
pressed by plaintiffs which supported the broad allegation of
dissemination set forth in

~f

19 of the amended complaint.

More-

over, I see little point in straining to find that the Court of
Appeals acted in a self-contradictory fashion, because there
can be no serious doubt that the allegation of dissemination
in the amended complaint is broad enough to encompass dissemination to the IRS.
I also have difficulty with your suggestion on p. 22 and
n. 29 that the question of whether dissemination to the Executive Branch is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause is an
open one.

The Court of Appeals unanimously, and in my view,

Re: 76-1621
Page 11
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correctly, concluded that McMillan and Gravel foreclosed any
contention that dissemination of materials to an agency of
the Executive constitutes a legislative act.

United States v.

Brewster also leans strongly in this direction.

"In no case

has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all conduct relating to the legislative process--only acts generally
done in the course of the process of enacting legislation
[are] protected."

408 U.S. 501, 515, 514

(1972).

Although

legislators will have frequent dealings, as they properly
should, with the Executive Branch, the fact

of the matter is

that such contacts are not legislative acts.
I should say that my views are not set in concrete, and
it may be that I could join a quite different approach.
presently advised, however, I would affirm.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

As

No. 76-1621

10:;.
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Thanks for your thoughtful memorandum of April 4.
You have touched upon several of the more troubling aspects
of this case, and I will take this opportunity to amplify
my analysis of them.
I

You express the view that the Speech or Debate
Clause does not cover field investigations at all. If w'e '
had a case that clearly presented that issue I woul.d be
inclined to go along with you. In this case, however, I
have thought it unnecessary to go beyond the "facially
proper means" approach, which essentially was that of Judge
Leventhal below. As you observe, there probably are few
cases in which your approach and mlne would produce
different results, but I am reluctant to embrace the
broader rationale without clear need to do so or a clear
idea of the implications of such a conclusion. I do not
think the principle emerges clearly from Gravel or Doe v
McMillan.
·
---I will adc a footnote stating that because of my
proposed disposition of this case, it is unnecessary to
determine whether even properly conducted field
investigation would fall outside the protectjon of the
Speech or Debate Clause.

As you correctly stated it, the argument
concerning the disposition of the Fourth Amendment claims
against McClellan, Adlerman, and O'Donnell is "very
fact-bound." We simply seem to view the facts differently,
but I will attempt to set out in greater. detail the reasons
for my views.
You off~r two reasons for accepting the Court of
judgment that the defendants other than Brick were

'ti

\

i

(I.\

.•

~;

!I'

t

not entitled to summary judgment. The first reason is that
"it is doubtful that plaintiffs were ever on notice that
they had to present evidence that the Senator, Aalerman,
and O'Donnell were accessories to Brick's actions • • • • •
(Your Memo at 6.) It seems to me that the record clearly ~'l'~'t ••
shows the contrary. At page 13 of my Memorandum to the
Conference, in the footnote, I quote a colloquy at the
summary judgment hearing in which defense counsel states
that the burden is upon plaintiffs "to come forward with
any evidence they may have to suggest and demonstrate that ~
these defendants were not acting within the scope of their
legislative duties." (Emphasis added.)

Further, ~ I cited in the same footnote several
documents filed by defendants in support of their motion '
that appear quite clearly to call upon plaintiffs for
··
· whatever evidence they have with respect to each
' defendant. For example, in their Supplemental Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss or in the Al ternati.ve for Summary Judgment, Nov.
23, 1971,1, . at "?'it i, s ~ sta .ted:
.
;~·

'/

..

,,..

The affidavit of Senator McClellan filed in
support of the pending motions fully establishes
the circumstances by which the Senate Committee
conducted its investigation and served the '
subpoenas out of which this litigation arises: •
~a~n~othing in the M~§urelys• affid~~!!
furnis!}es any fa9ts to demonstrate J:!:!at Brick '- ~~.·1~( "
Adlerman..L or O'Donnell were acting o~tsid~the · ...,
perimeter of their legislative functiQn!."
(Emphasis added.)
I cannot see how defendants could have put plaintiffs on
notice more specifically that they had to come forward
with whatever "more than merely colorable" evidence they
had with respect to each defendant.
~ .•
Your second reason for accepting the Court of
Appeals view on the summary judgment issue is that the
three "Washington" defendants failed to present facts •
· · which would constitute a defense to the charges. (Your
Memo at 7.) I think our disagreement here highlights one
of the most unusual aspects of this case - one that is not
made clear by the briefs. In the Court of Appeals, and in
.. my Memorandum to the Conference, Brick was kept in the ,
case because plaintiffs were held to have alleged a
~nd_, ~parate violat.i.on of the Fourth Amendment Q.y_ ~.·
Brick in inspecting the documents in Pikeville. As I ~

·>;.·

----

"~ ..

/
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noted in footnote 22 of my Memorandum, however, this
"second violation" theory of the case apparently did not
emerge until the matter was before the Court of Appeals.
I say this because my examination of the District
Court record did not disclose any suggestion that Brick's
activity in and of itself amounted to a separate violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, plaintiffs argued that
since the Kentucky search and seizure had been ruled
unconstitutional at the time of the Subcommittee takeover
of the documents, the rule of Dombrowski v. Eastland did
not apply and that the subpoenas-were the fruit of the
original Kentucky seizure. This i.s the !?!!lx Fourth
Amendment theory set forth in the amended complaint. App.
32-33. Thus, in the District Court the theory was not
that Brick's inspection of the documents in Pikesville was
a second violation of the Fourth Amendment, rendering the
Calandra doctrine inappJicable (the view of Judge
Leventhal and my t1emorandum); rather, the theory there was
that Brick's inspection, the takeover, and the subsequent
subpoenas were the fruits of the original tllegal search
and seizure. The first mention of a separate Fourth
Amendment violation by Brick appears to have been in the
Court of Appeals opinion in the contempt case, which came
down after the filing of all the oocuments in the District
Court. Apparently, plaintiffs developed thi.s theory
during the contempt appeal and introduced it 'in this case
for. the first time before the Court of Appeals}.

,•

r:"'.r

,,,,

•
,,,, ,., •:
~J

,,

~.

i

,;.:

In these' circumstances, it could hardly be "''~;·;,
expected that McCJellan's affidavit would declare
specifically that there had been no Fourth Amendment
violation by Brick. Defendants had never been presented
with that theory of the case. Since the amended complaint
was viewed expansively (perhaps more so than it merited),
it would seem unduly harsh to read the defense affidavlt
narrowly as failing to negate a theory not then advanced.
Rather, I think it must be taken as putting in issue all .•
the allegations that subsequently were read into the
E~.
amended complaint. It denies, on behalf of all the
'
defendants, any activity outside the scope of legislative
authority. App. 50. In my view, that denial is
sufficiently explicit in view of McSurleys' theory of
case at the time.
,,

I do not think that the failure of the other
defendants to file affidavits is of any impor.tance. As
McClellan's affidavit covers them, separate affidavits
would be repetitive.

''

4-

As to the dissemination claim, I still think my
reading of Judge Leventhal's footnote 25 is correct. It
seems to me that the Court of Appeals was contrasting
those claims that were in the complaint with the IRS
allegation which wasnot. Judge Leventhal's opinion on
this point is far below his usual .l standard of clarity.
,,
;f';t..,

~)_

I nevertheless agree that your reading is a
plausible one. Indeed, the original draft of my
Memorandum came out exactly that way. I therefore wouJd
have no objection to reading the Court of Appeals opinion
in that manner, but my disposition still would be
different from yours. If we read the amended complaint as
alleging dissemination outs ide of the Subcommittee, then ·we are faced with Brick's testimony that the copies were ~ n
all returned to Kentucky officials before the earliest
date when any information exchanges between the .
~
Subcommittee and the IRS could have ·begun, as well as the
denial by both Brick and McClellan that any copies were
retained. (My Memo at 19-20 n.26) Under the analysis
used in Part II of my Memo, these denials cast upon
plaintiffs the burden of coming forward with something
more than mere information and belief concerning
'
dissemination of their mciterials outside of Congress.
Since they failed to do that, even in the Court of Appeals
(Pet. at 14a n.25), summary judgment must follow under

,,,
~;~

'~·-)

'.''•

~ombrowski. '
..-~

~·

-l>:;

/{I,

o\l!

'

~'~.,.,\)~~ this were .~r'a garden variety 1a~1 su'i. t r ~ would

.~.,

have taken far Jess •interest in the questions we are now
discussing. This Court normally is reluctant to review
arguably close decisions below as to whether . summary
f•r.. "
judgment motions should have been sustained. ' But this _~~is}
. no garden variety litigation between private parties.
·
• This is an example of legal warfare, conducted now for ~
full decade, against a Subcommittee of the United States
Senate. As stated on page 17 of my Memo (circulated March
24), the purposes served by the Speech or Debate Clause
are i.ntended to protect members and their aides from "the '
burden of defending themselves against unsubstantiated
claims", Dombrowski at 85, and thus the Clause requires
that motionsfounded on legislative immunity be "given the
most expeditious treatment by distri.ct courts because one
branch of government is being ask to halt the functions of
a coordinate branch." §ervicemen's Fund, at 511 n. 17.

·~~.

...

.

.
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In our interestjng and helpful convers~tion
Saturday, you questioned whether the Clause : rather
general official immunity - applied to the alleged
activities in Pikesville. I am adding a footnote to my
Memorandum that for me recognizes this possi.bllity (even
though the case has never been so viewed by the parties or
courts below), and indicating that it makes no difference
as to the proper outcome. The policy reasons identified
in Dombrowski and Servicemen's Fund app1 y in most cases ':
withequal force when a government official ls sued for '
conduct taken within the scope of his authority.
·~

:1!

~···

~

."'}~,

\

,;;·

.. ,~-..,~~p•"•h,.''

' .... "''J

ll'

~

!• · r.~ mus~ ' say ~. that your memorandum of Apr i1 4 gives
me more than a ,.,•J.i tt.le concern as to the position you and I ~
have taken ge-rie r ally i.n .Butz. In my letter to you of
February 3, , ., cornme ntj.ng on your ci.rcuJation in Butz, I
~
; referred
Bi l~~R.ehnqui st 's sound. observation- that "any
legal neophyte" .ica n· f ~ ame a compla1nt of constitutional
dimensions, and unless the courts put such a plaintiff td ·
a degree of specificity , not customart1y observed on
•
summary judgment mot i ens, substanti a1 ,.inter.ference t•d th
the functioning of government officials wi . l ~ iesult. In
my let'ter'" .. t9 you, I paid;·.·· .~·.>··i.
. .., ·:
' .

to

'/.;

~

"Court~ should be alert to limit public officia i ·~~
exposure to the inhibiting force of a protracted
t r.ial by •requiring a convincing showing in order
to withstand a motion for summary judgment." .,
~

·~ '

!I

'

1:

'

'

I unq(;!rstood then ..that you were generally in
accord •1 But ~ I' am cons.iderabl y shaken by your apparent
disposition to give the McSurelys the benefit of every
doubt and deny - at least as I view it - a ~irnilar reading
to the McClellan affidavit, the colloquy between counsel,
and the othe r indications that at least as to the Senator
and the two co-defendants here in Washington nothing of
substance has been turned up in the ten-year McSurely
crusade.
·
'I have thought that the important public pOlicies
served by the Clause and by the doctrine of official
immunity require - as the Court has stated in pombrowskl
and Servicemen's - a more demanding standard wi~espect
to summary judgment and discovery where these policies
implicated than in the ordin~ry suit between private

' '

-6-

;

'

litigants. I would find it difficult to jojn a Butz
opinion that would not encourage courts to accord more
protection of these policies than your letter appears to
reflect.
I do appreciate your talking to me and devoting so
much thought to my Memo of March 24. Maybe this
ventilation of the issues will be helpful to our Brothers
who have been uncharacteristically silent up to now.

Mr.
lfp/ss'
cc:
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No. 76-1621
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of the Estate of John L. McClellan,
to the United States
et al., Petitioners,
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v.
the District of Co~
Alan McSurely et ux.
lumbia Circuit.
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[March -, 1978]

Memorandum to the Conference from MR. JusTICE PowELl-.

I
In 1967, Alan and Margaret McSurely were field organizers
for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., in Pike
County, Ky. Alan McSurely also had served as a field organizer for the National Conference of New Politics and
distributed literature for Vietnam Summer. On the night of
August 11, 1967, under authority of a warrant charging sedi~
tious activities against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and
the United States in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 432.040
(19--), Pike County officials arrested the McSurelys and
seized a quantity of books, pamphlets, and letters found in
their home. Shortly after the raid, Thomas Ratliff, Commonwealth Attorney for Pike County, announced publicly that the
seized material would be made available to any Congressional
Committees interested in the McSurelys.
On September 14, 1967, a three-judge District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, one judge dissenting, declared
the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional on its face and
enjoined state prosecution of the McSurelys. M cSurely v.
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 1967). The court ordered
·t hat all the seized material "be held by [Ratliff] in safekeeping
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until final disposition of this case by appeal or otherwise."
App. 78.
Soon after issuance of the District Court's order, Ratliff
received a telephone call from Lavern Duffy, Assistant Counsel
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations . . 'The Subcommittee, which was headed by Senator McClellan, was investigating the causes of various riot'3 across the Nation, including
one that had occurred ·in Nashville, Tennessee, in April 1967.
Some of the Subcommittee's information showed that the
organizations with which the McSurelys were affiliated might
have been involved in the Nashville riot. Hence, Duffy
asked Ratliff whether the materials seized from the McSurelys
were in his custody. Ratliff replied that they were, and on
October 8, 1967, a Subcommittee investigator, John Brick,
arrived in Pikeville, the county seat.
That same evening T~adeus Scott, a Commonwealth detective, visited Brick's motel room and gave Brick photocopies
of 234 of the seized documents. The next morning, Brick
spent an hour examining the o1'iginals in a locked room at the
Pike County courthouse. Apparently, Ra.tliff tried to reach
the members of the three-judge court before, permitting Brick
to enter the locked room. He succeeded in reaching the dissenting member of the court, but what transpired is not clear.1
Brick also visited the Clerk of the District Court, who
allowed him to inspect the case file of the McSurelys' threejudge court action. Brick arranged to have the Clerk send
1 At the McSurelys' subsequent tnal for contempt of Congress, see n. 5,
infra, Ratliff testifird that "l had my permission" before he allowed Brick
access to the stored material>:. DrfPndants' Appendix 407, United States
v. McSurely, Nos. 24,812, 24,813 (DC 1971). The 1mplication of this
statement was that the d1ssentmg .Judge gave "permission," but that is not
dear. Moreover, the scope of any permisswn r!'mains unexplained. Ra.tliff
conceded that he had not communicated' with the cocustodian of the
materials, United Stat<'s Marshal Archw Kraft, before perm1tting Brick to
inspect the materials. ld ., at 407-408.

T
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him a copy of the court's safekeeping order and the inventory
of seized items. On October 12, 1967, Brick again entered the
locked room at the county courthouse and spent four hours
taking notes on the materials. He then returned to Washington, taking with him the 234 copies that Scott had given him.
This material included one personal letter addressed to Mrs.
McSurely, which concededly had no relevance to Brick's inves-tigation. At Senator McClellan's direction, Brick prepared
subpoenas duces tecum for some of the material in Ratliff's
possession that Senator McClellan concluded would be relevant to the investigation of the Nashville riot.
The McSurelys moved before the three-judge court to
prevent Ratliff from releasing the subpoenaed materials.2 On
October 30, 1967, the court denied the motion and directed the
parties to cooperate with the Subcommittee. 3 Further litigation ensued/ culminating in an order of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in July 1968, holding that since the time
for appeal from the judgment of the District Court striking
2 The McSurelys did not premise their opposition to the subpoenas upon
any allegedly unlawful activity on Brick's part in inspecting and transporting the documents . Indeed, they testified that they did not even become
aware of Brick's actual role until December 5, 1967. !d., at 655-656,
681-682, 704-705, 707-709.
3 The court'~; order rPad in part as follows:
"The parties to tlus action and the officers of this Court are directed to
cooperate with the Senate Committee in making available such of the
materials, or copies thereof, as the Committee considers pertinent to its
inquiry; but until time for amwal is expi11ed, this will be done in such
manner as to keep intact those materials that may be pertinent to the
appeal of this case."
I cannot say whether this ma.y be read as a retroactive ratification of
Brick's inspection and transportation activities. There is nothing in the
record before us to indicate that the three-judge court was apprised of
those 1wtivities. See 180 U. S. App . D. C., at 117 n. 59, 553 F. 2d, at
1293 n. 59.
4 For a synopsis of that litigation 's course, see the opinion below of
Judge Wilkey1 id. 1 at 132-133, 553 F . 2d, at 1308-13090
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down the sedition staltite had expired, there was no basis for
continued court custody. The court ordered the seized materials returned to the McSurelys, M cSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F. 2d
817 (CA6 1968), and noted that questions as to the validity of
the subpoenas still were open. According to Brick, the Subcommittee's photocopies were returned to Detective Scott on
August 14, 1968. The originals and copies were returned to
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968. Upon receipt of these
materials, the McSurelys were served with new subpoenas.
On March 4, 1969, McSurelys appeared before the Subcommittee and refused to comply with the subpoenas. Their
refusal resulted in a conviction for contempt of Congress,;; but
in December 1972, the Court of Appeais for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the subpoenas were
the fruit of two Fourth Amendment violations: (i) the original
seizure by Kentucky officials, and (ii) Brick's "unauthorized
search and inspection of the documents" in violation of the
three-judge court's sa.fekeeping order. United States v.
McSurely, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 154-155, 473 F. 2d 1178,
1191-1192 (1972).
On the same day that they appeared before the Subcommittee, the McSurelys filed this action.n alleging that Sena.tor
McClellan, Brick. Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's
General Counsel). Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's
Chief Counsel) , and individuai Members of the Subcommittee
had conspired to violate the McSurelys' constitutional rights.
They sought decla,ratory and in,j unctive relief and $50,000
damages from ea.ch defendant. The action was stayed to permit the contempt trial to proceed. M cSurely v. McClellan,
138 U.S. App. D. C. 187, 426 F. 2d 664 (1970). In Septemr. The variou:o: testimony refl:'rred to in this memorandum was given al t.he
contempt trial. Sec. e. y., n. 1, supra.
6 Listed with the McSurelys as plaintiffs in this initial complaint were
three associations wJt.h which they were connected: the Southern Conference
Educational Fund, the Southern Student Organizing Committee, and the
Students for a Democra-tic Society.
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her 1971, while the appeal of their contempt conviction was
pending, the McSurelys filed an amended complaint, naming
Ratliff, McClellan, Brick, Adlerman, and O'Donnell as defendants. The amended complaint alleged in essence that the
federal defendants had conspired with Ratliff to carry out an
illegal raid in 1967, and to inspect, tran,sport, and use the seized
materials in violation of the McSurelys' constitutional and
other rights. On October 26, 1971, petitioners moved to
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the
basis of legislative immunity. failure to state a claim, and
collateral estoppel by virtue of the contempt conviction. 7 The
motion was denied and petitioners appealed. 8
In 1974, while petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, respondents obtained
documents thought by them to indicate that the Subcommittee
Ratliff did not join this motion.
Normally the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not. appealable because it is not a final deci8ion for purposE's of § 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
See generally 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ,[ 56.21 [2], at 56-1275 to
56-1286 (2d ed. 1976) . The Court of Appeal::;, however, adopted the
reasoning of the panel opinion, which lwld that this particular denia.! had
"sufficient indicia of finality," 172 U. S. App. D. C. 364, 371, 521 F. 2d
1024, 1031, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 308
(1962), to quahfy as appealable, even though it was not. a dPcision that
ended the action. The p..'lnel ob.~e-rvPd that t.he Sp<>ech or Debat(' Clause,
upon which the sumrnary judgment motion wa~ focused, protects Members·
of Congress and their aides from the burdl.'lns of de-fending themselves as
well as from the conseque-nces of the litigation. 172 U.S. App. D. C., a.t. 372,
521 F. 2d, a.t 1032, citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82,85 (1967).
Reasoning that the asserte-d right io he free of the burdens of a. la,wsuit
would be irretrievably lost 1f tlw cmw proce-eded to trial, the pm1t>l concluded that an appeal from the final JUdgment would come too 1'1.te to pro..
vite meaningful review of that clmm. Henct>, as to the assertion of immunity from inquiry, the demal of summary judgment was held a "final
decision" for purposes of § 1291 172 U. S. App . D. C., at 372, 521 F.
2d, at 1032. Neither side chatlengl\'S that analysis here, and I sre no reason
to depart from ill. See aliso Cohen v . Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U . S. 541
7

8

~£9419:».
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had established an information-sharing relationship with the
Internal Revenue Service. These documents were lodged with
the Court of Appeals, together with affidavits suggesting that
petitioners might have exhibited the allegedly wrongfully
seized materials to agents of the Internal Revenue Service.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, en bane, affirmed in part,
reve'rsed in part, and remanded.u Judge Leventhal wrote for
himself and four others, a.'> did Judge Wilkey. Senior Judge
Danaher, who had sat on the panel,· joined Judge Wilkey's
opinion, but'wrote a separate opinion as well. The court
unanimously reversed the refusal to dismiss that part of the
complaint relating to the original seizure of the McSurelys'
materials by Kentucky authorities. · The court also agreed
unanimously that summary · judgment should have been
granted as to the portion of the complaint charging unlawful
use of the material within Congress itself. 180 U. S. App.
D. C. 101, 104, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (1976). Respondents do
not dispute those actions here.
The Court of Appeals, again unanimously, affirmed what it
designated as the denial of summary judgment as to those
portions of the complai11t alleging dissemination of the material outside of Congress. lbid. 10 By an evenly divided vote,
9

While the case was in the Court of Appeals, Brick and Adlerman died.

180 U.S. App. D . C., at 104 u . 1, 51)3 F. 2'd, aL 1280 n. 1. Th<' Court of
Appea.Js did not aecidl' wh<'tTH'r thr actiOI1~ agaim;t tlwm survivrd, lea,v ing
that. issue for the District Court on r<'mand. In Augu:;t 1977, respondent
moved m the District Court to ~uh~titutr tll<' tiUrvivors or e;;tates for Brick
and Adlerman. PetitionPr~ oppo~<' that motion, arguing that respondents'
' delay caused the actlon to abnt<'. Thry ncvrrthelrss named Brick a11d
Adlcrman as pet.if10ners m cn~<' thi:-l oppoHition should fail. See Fed. Rule
App. Proc. 43 (a). Wr nrcd not pa~:; on the questions ejther of survival or
· aba.t.ement of the a.ctions.
Senn.tor McClellan d1ed while tlw case was pendmg before this Court.
His executor was substituted under Rule 48 (1) of thi,; Court.
10 Judge Leventhal's opinion and thr ~hort per cu1·iam opinion stating
the judgment both indicated that the dissemination rlaim was to proceed
\lpon remand. Judge Wilkry '~' opinion agreed with that disposition..
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it affirmed the denial of summary judgmen.t on the allegations
that Brick had violated the McSurelys' rights by inspecting
the documents subject to the safekeeping order and transporting copies back to Washington. 11 Judge Leventhal, writing
for himself and four others, concluded that the allegations
and facts of record stated Fourth Amendment and invasion
of privacy claims. Judge Wilkey, writing for the other five
members of the court, disagreed and would have reversed and
remanded only in the allegation of dissemination outside of
Congress. Judge Danaher would have ordered the case dismissed on the basis of official immunity. We granted certiorari. - U . S . - (1977).
II

A
In this Court, petitioners have chosen to rely principally
Although Judge Danaher joined Judge Wilkey's opinion, his sepa.rate opinion seems to call for a clifferent resolution of the dissemination claim, since
l1e would have directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint entireTy,
on tJw basis of official immunity.
n All 10 judges below a.ppear to have agreed that the McSurelys alleged
seven categories of wrongdoing:
"(1) The unlawful search and seizure of the McSurelys' books and
papers by Kentucky authorities;
"(2) t.he inspection by Brick of those unlawfully seized materials;
"(3) the transport by Brick of copies of 234 documents to Washington;
" (4) the inspection of some or all of these 234 copies by the staff of the
Subcommittee;
"(5) the use of the copies, as the basis for issuance of subpoenas for some·
of the documents;
"(6) the procurement of Contempt of Congress citations against the·
plaintiff;; by consciously withholcling from the Senate the facts relating to·
the challenged subpoenas;
" (7) the dissemination of ~orne or all of the 234 copies obtained by Brick
to persons or agencies outside of the Subcommittee-particula.rly thelnternal Revenue Service." 180 U. S. App. D. C., at '108, 553 F . 2dl, a.1t
1285 (footnote omited).
At iss~ro here are all~fttions ~2), (3,), ami €,'1),•.
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upon an argument that was rejected by all 10 judges of the
Court of Appeals. They contend that the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause extends "to [the use of] unlawful
means to achieve legitimate objectives." 12 In their view,
unlawful activities carried out in the course of an otherwise
legitimate investiga.tion should be completely cloaked by a
legislative immunity that "precludes judicial inquiry even intoconduct that would be illega.l or unconstitutional if performed
by priva.t e persons." 13 Indeed, for purposes of this argument,
petition,ers concede that Brick's conduct was "a violation of
the Fourth Amendment." 14 They insist, however, that legislative immunity from suit is meaningful only when a Member
or a legislative aid is alleged to have engaged in conduct that
would be actionable if engaged in by a private citizen, since
an "immunity that would protect on;l y when no wrong was
alleged to have been committed would be no immunity at
all." 15
While this extreme position may have some superficial plausibility, its logic would lead to acceptance of untrammeled
legislative power:10 Moreover, it has 'been rejected by prior
12

Brief for Petitioners 15.
lfd., a.t 14.
14 At oraJ a.r gument, petitioners made their concession on this issue quite
·explicit:
"QUESTION: AilE'Ji't you conceding for the purpose of argument that
there was wrongdoing?
"MR.. EASTER13ROOK: We a.rc conreding for the. purposes of this
!trgumcnt. thnt. [Brick's n.ei"lvity] wrtf' actionable in some wa.y.
"QUESTION: That'" wha.t I thought.
" QUESTION: And nlso a. violation of the Fourth Amendment.
"MR.. EASTERBROOK: YcR, we are conceding for purposes of this
;argument." Tr. of OmJ Arg. 26. See also id., at. 29.
1 " Brief for Petitioner 15.
lG In petitioners' view, legislntive immunity " probably" extends even t&
deliberate theft :md murder, ~o long as they occur in the cour~·c of a.
' congres.;;ional investigation. Thi ~ \va s made clear a.t ·oral [~rgument :
·"MR EASTERBROOK :...••
11
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decisions of this Court. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387
U. S. 82 (1967), this Court squarely held that legislative
immunity did not shield a congressional aide charged with
violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights in the
course of an otherwise legitimate inw_stigation. 17 Similarly,
"But essentially our approach rests on the contention that the immunity
is triggered by the purposr:s of the activity in which the Senator or the
Senate aide waR Pngagrd. We bPiieve that this approach was con:sistent
with nnd indeed required by the considerations that led to the esiablishment
of the constitutional privilegP.
"QUESTION: How far doe;; that reasoning take you? Let's say its
purpose:; were very rlenrl~· to aid the legislative proce;,;s by aiding the
congressional committees, and in pur:suance of that. pristinely protected
purpose hP simply burglarized a house and stole things out of a locked
drawer or safe. Ii< he protPet~d under the Speech or Dt>bate Clause for
that? I am talking now, b~· "hr" I mean an aidr to the committee.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Mr . .Justice Stewart, that que::;tion raises a
number of complexities. My answer to it ultimately is, yes, probably he
is protected.
"QUESTION: Including murder, I suppose. Well, maybe not, there.
"MR. EASTERBROOK : That. too falls within my yes, probably
answer, but I would like , if I can-thi::; one, the answer i::; not intuitively
appealing, I must concede." Tr. of Oral Arg.14-15. See also id., at 16-17.
17 Petitioner:; attempt to distinguish Dombrowski on the ground that
the congrC~;sional aide involved in that case was not engaged in investiga,.
tive activit.y on behalf of Congress. They argue that. he merely "conspired with state officials to plan and carry out a, raid to gain evidence
for use in a ::;tat(\ prosecution." Brief for Pctitionl:'rs, at 29. In their
view, summary judgment in hil; favor was reversed simply because the
Speech or DC~bate Clause furmshes no protection to activities not carried
out. in the course of a congrC~;Sional investigation. Petitioners' characterization of the fact~ in that. case. is erroneous. As we observed in G1"avel v.
United States, 408 U. S. 606, 620 (1972), t.he aide in Domb1"owski "was
g~thering information for a hearing." Moreover, the re.cord in Dombrowski mak~ clea.r that the aide traveled to Louisiana, at the behest. of
Senator Eastland a.nd in pursuance of the investigative functions of a
Sena.te Subcomnllttee. Record in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0. T. 1966,
No. 118, pp. 35, 40-41, 87, 91-94.
Dombrowski can be read as suggesting that the scope of legislative
itnm_unit:y for aides is narrower than that for the Member.. :387 U.S., at 85.
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our decision in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 628629 ( 1972), held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not
immunize an aide from grand jury questioning concerning possible criminal conduct in the course of Senate informationgathering activity. As we declared in Gravel, "no prior case
[has] held that Members ~f Congress would be immune if
they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a
hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the privacy
of a citizen. Such acts are no more essential to legislating
than the [conspiracy] held unprotected in United States ·v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)." Gravel, supra, at 621 (footnote omitted). Conduct in the course of informal investigative activity simply does not fall within the Speech or Debate
Clause if it clearly exceeds the 'lawful powers of Congress.
Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), is not to the contrary. ·There the
Court addressed the "power to investigate and to do so through
compulsory process." ld., at 504 (emphasis added). We
refused to recognize an action to enjoin implementation of a
facially proper subpoena, holding the subpoena "an indispen~
sable ingredient of lawmaking," 18 id., at 505. We had no
·This suggestion, howewr, wa.~ laid to rest in Gravel v. United States, 408
U. S. 606 (1972), which hPld "that the Speech or Debntc Clause applies
not only to n Member but also to hi~ aides insofar as the conduct of the
latter would be a protected legislative act if perfonned · by the Member
himself." !d., at 618. Our deci~ion in Eastland v. United States Setvicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 502 (1975), viewed the distinction in
Dombtowski betwern Mrmbrr and aide not. aR one drriving from a
difference in the seopr of t hrir legi~la tive immunities, but as one relating
to the activities in which they were alleged to htwc 'engaged by the
complaint.
18 In this ease the Court of Appeals revcr~ed ihe denial of summary
judgment as to the claims rrlnting to the is;;uance of subpoenas:
· "The Subcommittee here employed proper proce~s for information· 'on
which "legislation could be had ."' We note that ·the subpoenas called for
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occasion, however, to consider the effect of lawless activity in
the course of informal investigative conduct. Such activity
simply is not a part of "th~ due functioning of the [legislative]
process." United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516
(1972) (emphasis in original).
In arguing that an immunity which evaporates with the
allegation of actionable conduct is no immunity at all, petitioners misapprehend the sweep of our prior decisions dealing
with investigative activity. When Congress employs facially
proper means of information-gathering-such as the subpoena
in Servicemen's Fund-the Speech or Debate Clause precludes
both inquiry into legislative motive and lawsuits for damages
resulting from the investigation. But when Members of
Congress or their aides resort instead to criminal or otherwise
unlawful methods of obtaining information, they exceed the
power duly vested in Congress and can expect no condonation
by virtue on the Speech or Debate Clause. This "focus on
means permits the court to afford relief 'without proof of a
legislative a.ct.' " 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 112, 553 F. 2d, at
1288 (opinion of Leventhal, J.), quoting Gravel, 408 U. S., at
621. I therefore conclude that legislative immunity does not
shield a Member or his aide from being called to account for
materials that were at lem;L arguably relevant, to it:; investigation , but. did
not call for the production of :Mr;::. McSurely's letter or any other
demonstrably irrelevant private correspondr.nce. Undrr these circumstancE'S Servicemen's F·und prrvmt:o: furthrr inquiry into plaint iff's charge
tha.t the Subcommittee's purpo:;e was to hara:;s nnd iutimida!e them in the
exercise of their Fit·:;t Amrnclment. rights. The Subrommittrr ';; i;;suance of
subpoenas is privileged nct.ivity, notwith:;tnnding plnintiff ':; bnrr aUegation
t.hat the real purpose behind the subporna;; wac; to ' rover-up' the earlier
improper conduct by Brick, nnd thr furthrr a:;,;rrtion that had there been
full disclosure the Subcommittee would not hn vr i,;:;ued thr ,;ubpoenas, and·
the Senate would not have approved the contempt cita,t ion." 180 U. S.
App .. D . C., at 122, 553 F. 2d, at 1298 (footnote.-; omitted).
·No f(uestion is rnisoo ht>rE> concerning the correctnc;;s of tJw Court mii'
Appeals~ iudgment o.un this is:>ue~
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Fourth Amendment or other violations committed m the
course of their investigative work in the field. Dombrowski,
supra; cf. Gravel, supra.19
B
Petitioners further contend that on the record in this case,
respondents' complaint should be dismissed because they have
not made the requisite showing of liability. It is clear that
The issue in this case was joined on whether petitioners were entitled
to immunity by virtue of the Speech or Debate Clause. The case was
considered below, and argued here, primarily on this issue. This focus on
the Clause is appropriate with respect to defendants McClellan, Alderman,
and O'Donnell. It is not alleged that any of them performed any investigative act outside of Washington. No issue remains as to the validity of the
subpoenas issued by Senator McClellan's Subcommittee. See n. 18, 8Upra.
And, as Judge Leventhal's opinion noted, "the record [also] is silent" as to
the involvement of these three defendants "in any activity that could result
in liability." P. 15, infra. This leaves only the general allegations of the
amended complaint and respondents ' affidavits as to conspira,cy and exceeding legislative authority. Disposition of these, as presenting a Speech or
Debate issue, is appropriate.
The situation may be different with respect to Brick. His "possibly
actionable conduct" (infra, p. 15) for the most part consisted of investigative acts in Pikesville. It could be argued that such informal
investigative activity, whether facially proper or not, simply is not a
legislative act within the ambit of the Speech or Debate Clause. If that
claim were made, the only immunity upon which Brick might rely would
be the judicially fashioned immunity accorded public officials who act
within the scope of their authority. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306,
318-324 (1972). Taking this view of Brick's claim, however, would not
significantly change the analysis of the case. We held in McMillan that
the official immunity accorded congressional employees generally will apply
in the same instances as Speech or Debate immunity, i. e., when the
employees are performing "legislative acts." !d., at 324.
Since I would hold that the alleged illegal conduct in the course of
Brick's informal investigation would not be a legislative act for purposes of
the Speech or Debate Clause, the question of judicially created official immunity is answered as well: there can be none where there is no legislative
act. We need not determine whether even properly conducted field in.vestigation would fall outside the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause.
11l
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when a defendant entitled to invoke Speech or Debate immunity moves for summary judgment on tha.t basis, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to adduce evidence affording "more
than merely colorable substance" to allega.tions of actionable
conduct. Dombrowski, 387 U. S., at 84. Otherwise, the
cloak of immunity is not lifted, and summary judgment must
be granted for defendant. This follows from the established
doctrine that Speech or Debate immunity protects Members
of Congress and their aides "not only from the consequences
of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending
themselves." ld., at 85. Sin.ce petitioners moved for summary judgment on the basis of the Speech or Debate Clause,
the courts below were required to determine whether the Dombrowski threshold-evidence affording "more than merely
colorable substance" to the allegations of unimmunized conduct-had been passed with respect to each defendant. 20
~ 0 Respondents were put on notice quite explicitly that by making the
summary judgment motion petitioners were calling upon them to adduce
some evidence tending to connect each defendant. to the alleged wrongdoing. The petitioners made that. point repeatedly at the hearing on the
sumrnary judgment. motion. For example, coum;el for petitioners declared
at one point as follows:
·
" ... rPJart and pa.rtial [sic] of the defense of legislative immunity, is the
immunity of having to fmffer the burdens of extensive litigation.
"This is what. the Supreme Court held in Dombrowski against Eastland . . . . And the only rraHon that Dombrowski againHt Ea!ltland was
permitted to go into ;;ome di;:;covery-and I understand that case has been
dismissed for wnnt of prosecution-the only reason was, there was on the
record a discrrpancy of factual evidence. The documents seemed to show
some discrepancy about. a dale on some subpoena which lent some support
in argument., and the Supreme Court said, in view of this factual dispute,
we need to resolve it a little further before we can consider whether or not
legislative immunity is sufficient to protect [tl1e Member's aide]." Tr. of
Hearing Oct.. 28, 1971, at. 15-16.
More succinct.ly, counsel for petitioners sta.t ed:
" .. . I think the burden should be placed on the plaintiffs to come forward
with any evidence they ma.y have to suggest and demonstrate tha.t these
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Respondents have satisfied the Dombrowski standard as to
allegations of Brick's misconduct. It is stipulated that Brick
inspected the documents subject to the safekeeping order in a
locked vault in Pikevill~ and that he transported copies of
selected ones toWashington. The court below divided evenly
as to whether, in light of the three-judge court's safekeeping
order, the stipulated f~;tcts state a claim under the Fourth
defendants were not acting wit.hin the scope of their legislative duties.
That would present an issue in which we were forewarned. That is the
function of the motion for summary judgment." ld., at 18.
Respondents made a. simila.r argument in a memora11dum supporting their
motion:
"The affidavit. of Senator McClellan filed in support of tlw pending
motions fully e~tablishes the circumstances by which the Senate Committee
conducted its investigation and served the subpol'nas out of which this
litigation arises. Again, nothing in the McSurelys' affidavit furni.shes rrny
facts to demonstmte that Brick, Adlerman, 01· O'Donnell were acting
outside the perimeter of their legislative functions." Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Aut110ritil'o in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgme.n t, Nov. 23, 1971, at 5
(emphasis nddrd).
See aloo Memora11dum of Points and Authorities in Support. of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary .T udgment, Oct. 26,
1971, a.t, 3-4 ; Reply of Defendants McClellan, Adlerman, O'Donnell, and
Brick to Plaintiff's Letter to the Court Dated Sept. 12, 1972, Oct. 13, 1972,
:.tl; 10.

Counsel for respondents indicated that he understood the burden petitioners sought to cast upon him, although he disputed their right to do so:
"Now comes Mr. Goldbloom [counsel for petitioners] and says, prove to
me by facts disputing Senator McClelland's [sic] affidavit that it is not
true, before you can take depositions. How can I do that? And this is
what the trouble is with this whole posture. I am going to file an affidavit
which says he is wrong. I have to say it on information and belief. And
then he is going to come into court and say, it is just on information and
belief." !d., at 43-44.
Thus, there can be no question tha.t respondents were on notice as to the
importance of adducing such evidence as they had with respect to each
-defendant,

76-1621· -MEMO
McADAMS v. McSURELY

15

Amendment. On the present state of the record, however,
there is no basis for concluding that respondents failed to
state a claim, if only for invasion of privacy.~ Some of the
facts at issue in the dispute> as to the validity of the Fourth
Amendment claim were obtained only after oral argument en
bane. 180 U. S. App. D. C._, at 126 n. 84, 553 F. 2d, at 1302
n. 84. There has ooen no opportunity to weigh the various
characteriza.tions of Brick's activity or the meaning of the
three-judge court's safekeeping order. Moreover, the reco·rd
also contains testimony by Brick that he carried to Washington a copy of at least one document that he believed to be
of no relevance to the Subcommittee's investigation of the
riots. 22 Congress possesses no general power to investigate
1

21 At oml argument, comJSel for petitioners acknowledged thf' po~:>Sibility
that the compla,int ma.y state a cause of action under state tort law:
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . . . There is the possibility that under District of Columbia or Kentucky law there is a common-law tort lurking in
the background of this case. That's the reason why we elected not to
make strongly here any arguments a,bout the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, precisely because there may be a.!legations of other bases of
liability based on common law." Tr. of Oml Arg. 21.
22 Brick testified as follows:
"Q. Did you tell Mr. Dotson or any of the folk with whom you met
there that there was some of that stuff that you didn't think that you
needed?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Did you give it back to them?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you need that letter signed Dea.rest Cucumber or address
Dearest Cucumber?
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant.
"THE COURT : He may answer the question .
"THE WITNESS: No. Didn't you say signed Dearest Cucumber and
when in fact, it says addressed to Dearest Cucumber.
"MR. STAVIS : No, I didn't .
"THE WITNESS : Was the question, did I need that letter?
"BY MR. STAVIS :
('Q.. Y ~ . For the perlorlOOllce Qf your duties.
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private affairs, even by subpoena; the subject of the inquiry
must always be one on which legislation could be had. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S., at 504 n. 15. Therefore, Brick's
eopying and transportation of concededly irrelevant material
is sufficient to lift legislative immunity for purposes of a summary judgment motion. Brick's testimony on tha.t subject
ultimately may be explained away, or the inclusion of a single
irrelevant letter may be deemed de minimis. But his tes-.
timony, together with the other factors mentioned above,
is sufficient to carry respondents across the Dombrowski
threshold.
The posture of the ot.her three federal defendants, however,
is decidedly different. The opinion of Judge Leventhal noted
that although "plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement in
possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity
"A. No sir.
"Q. As a matter of fact, in respect. to the performance of your duties,
you didn't need most of the items in that list, did you?
"A. Some of them. There were many others in the locked vault in
the Court House that I would have obtained under the subpoena.
"Q. That what?
"A. That I would ha.ve obtained under the subpoena had not the Sub-committee stopped all action when the d·efendan.ts went into Court.
"Q. Did you-when I was a.Sking my questions about. this Jist of 234
items, there were lots of these items that you didn't need at all, correct?:
"MR. BRESS: Objection. In:elevant.
·"THE COURT: I believe he has alrea.dy answered the questi011 ..

'·'BY MR,'. BRESS :·
'·'Q. What was your answer?
"A. Some, yes.
''Q. Some that yoll did ?
"A. It was·"Q. Lots?
"A. I object to the u:,;e of the word Jots.
"Q. A great many, a grea.t many ?
"A. Oh, 1 will say many. Let me explain. l didn't select any of
<J&l tQJd ~ou ,~' · Al?P · l{}l-1.()2~

thes~
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to permit trial to proceed as to him, the record is silent on
the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and
O'Donnell 'in any activity that could result in liability.' "
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 123, 553 F. 2d, at 1299, quoting Dombrowski, supra, at 84. I agree. In response to defendants'
summa.ry judgment motion and Senator McClellan's a.ffidavit
denying any conspiracy or activities outside the scope of legislative activity, respondents could aver only on information
and belief that the defendants joined in the conspiracy to drive
respondents out of Pikeville and exceeded the bounds of legislative activity. ~ Dombrowski teaches tha.t mere allegations
2

Senator McClellan's affidavit deniPd "an~' conspiracy, collabora.tion or
any other participation of any sort in the allegedly illegal police raid
allegedly planned and conduct<>d by defenda1~t. Ratliff." App. 49. He also
denied tha.t he or his aides had excPeded t.he legislative authority of the
Subcommittee. /d., at. 50. While his aifidavit cont~lins no specific denial
of a Fourth Amendment violat,ion by Brick with respect. to the inspection
of documents in Pikeville, the general denial of exceeding legislative authority must. be read as mnbracing one. It. is only fair to rmd th<' affidavit
that way, since the SJWCific theory of a separate Fourth Amendment viola.tion by Brick-though supportablr on the allega.tions of the amended
complaintr-apparent.ly did not emerge clearly until the case reached the
Court of Appeals.
Examination of the District Court rc•corcl d.iselo~P~ no suggestion by
appellants that Brick's activity in and of it~elf amount<>d to 1L ~eparatP
violation of the Fourth Amenclrnent . In~tPad, plaintiff~' theory of thP ca~e
wa::; tha.t. since the Kentucky search a.nd seizure had bern ruled unconstitutional at t.he time of 1hr Subrommitt<'r tak<'ovrr of the documents, tho
subpoenas were the fruit of the original Kenturk~· :;pizure. This i:; the only
Fourth Amendment tlwor~· ~et forth in 1hr amended compltdn1. App.
32-33. Thus, in the Di»t.rirt Comt tlw theory wat< not. that Brick's
inspection of the document;; in Pikesville wa~< n second violntion of thP
Fourth AmendmPnt , the- i::>:>\IP dividing JudgP WiJkp~· and .Judge Leventhal;
rather, the theor~· then wa::; that. Brick':,: in~peetion, takeover, and the
subsc4nent subpoenas werr the fruit:; of the original ille-gal :senrch nnd
seizure.
Iu th~e circumstance~ , it hardly could be <>xperted that Senator
McClPLlan's affidavit. would declare specifically that there had been U()
23

•

..
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arc not enough.~ There' mut;t be facts of record tending to
connect the defendant to the alleged misconduct. Having
found, properly, that the record was silent as to the involvement of McClellan, Adlerman, and O'Donnell in any activity
that could result in liability, it was the duty of the court
below to reverse the denial of their motion for summary
judgment.
I recognize that this standard imposes a not insubstantial
burden upon plaintiffs who seek to lift the veil of legislative
immunity. This is justified, however, by the purposes served
by the Speech or Debate Clause. As noted above, it is intended to protect Members of Congress and their aides from
"the burden of clt>fending thernselves against unsubstantiated
claims." Dombrowski, supra, at 85. Even where an injunction is not sought, Members are forced "to divert their time,
energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend
the litigation." !d., at 503. Thus, the Clause requires that
motions founded on legislative immunity to "be given the
Fonrt.h Amendmrnt Yiolation b~· Brick. l~e;;pondrnto; hnd not been
pre;;entrd with that tlwor~· of the ca;;P. Siner t.hp amrnded complaint ha!'heen virwrd expa n><ivrly, the SPna tor'~ affidavit eorre:<ponclingly must be
tnkrn a.,; putting in is,;ue all thr allrgation..~ ,;ubsrqurntly read into the
amendE'd complaint. It drnirs, 011 brhalf of all U1P respondents, any
activity out;;ide the scopr of lrglslatJvp aufhority.
To this denial, respondent::; could reply only "on information ru1d belief
[that] the defrndan,t McClellan, together wit.l1 defendants AdlermaJ1,
O'Donnell, and Brick, joined in the conspiracy of U1e defendant Ratliff
to force us out of Pikeville. . . ." App. 55-56. See also n. 19, supra.
They also contested McClellan's general drnial of exceecling legislative
authority, App. 56, but again no facts were adduced.
2
~ Nor may th<' involvemr-nt of tl1e Member or Home of hit-> aide::; br ·
inferred solely from the involvement of other aides. In Dombrowski, summary judgment for Senator Eastland was upheld despite an allegation of
conspiracy and the existence of facts linking his Subcommittee's chief
counsel to possible Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the mere fact
that Brick ma.y have engaged in conduct outside the scope of legislative:
i~un.it~ does not suffice to link the other d~fendants tQ that conduct..
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most expeditious treatment by district courts because one
branch of Government is being asked to halt the functions
of a coordinate branch." Servicemen's Fund, supra, at 511
n. 17.

III
I turn now to respondents' claim that petitioners made
available some of the seized materials to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). The Speech or Debate Clause does not
immunize the dissemination of allegedly actionable material
"beyond the reasonable bounds of the legislative task." Doe
v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 315 (1973). Again, however, a
motion for summary judgment grounded on Speech or Debate
immunity requires a pla.intiff to adduce evidence lending
"more than merely colorable substance" to an assertion of
unlawful dissemination. Dombrowski, supra, at 84.
Respondents argue that they have carried this burden with
respect to their claim that petitioners exhibited to the IRS
the documents Brick obtained in Pikeville. In 1974, they
lodged with the Court of Appeals recently obtained material
indicating that the Subcommittee had permitted agents of
the IRS to inspect portions of the Subcommittee files. Specifically, respondents pointed to a letter of March 5, 1969/~
2~

ThiH letter read as follows:
"UNITlm STATES SENATE

Committee on
Government Operations
Sena.t e Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations
Washmgton, D. C. 20510
March 5, 1969
"Dear Mr. Secretary :
"In accordance with Executive Order 11337, dated March 27, 1967, a·
resolution was duly adopted by the Comm1t.tee on Government Operations on September 18, 1968, with regard to the organizations listed on the·
attached pages. It flhould be noted that. this request. was made on Decem'ber lfi1 196B. prior ttl» tl'm expiration of Rxecuti.ve Order 11337.. This i$
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in which Senator McClellan informed the Secretary of the
Treasury that the Subcommittee had taken certain steps in
September 1968, toward arranging meetings with Internal
Revenue agents for the purpose of exchanging information
about organizations under investigation. Respondents also
emphasized an IRS memorandum "6 showing August 28, 1968,
to reaffirm the same request pursuant to Execut.ive Order 11454 dated
February 7, 1969, and Treasury Decision 6133.
"Pursuant to this re;olution, I hereby designate the following individuals, members of the Subcommittee staff, to make such examinations: Mr.
Philip R. Manuel, Mr. John E. Drass, Mr. Fred P. Miller, Mr. Perman
H. Clay, Mr. James H. Dillon, and Mr. Walter S. Fialkewicz. In, this
connection, it will be appreciatrd if the files could be assembled in the
district office of jurisdiction. In order to facilitMe the work of the staff,
it would be further appreciated if the staff designees be permitted to con~
suit with Internal Revenue Agents and Auditors familiar with the content
of the respective files.
"Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated,
1
'Sii\Cerely yours,
John J. McClellan
Chairman
"Honorable David M. Kennedy
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C."
App., a.t 70.
~u The memorandum rend~ in JWrt inE'nt pnri as follow~:

"FAC1'

SHEET

Es'I'ABLISHMEN1' oF SPECIAL SERVICE STAFF

"Allegations have been made that the Internal Revenue Service esta~
lished the SpeciaJ Service Staff from inst.ruct.ions received from White
House officials. This simply is not tme. The fa.cts are these:
"August 28, 1968. Mr. Philip Manuel, an investigator with the Penna~
nent Committee on Investigations, Sena.to Committee on GovE'rnment
Operations, contacted the Service to say that he had a group of seven
investiga.tors working for him on mntters pert.aining to certain organizations and other groups; that he had prepared a letter for the Chairman,
of the Committee, Honorable John J. McClellan; and that he expected
the request. to be signed shortly. His call was t.o alert. us to the fa.ct that
he wanted the Committee mves6gators to be permitted to discuss these
matters with our District officials rather than to conduct inspectiQn Qf
returns in the National Oftire." App., a.t. 73.
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as the date on which the possibility of a cooperative relationship between Subcommittee and Service was first explored.
Respondents argue that these materials tend to establish that
the defendants exhibited to the Internal Revenue agents the
Pikeville documents, which were not returned to respondents
until November 8, 1968. 27
27 Although the document~ wen~ not returned to the McSurely~ until
November, Brick testified that he returned the Subcommittee copies to
Kentucky authorities on August 14, 1968-two weeks before the initial
exploration of possible coopera.tion between the Subcommittee and the
Service. He also declared that the Subcommittee had made no additional
copies:
"Q. And did they-did there come a time when you returned those
documents?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. During the time that you had possession of the documents, were
they publicly-publicized, distributed or seen by anybody outside of the
Committee?
"A. No, sir, n.nd not by anybody inside of the Committee, either.
"Q. Where were the documents maintained?
"A. In my personal file under lock nnd key nnd the key was always
in my pocket and that was by order of Senator McClellan,.
"Q. Did Sena.tor McClellan look at those recor~?
"A. No, sir. He looked at one.
"Q. Did there come a time when you-a.fter the expiration of certain
litigation between the McSurelys and the officials in Kentucky, did you
then return that batch of documents to the authorities in Kentucky?
"A. I did. I returned them to Thadeus Scott on August 14, 1978.
"Q. And irs the receipt t.hat has been marked listing the 230-somc documents, is that the receipt that you got when you ret.urned them?
"A. That is the receipt I prepared and he signed, yes.
"Q. Did you retain any of the documents there.after or did you make
any copy of any documents and retain them in your file?
"A. I never made a single copy of those documents. I retained none.
I have not now and the Subcommittee has none. All the documents were
returned to Mr. Thadeus Scott. I have never used a Xerox machine on
those documents, although it ha~ been rsnid here a number of times that
I did. I did not." App. 97-98.
This testimony was incorporated in Senator McClellan 's affidavit. accompa.nying tho suromat'y judgment, motion . ld., a,t, 50. Respondents dis.
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The Court of Appeals, however, apparently did not view
respondents' amended complaint as presenting this belated
claim of dissemination outside the Subcommittee:
"The claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234
documents to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was
not made in the amended complaint. This claim arose
because of the disclosure of certain IRS documents,
obtained as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit,
which indicated contacts, beginning on August 28, 1968,
between members of the Subcommittee staff and the IRS
concerning formal access to each other's files." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25 (emphasis added).
The court noted further, ibid., that the complaint "also" made
two other allegations that could have been related to the
dissemination claim. First, there was a cha.r ge that Brick had
exhibited the McSurely documents "to persons whose names
are unknown to pla.intiffs." App. 31-32. Second, the complaint alleged tha.t McClellan has "used the instrumentality
of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal
vendetta between himself and a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private correspondence of the
plaintiff Ma.rgaret McSurely." App. 35. The court pointed
out, however, that there was "no specific allegation that Brick
embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his purported
'vendetta' by dissemination outside the Subcommittee itself.
The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress
apparently rests on access oy the IRS officials." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 558 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25. 28 In sum,
pute it, although they have adduced no facts tending to disprove it.

See

n. 28, infra.
28
The Court of Appt>nb' di:scuHsiou of the pn.rliC's' dispute nnd the tw()
:allegations in t.he amendt>d complainl •iH as follows:
"On November 25, 1974, plaintiff:; filt>d a supplemental affidavit lodging ·
' i.b.~se J:ecentl.y djsclQsed. ffiiltt>rials with the cQurt. The federal defendants.
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the court's conclusion that the dissemination claim "was not
made in the amended complajnt," its distinction between that
claim and the other two claims actually made in the com•
plaint, and its ultimate conclusion that the claim of dissemination rested solely on the newly developed theory indicate that
the Court of Appeals did not believe that the amended com•
plaint encompassed this claim." 0
In light of this apparent conclusion, it is difficult to understand the court's declaration in the same footnote that it was
affirming "the District Court's denial of summary judgment
on this claim," as weli lls the statement to that effect in the
per curiam opinion announcing the judgment. If the com ...
piaint did not encompass the new dissemination claim, there
countered on January 24, 1975, arguing that even if the IRS had gained
access to the Subcommittee files at some point after August 28, 1968, t.he
McSurelys could not have been harmed then•by because the 234 copies
were returned to Commonwealth Detective Scott on August. 14, 1968 (and
received by the McSlirelys oil Novembrr 8, 1968), and Brick had testified
at the McSurelys' contempt trial tha.t he made no copies and that neither
he nor the Subcommittee retained any of the documents, D. A., II, 730.
Plaintiffs, in their rei)ly to defendants' response, filed January 31, 1975, dispute both that the documents were turned over to Scott on August 14,
1968, and that no copies were made. Since we affirm the District Court's
denial of summary judgment on t.his claim, we leave the resolution of this
question to the District Court on remand.
"Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copieg
of the 234 items to un.known persons causing plaintiffs damage and embarrassment, and that McClellan 'used the instrumentality of t.he [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal vendetta between himself ana
a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private corre-·
spondence of the plaintiff Margaret McSurely.' Amended and Suppl..
Com pl. 1]'1]' 19, 28 (b) (li) , App. 45, 50. However, there is no specific allegation that Brick embarrassed plaintiff's or tha.t McClellan pursued his purported 'vendetta' by dissemination outside of the Subcommittee itself. The·
claim of dissemination outside of the Halls of Congress appa.rently rests on
access by IRS officials.'' 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d·,
at 1285 n. 25.
'2 0 The pa.nel opinion waB no clr:urr on this issur.
See 172 U. S. App.
D .. C.,, at 3'Z3-374, and n. 29, 521 F . 2'dl, a.t 103.3.-l034» at1d. n. 29.
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had been no oocasion for the District Court to pass on it5
sufficiency, nor for the Court of Appeals to affirm any judgment thereon. Respondents' belated injection, of the dissemination theory into the case, standing alone, would not amount
to an amendment of the complaint, and no motion to amend
was made. Because there had been no trial, there had been
no admission 6f evidenc<• to which the pleadings could be held
to conform under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 (b). Thus, it is
unclear whether any issue regarding dissemination of the
McSurely materials outside Congress was properly before the
Court of Appeals.
For this reason, we must vacate the judgment of affirmance
as to that claim. \Ve need express no opinion as to the merits
of the dissemination theory." 0 On remand. the Court of
Appeals may determine whether the dissemination claim is
embraced by respondents' amended complaint, or it may take
such other steps with respect to this claim as it deems proper.

IV
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar
as it reversed the refusal of the District Court to dismiss the
portions of the complaint relating to the original seizure of the
McSurelys' materials. I a.lso would affirm the portion of the
judgment directing the entry of summary judgment for petitioners as to claims concerning use of the materials within
Congress. With respect to the claim concerning Brick's inspection of the documents and transportation of copies, I would
affirm as to Brick, but reverse as to McClellan, Adlerman, and
O'Donnell, and remand with directions to enter summary
judgment for them on that cla.im. Finally, I would vacate the
Court of Appeals judgment insofar as it purports to affirm the
denial of summary judgment on the dissemination issue and
remand for further prooeedings consistent with this opinion.
30 Nor is there any reason for 11s to addre~:o: the que~tion whether legisla~
tive immunity or some other form of immunity would protect Members
of Congress and their aides from inquiries concerning the sharing of infol'ma~ion, w~th executive agencies. ·

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE W>< . .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

April 6, 1978

RE: No. 76-1621

McAdams v. McSurely

Dear Byron:
After reading the most interesting exchange between
Lewis and yourself in the above, as one who has been nuncharacteristically silent up to now 11 , I think your approach
has the better of the argument and I'd be inclined to join
an opinion along those lines.
Sincerely,
I '

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

.:in.prtm:t ~ltltri ltf tqt 'Jttittb ;ibtftg
..-ufrhtghtn, ~. ~· 20.?'!~
CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 7, 1978

Re:

76-1621 - McAdams, etc. v. McSurely

Dear Lewis:
I am in general agreement with your memo
of April 6. I am not prepared to open the door to
harassment of Members of the House and Senate.
Interviews with some of the best of those who
retired from Congress in the past few years reflect
their unwillingness to put up with not only "slings
and arrows" from the media but from brigades of
"causists", many of them bent on tearing the entire
system apart.
Members of Congress and Judges should have at
least the comprehensive immunity we have given the
press -- and a lot more. People can "fire"
Congress Members-- hey can't "fire" newspapers!

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

P.S.

(Justice Powell only) My request to you
at the Conference to "write a P.C." was,
of course TIC -- tongue in cheek. You have
developed an excellent analysis.

.iu.prtutt oro-uri ltf tJrt ~tb ~tatrg

jtulrhtgton. ~.

or.

2ll.;t,.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 11, 1978

Re:

No. 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely

Dear Lewis:
I, too, have in your words been "uncharacteristically
silent up to now," but have read with both interest and
enlightenment the correspondence between you and Byron in this
case.

I most certainly agree with you as to the purposes to be

served by legislative immunity.

As you trenchantly put it,

this case "is no garden variety litigation between private parties.
This is an example of legal warfare, conducted now for a full
decade, against a Subcommittee of the United States Senate."
Unfortunately this would not appear to be a unique case.
Congressmen and other governmental officials, because of the
nature of their positions, are frequently subjected to unmeritorious

- 2 -

lawsuits.

With this background in mind, the Court has said:
"It is the purpose and office of the doctrine
of legislative immunity, having its roots as
it does in the Speech or Debate Clause of the
Constitution,
• . that legislators engaged
'in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity'
. • should be protected not only from the
consequences of litigation's results but also
from the burden of defending themselves."
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 u.s. 82, 84-85 (1967).

The present difference in our thinking, I guess, is
the proper means of achieving the purposes of legislative immunity.
As I understand your memoranda, you would protect the legislative
official from unmeritorious lawsuits by modifying the summary

('{o
/

judgment standard of Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc. 56.

In the normal

lawsuit, a defendant who seeks summary judgment in his favor
must affirmatively show "that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that [he]
matter of law."

is entitled to a judgment as a

Where the defendant is a Congressman or

congressional aide, however, you, I gather, would require the
plaintiff, once the defendant denies the allegations, to come
forward with "evidence affording 'more than merely colorable
substance' to the allegations of unimmunized conduct."

Though

- 3 -

I agree entirely with your objective, my present feeling is that
fhis "procedural" means of protecting government officials from
unmeritorious claims would turn out to be both unworkable and
unwise.
To begin with, I am not sure that the announcement of a
heightened summary judgment standard will greatly increase the
number of unmeritorious claims that will be disposed of on
summary judgment.

As Byron's disagreement with you demonstrates,

"evidence affording more than merely colorable substance" will be
interpreted and applied differently by each judge.

In your

view, this language is a heightened standard for summary judgment
and would call for summary judgment here.

In Byron's view,

rowever, this language merely represents "a careful application
of F.R. Civ. P. 56" and, applied to this case, does not call for
summary judgment.

Even in a case as seemingly weak as the

instant one, many judges are likely to take Byron's view and
require the case to be tried.
Your language, as with all broad standards, will be "stretched"
according to the proclivity of the particular district court
judge before whom it comes.

According to Professor Wright,

even as Rule 56 is currently written, there is "much confusion"
as to the exact

showing required to defeat a motion for

summary judgment7 the necessary showings vary depending on

- 4 "the differing views various judges have as to the utility and
application of this procedural device."
Courts, 495-496

(1976).

Wright, Law of Federal

I fear that your standard may be even

more open-ended in its worcling and will be subject to the same
varying interpretations.
Even assuming that every lower court judge will apply the
standard that you propose with a vigor equal to yours, I wonder
how many litigants will find themselves unable to meet it in
practice.

In my memorandum in Butz, I observed that "any legal

neophyte" can frame a complaint of constitutional dimensions;
if you give that legal neophyte one or two experiences in the
courtroom, I would venture to extend the observation to defeating
motions for summary judgment even where a heightened variety of
scrutiny is applicable.

In this case, the respondents initially

offered no affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment.

If the case were remanded in line with Byron's

fuinking, however, I have li t tle doubt that respondents would be
able to come up with some form of affidavit lending "more than
mere colorable substance" to their claims.

-
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Indulging my inclination to beat a dead horse, I should
note my fear that a heightened summary judgment standard
may be even less of an answer to a case like Butz, where, if
only a qualified immunity is extended, the judgment may well turn
on the defendant's state of mind.

I assume that even under your

heightened summary judgment standard a plaintiff will not have to
introduce counter-affidavits on the defendant's state of mind.
As Professor Wright notes, usually it simply "is not feasible to
resolve on motion for summary judgment cases involving state of
rrind."

Wright, Law of Federal Courts, 493

Goldsmith, 224 F. 2d 753
Court.

(1976).

See Subin v.

(CA 2 1955), relying on cases of this

Once it is held that only qualified immunity is to be

accorded, public officials will be protected only from payment
of damages at the end of the lawsuit, and then only if the jury
chooses to believe their account of the facts.

A heightened

summary judgment standard, combined with an expedited time frame,
will be of little, if any, help.
Getting back to the case before us, I cannot dispel my
whether
doubtsL
your proposal would aid in carrying out the goal
of legislative immunity in protecting congressional officials
from the time, worry and expense of combatting unmeritorious claims.

- 6 But even if I could dispel those doubts, I would be hesitant to
create an exception to the normal standard of Rule 56.

I think

a good case can be made that the entire evolution of the English
common law -- from the original forms of action, to ·the
intermediate stage where the forms of action were abolished but
code pleading existed in some states and law and equity were
separate in most, to the present stage where the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or their state counterparts govern virtually
all civil actions -- has been a monumental change for the better.
It has taken hundreds of years to accomplish, and is based on
the notion that whatever the substance of the lawsuit may be,
procedurally the suit may be litigated by following uniform
rules in the form of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If

we try to modify those rules in one area of the law, we will
mevitably invite modification, or at least claims for modification,
in other areas of the law which will be difficult to distinguish
from those which we will have already

allowed~

The result, it

seems to me, will be a setback for what is presently a relatively
uniform system of procedure through which all of the myriad
substantive grist of the legal mill is processed.

- 7 Finally, I should note that I simply don't believe that there
are the votes for your heightened standard for summary judgment.
Byron, with whom Bill Brennan apparently agrees, would only
accord petitioners "a careful application of Fed Rules of Civ.
Proc. 56" which, of course, is exactly what every federal
defendant is entitled to.

And, as you might gather from the

above, I also would find it very difficult to join an opinion drawn
along the procedural line that you suggest, even though I agree
completely with the end result which you seek.
My own solution to the problem of protecting

congressional

~

officials from the intrusion of unmeritorious legal claims, and
a solution that I believe is time honored, not surprisingly
parallels my thinking in Butz v. Economou.

While, as the above

discussion might have already revealed, I have not given this
particular case as much thought as either you or Byron, I will
hazard my own effort to trace out the resolution of this dispute
along those lines.

I

which must indicate that my thinking is not too far out of line
with yours.

-
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I begin by agreeing with Byron that the Speech or Debate
Clause protects even illegal activity within its coverage, see
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421

u.s.

491 (1975),

but that it probably does not cover as far as field investigations.
We have already given a relatively expansive reading to the
activities covered by the Speech or Debate Clause; extending
its protection to field investigations might be stretching its
fabric a step too far.
Because there is no doubt that Congress has the power to
carry on field investigations, and because those investigations
are in furtherance of Congress' functions, I would also agree with
Byron that congressional officials should enjoy common law
crficial immunity in such investigations even where Speech or Debate
Clause protection ends.

Support for this position can be found

in Byron's opinion in Doe v. McMillan, 412

u.s.

306, 318-324

(1972), as you note in fn. 19 of your present draft.

Indeed, it

would strike me as odd to, as I presume we would, extend official
immunity to the investigative activities of cabinet officials,
cf., Butz, and state legislators, cf., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341

r

(

I
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u.s.

367 (1951), but not to congressional officials.

In short,

I would limit Speech or Debate Clause protection to conduct which
i

an "integral part of the deliberative and communicative process,"

Gravel v. United States, 408

u.s.

606, 625 (1972), but, as with

any other governmental official, extend official immunity whenever the defendant is acting within his official authority.

(Should

____________

I assume from your new footnote 19 that, assuming it is ultimately
determined that Brick violated respondents' Fourth Amendment
rights, you would not accord Brick even qualified immunity?
I assume that the gist of Byron's proposal is that Brick
would at least be entitled to a good faith defense.)
Under this framework, resolution of this case would turn
on our ultimate disposition in Butz.

Analogizing from my position

Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's General Counsel), and
Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel), and
remand to the Court of Appeals with directions to dismiss the

L

McSurelys ~'

action as to them.

I would accord only qua l ified

immunity, however, to Brick and allow the action as to him to
proceed on towards trial.

As for the dissemination claim, I agree

- 10 with you that it should be remanded for a determination of
whether it is embraced in respondents• amended complaint.

(If

the Court were to conclude that the dissemination claim is
embraced in the amended complaint, I would at a minimum direct
the Court of Appeals to dismiss as to McClellan, Adlerman and
O'Donnell, who as noted above should enjoy absolute official
irnrnun i ty. )
In conclusion, I agree with Parts I, III and IV of your
memorandum and the result reached in Part II.

I cannot, however,

join in your "procedural" answer to the problem of unmeritorious
suits against congressional officials.

As Learned Hand

(Thurgood, I know you won't read past this point) recognized in
his famous quotation from Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579,
581 (1948), a balance of the evils involved in, on the one hand,
unpunished truancy of public officials and, on the other, the
subjection of honest officials to unmeritorious lawsuits,
calls for absolute immunity:
"It does indeed go without saying that
an official, who is in fact guilty of using
his powers to vent his spleen upon others,
or for any other personal motive not connected
with the public good, should not escape
liability for the injuries he may so cause; and,

-
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if it were possible in practice to confine
such complaints to the guilty, it would be
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification
for doing so is that it is impossible to know
whether the claim is well founded until the
case has been tried, and that to submit all
officials, the innocent as well as the guilty,
to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable
danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of
their duties. Again and again the public
interest calls for action which may turn out to
be founded on a mistake, in the face of which
an official may later find himself hard put to
it to satisfy a jury of his good faith.
There
must indeed be means of punishing public officers
who have been truant to their duties; but that is
quite another matter from exposing such as have
been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has
suffered from their errors. As is so often the
case, the answer must be found in a balance between
the evils inevitable in either alternative.
In
this instance it has been thought in the end
better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to subject those who try
to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."
While it is tempting to embrace a heightened summary judgment
standard as a theoretically more highly tuned solution to this
tradeoff, I am convinced for the reasons outlined above that it
will fail.

Rather than culling the good from the bad, it will

merely open up all public officials to unwarranted and burden-

- 12 ·-

some lawsuits at the benefit of compensating those few
plaintiffs who are actually injured.
Sincerely,

~0-'
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

ROC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
FROM:
RE:

Bob

DATE:

April 12, 1978

Justice Rehnquist's Position in McSurely, No. 76-1621

I do not think that Justice Rehnquist's approach
to this case will hold water, even on his own terms.

The

initial problem is that he starts from his Butz position
and assumes that all the federal officials must have
absolute immunity for actions within official authority.
WHR memo, p. 9.

This creates some tension with your views

in Butz, since it's not clear what would be the historical
justification for cutting the immunity away from its
historical mooring in the Speech or Debate Clause.
Moreover, it is not clear why the field investigation, to
which WHR would accord only qualified immunity, does not
fall within this range.

He says on p. 8 that field

investigations are clearly within the ambit of
congressional power.

2.

The more important problem with WHR's analysis is
that it does not seem to avoid the very problem it sets
~

out to avoid:

an insistence

~

a relatively stringent

~

summary judgment standard.

There is an allegation that

the three Washington defendants and Brick were engaged in
a conspiracy.

Thus, unless the Dombrowski "more than

merely colorable" standard is applied to them, they
probably cannot hide behind their individual absolute
immunities:

they are linked to Brick's activity by virtue

of the pleadings.
That is why we had to resort to the Dombrowski
route in the first place, and WHR does not explain how he
is avoiding it.

If there is no requirement of a showing

of more than merely colorable substance as to the
participation of

~

defendant, then WHR's theory would

seem incapable of getting the Washington defendants out of
the case.

He is merely changing the name of the immunity

he is applying:

he is doing nothing to the state of the

pleadings.

'•

;ittprtltt.t <!Jll'Urlltf tlrt 'Jbti:t~ ~httt.s'

JlzurJringhm. ~. <!J.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 12, 1978

Re:

76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely

Dear Lewis:
Although I still have a good deal of uncertainty about
this case, my present views are:

~

v

1.

That Bill Rehnquist is correct in his unwillingness to
bend the summary judgment rule to dispose of this case:

2.

That Bill and Byron are correct in their unwillingness
to extend Speech and Debate immunity to include
informal information gathering activity:

3.

That we should not create a new absolute immunity for
legislators or their aides, beyond that authorized by
the Speech and Debate Clause:

4.

That there is no need to venture into the factual
thickets explored by Byron and Lewis because the
questions presented by the certiorari petition do not
embrace the sufficiency of the allegations of the
complaint or the sufficiency of an affirmative defense
of good faith: and

5.

That the dissemination of information by a legislative
committee to the executive should be considered a
legislative act entitled to immunity.

In short, except for the dissemination claim, I
substantially agree with Byron's views. I also do not think
much of plaintiff's lawsuit but I am not sure that defendants'
conduct was exemplary either.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

Dear
•iiOO··!I: ~ ~~1i 'l:

Thanks for your memorandum in this case. I am
glad that we are relatively close on the result, and I can
appreciate your concern over the summary judgment rules. I
am not sure, however, that I understand why your reliance
on absolute official immunity serves to avoid recourse to
the heightened summary judgment procedure outlined in Part
II-B of my memorandum to the Conference.
Everyone who has spoken so far seems to agree that
enough facts have been adduced as to Brick's possible
wrongdoing to keep him in the case. The trouble starts
with the three Washington defendants - McCleJlan, Adlerman,
and O'Donnell. There is an allegation of conspiracy among
Brick and those three to carry on various non-legislative
activities in Kentucky and elsewhere. Thus, the Washington
defendants are tied into whatever non-legislative actions
Brick was performing out in the field, unless there is a
requirement - as I believe there i.s under Dombrowski v.
Eastland, 387 u.s. 82 (1967) - that the plaintiffs adduce
f'acts--or affidavits tending to establish "more than merely
colorable" substance to the charges of wrongdoing ~~ ~Q
each defendant.

- - --- ---

It seems to me that you have not avoided this
problem simply by changing the name of the immunity you are
applying to the Washington defendants. ~h~Ra~e
Clause immunity is also a
bsolute immuni~y,~so- tnat-your
approach an
1 e
hould not d1 · er w1
r pect to the
light they cast upon the pleadings. In other words, the
problem is not the scope of the immunity, but the posture
of the case on summary judgment. Shifting from Speech or
Debate to official immunity does not alter this, as I view
the case.

-2T'

In addition, as you would expect, I have some
difficulty applying your analysis in Butz to this case.
But apart from this more general problem, I am unable to
see how taking your approach obviates resort to the sort
summary judgment procedure you wish to avoid.
Nor do I agree, at least as to federal practice,
that we cannot influence (if not require) district courts
to hold plaintiffs who sue government officials to a
stricter standard on summary judgment than in an FELA case ,·
- whether the official claims qualified immunity or
- '"
absolute immunity. The policy considerations ldenti.fied on
p. 17 of
.. my memo, and recognized Jn our cases, justify this. '1·····
;~

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

.._.,;;.

X'

:1·"
"'

'l!ii

f.

\•

The

,.

,,

l

'

'>!!'

Dear John:
. . :··'I am beginning to feel, in view of the fusillades
launched 'in my direction, that my foxhole is not deep
'!'.
enough, ; and that I had best keep qui~t _ ..
'
'

~

'1

But ~ ~ill respond briefly' t~ your letter m~rely
to say that as to two of your five points, we are not in
disagreement. If it were necessary to decide that Speech
or Debate immunity does not include informal information
gathering, I would agree·. This question t<~as expressly left
open in my memo.
·
.,

· :, .~ ~-~ Nor would I create any "new absolute immunity" or,
indeed, any new immunity of any kind. My point was that an
aide (e.g., Brick}, if not entitled to invoke Speech or
Debate-Clauser-mmuni ty, could re1 at least on
alified
otfl~i~unity.
As the case now stan s, however, this
quest1on--i~ presented.
See note _, :in my memorandum.
.

l·

~

.
As to the fifth point in your letter
(dissemination to the IRS), I would simply leave that issue
open. On the record before us, . I am not at all s~re that
it' is
'-·, ,i.n,,, the case.
~
.. "
" ".. •n
:1.1'<

1~

~\8:.~<-

We are in disagreement as to the duty of a
District Court, where Speech or Debate immunity is the
issue. The policy considerations identified in Dombrowski
and Servicemen's Fund then would require a DC, i'n-my view:to expect-a plaintiff to go beyond vague "information and
belief" allegations.
•
'l.

't;

~-;

_,, ..,.

•:\

J'';d(

We disagree also as to the questions fairly raised
by the petition and brief of the Solicitor General. I
think a fair reading makes clear that he did raise the
issue whether a viable Fourth Amendment claim was raised by
McSurelys' pleadings and affidavits.

-2~ ').'1

You have mentioned, rightly, that we seem this •
Term to be "burying" a number of the Court's prior
decisions. In my view Dombrowski, a case similar in many
respects to this one, can-be added to the list if the Court
concludes that the McSurJeys hav~ shown "more than merely
colorable substance" to their allegations.

I do not wish bad luck on any of my Brothers, but
I would not be "bitter" - to use the Chief's term if this
cat were now put on "someone else's back". I aJready have
spent as much time on this "loser" as Bill Brennan and I
~
did a couple of years ago on Murg..!~· '
., "''
Sincerely,

Mr.
lfp/ss
cc: "The Conference

;...·•·,

'.~!'·

l"'

April '14, 1978 :\'
l~v

,.

· t Si~ce the~e were no "takers" of my generous offer
thj s ,mornl.ng · to reU nquish my ., interest in ~E~.!:!!~Jr, I , wi lJ.
continue the dialogue.
·
~
~·

-~--

-.

~., ~~>1\:
t;

: .. 1

•

~

f]'- f

~-

~.t.

j,".

Some of the circulated comments indi cat'e a
perception tha~ Part II B of my initial. memo would ;~~~;~
undercut Ru e 56. This is neither its pur. pose nor its :( ''\,
effect. Rather, I have attempted, .. · n , j ght of the '
'
teaching of Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 u.s. 82 (1967), to
be fai thfu1. to-the purposes ofa-consti tutional provision
-- the Speech or ,Debate Clause.
'

'

·~

I.~)

;

;

,, ,: 'f

,,

.
It is that Clause that provides fo! congressional
defendants protection from the burdens ,of litigation. It
is that constititutional immunity · that requires plaintiffs
to come forward with "more than merely colorable substance
to [their] assertions" before a lawsuit can be allowed to
proceed against such defendants.. Id., at 84 . A Rule 56
motion is merely the avenue for affording that procedural
protecti6n, ~ which actually derives from the Constitution
itself •• My view of this aspect of ~the case would be the
same if there were 0no Rule 56 .
~,.. ~u'J.i.!"
·r,.
/
~":''

'I'

X

'

,
·•· I would be glad to amend my memorandum, or to add
a footnote to this effect, if this is a stumbling block
for other Members of . the Court . _ ••
if,~ ;;,;;/' ~~:

;~;

..

;!;:

.k

J,•

~u.prttttt

<!fqmigf tlrt ~tb ~tzdtg
jtuftitt:gton, ~. <!f. 2ll.;i'l-$

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 17, 1978

Re:

No. 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely

Dear Lewis:
I think that your willingness to "continue the dialogue"
in this case is admirable, and that the case is one of those
whe re additional dialogue might produce a consensus which is
not apparent now.
As to the summary judgment point involving Rule 56, I
may have expressed myself too strongly, and if so would like to
now set the matter straight in the interest of obtaining a
consensus if one is possible.
I think that the phraseology
from Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 u.s. 82 (1 967), to the effect
that the plaintiffs must come forward with "more than merely
colorable substance to [their] assertions" before a lawsuit can
be allowed to proceed against defendants protected by the Speech
and Debate Clause is one of those phrases that sounds good until
you try to apply it. Since you were not the author of the
language in the case, I feel no reluctance in asking "What does
it mean?" My impression of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is that they were designed to require trial on the merits of all
contested actionsL_~li~~e there was no "genuine issue of material
fact", and to permit summary judgment with respect to the latter.
I think the creation of a hybrid, which you are quite correct
in citing Dombrowski v. Eastland as supporting, is inconsistent
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with these rules. If the immunity is absolute there should be
no requirement of "more than merely colorable substance to
[their] assertions", other than the assertion that the official
was acting outside the scope of his official duties, in order
to have their case dismissed.
If, on the other . hand, there is
merely a "qualified good faith-reasonable" privilege, then, as
I suggested in my earlier memorandum, this is the sort of battle
that a defendant asserting such a privilege should never be able
to win on summary judgment.
I agree absolutely with you as to the result~ everybody
but Brick should succeed on the immunity defense.
I am perfectly
willing to call that defense an extension of the Speech or Debate
Clause immunity, or another form of the doctrine of official
immunity. But I think we ought frankly to recognize that if
these defendants are to be released on immunity at the pre-trial
stage, their immunity cannot defend on their own good faith
or the reasonableness of their belief~ the only point in issue
can be whether or not they were acting within the outer perimeters
of their official duty, and this seems to me so patently clear
that a motion for summary judgment would be warranted.
Thus my disagreement with you, to the extent that it may
have been expressed in my earlier memorandum, comes not from a
disagreement as to result but from a preference for acknowledging
that some aspects of the privilege which the defendants claiming
in this case, whether it be denominated an extension of the
Speech and Debate Clause or a form of official immunity, be
recognized as a doctrine of substantive law, rather than just an
increased procedural burden. I don't think the quoted languag e
fran Dombrowski v. Eastland is susceptible to the principled
application by this Court or by other courts.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.,

Dear Chief:
One of your clerks called to inquire whether I had
formally "relinquished" the assignment to me of this case.
I suppose the answer i.s "no", i.f emphasis is
placed on the word "formal". My records indicate you are
the only Brother who joined me completely. Bi1J Rehnquist
joined me in the result only. Byron has circulated views
differ i.ng substant 'tally from mine, ano Bi.Jl Brennan has
' joined Byron. John Stevens also has indicated substantial
agreement with Byron. I do not have any record of having
heard from Potter., Thurgood or Harry.
:,
I think I commented at a Conference someti.me ago
that in view of this diversity of oplnion, I have no idea
how to reconcile it. I cannot tell at this point whether
there is a majority for any particular judgment.
As to my own position, I remain firm in Parts I
and II. I indic~ted in my letter of April 5 to Byron that
I had had considerable djfficu1ty with Part III, and that
his reading of Judge Leventhal's opinion was a plausible
one. I could modi.fy Part III to accord with Byron's
reading of the opinion, but my result still would differ
from his because of our difference as to the constitutional
burden plaintiffs bore in the summary judgment proceeding
under Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 u.s. 82 (1967).
In any event, in these bewildering circumstances,
more than happy to relinquish any residual cJajm to
opinion that may lurk in your records.
SlncereJy,

Chief Justice

.iltprtnt.t Qftturl ttf flrt ~nittb .§bdtg
~asqittgLtn, ~. Qt. 2.0.?'1-~
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 6, 1978

Re:

76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
In light of Lewis' memo of June 5, I propose
we discuss this case "one last time" at Thursday's
Conference. My records parallel Lewis' as to the
respective stances of each of you who have responded.
Depending upon Potter's, Thurgood's and Harry's
views, a reassignment, or assignment, as the case
may be, might be necessary.

;0:

.(r~ ; , :
Morituri te salutamus!
The important point to make at Conference is
that you are not rewriting Rule 56, but carrying out
the mandate of the Speech or Debate Clause as interpreted in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
If a Court does not form around your position,
I would recommend strongly that you vote to DIG.
plethora of

The

opinions and rationales that would

follow our failure to get a Court could disastrously
confuse this area of the law for years to -come.

~~~

.:iuprttttt <qtnttt 4tf tlr~ ~nitta ~htttg
._.Mftittgbm. ~. <q. 2ll.;i~$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

/

June 7, 1978

Re:

No. 76-1621

-

McAdams v. McSurely

Dear Lewis:
If it gives you any comfort, prior to tomorrow's

conference, this is to let you know that generally I lean
toward your proposed disposition of the case. There are
some bumps along the way for me, but you also encountered
some.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

cc: The Conference

tlrt ~b .§bdtg
JfaslrittgLtn. J. QJ. 2!T~'l-~

.ilt}Jrmtt (!fltltrl o-f

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 7, 1978

Memorandum to the Conference
Re: 76-1621, McAdams v. McSurely
My views in this case parallel those expressed
by Bill Rehnquist in his letter of April 11 to Lewis
Powell.

P. S.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 7, 1978

Memorandum to the Conference
Re: 76-1621, McAdams v. McSurely
My views in this case parallel those expressed
by Bill Rehnquist in his letter of April 11 to Lewis
Powell.

P. S.
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CHAMBERS OF

June

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely

Dear Byron;
I am with you.

Sincerely,

#,1tA .
T.M.

Mr. Justice White

cc:

The Conference

a,
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Pl£AS£ RETURN-

TO FILE
1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs
No. 76-1621
Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor On Writ of Certiorari
of the Estate of John L. McClellan,
to the United States
et al., Petitioners,
Court of Appeals for
v.
the District of CoAlan McSurely et ux.
lumbia Circuit.
'[March - , 1978]
MR. JusTICE PowELL announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the following opinion.*
This case presents important issues concerning the scope
of legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. 1
Specifically, the original petitioners-a Vnited States Senator
and three members of a committee staff-co11tend that the
Clause protects them from suits based on the alledegd use of
illegal means in the course of field investigations related to
congressional inquiries. They also argue that, on this record,
respondents have not adduced sufficient evideuce connecting
them to the alleged illegal actions to lift the cloak of legislative immunity. For the reasons that follow, we reject the
first contention, but agree with the second argument as to
three of the four petitioners.
I
In 1967, Alan and Margaret McSurely were field organizers
for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., in Pike
County, Ky. Alan McSurely also had served as a field orga*Part II of

thi~

opiniou

i~ joined

only by

THE

CHmF

JusTICE

and

Mn. l

JUSTICE BLACKMUN.

Article I , § 6, cl. 1, provides that ''for Sprech or Drbate in either House,
[Senato!1l and Represrntative;; I Hhall not be q11estioncd in any other Place."
1

I '
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nizer for the National Conference of New Politics and
distributed literature for Vietnam Summer. On the night of
August 11, 1967, under authority of a warrant charging seditious a.ctivities against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and
the United States in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. ~ 432.040,
Pike County officials arrested the McSurelys and seized a
quantity of books, pamphlets, and letters found in their
home. Shortly after the raid, Thomas Ratliff, Commonwealth Attorney for Pike County, announced publicly that the
seized material would be made available to any Congressional
Committees interested in the McSurelys.
On September 14, 1967, a three-judge District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, one judge dissenting, declared
the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional on its face and
enjoined state prosecution of the McSurelys. M cSurely v.
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 1967). The court ordered
that all the seized material "be held by rRatliff] in safekeeping
until final disposition of this case by appeal or otherwise."
App. 78.
Soon after issuance of the District Court's order, Ratliff
received a telephone call from Lavern Duffy, Assistant Counsel
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations. The Subcommittee, which was headed by Senator McClellan, was investigating the causes of various riot.c;; across the Nation, including·
one that had occurred in Nashville, Tennessee, in April 1967.
Some of the Subcommittee's information showed that the
organizations with which thf' McSurelys were a.ffiliated might.
have been involved in the Nashville riot. Hence, Duffy
asked Ratliff whether the materials seized from the McSurelys
were in his custody. Ratliff replied that they were, and on
October 8, 1967, a Subcommittee investigator, John Brick,
arrived in Pikeville, the county seat.
That same evening Thadeus Scott, a Commonwealth detective~ visited l3tkk'a motel room. and gave Brick photocopies

75-1621-0PlN!ON
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pf 234 of the seized documents.

The next morning, Brick
_,pent an hour examining the originals in a locked room at the
Pike County courthouse. Apparently, Ratliff tried to reach
the members of the three-judge court before, permitting Brick
to enter the locked room. He succeeded in reaching the dissenting member of the court, but what transpired is not clear. 2
Brick also visited the Clerk of the District Coutt, who
allowed him to inspect the case file of the McSurelys' threejudge court action. Brick arranged to have the Clerk send
him a copy of the court's safekeeping order and the inventory
of seized items. On October 12, 1967, Brick again entered the
locked room at the county courthouse and spent four hours
taking notes on the materials. He then returned to Wa.shington, taking with him the 234 copies that Scott had given him.
This material included one personal letter addressed to Mrs.
McSurely, which concededly had no relevance to Brick's investigation. At Senator McClellan's direction, Brick prepared
subpoenas duces tecum for some of the material in Ratliff's
possession that Senator McClellan concluded would be relevant to the investigation of the Nashville riot.
The McSurelys moved before the three-judge court to
prevent Ratliff from releasing the subpoenaed materials.a On
October 30, 1967, the court denied the motion and directed the

2
At the McSurely';; sub::;rqnent trial for contempt of Congrr~~, ser n. 5,
infra, Ratliff testified that "I had my permission" before he a11owed Brick
access to the stored materials. Defendants' Appendix 407, United States
v. McSurely, Nos. 24,812, 24,813 (DC 1971). The implica.tion of this
sta.tement was that the dissenting judge gave "permission," but that is not
clear. Moreover, the scope of any permission remains unexplained. Ra.tliff
conceded that he had not communicated with the cocustodian of the
materials, United States Marshal Archie Kraft, before permitting Brick to
inspect the materials. /d., at 407-408.
:• The MrSurely::; did not prrmi~e thrir oppo::;i1 ion to 1he ::;ubpo<'llllH upon
any allegedly unla.wful activity on Brick's part in impecting and transporting the documents. Indeed, they testified that they did not even become
aware of Brick's actual role until December 5, 1967. Id., at 655-65fJ,
681-682, 704-705, 707-709.
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parties to cooperate with the Subcommittee.' Further litiga·
tion rnsucd." culminating in an oruer of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in July 1968, holding that since the time
for appeal from the judgment of the District Court striking
down the sedition statute had expired, there was no basis for
continued court custody. The court ordered the seized mate.
rials returned to the McSurelys, M cSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F. 2d
817 (CA6 1968), and noted that questions as to the validity of
the subpoenas still were open. According to Brick, the Sub·
committee's photocopies were returned to Detective Scott on
August 14, 1968. The originals and copies were returned to
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968. Upon receipt of these
materials, the McSurelys were served with new subpoenas.
On March 4, 1969, McSurelys appeared before the Subcommittee and refused to comply with the subpoenas. Their
refusal rPsultcd in a conviction for contempt of Congress, 6 but
in December 1972, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the subpoenas were
the fruit of two Fourth Amendment violations: (i) the original
seizure by Kentucky officials, and (ii) Brick's "unauthorized
search and inspection of the documents" in violation of the
~ The court's ordPr rrad in part as follows:
"The parties to this action and the officers of this Court are directed to
·c ooperate with the Senate Committee in making available such of the
materials, or copies thereof, as the Committee considers pertinent to its
inquiry; but until time for appeal is expired, this will be done in such
ma.nnPr as to keep intact those materials that may be pertinent to the
appeal of this case."
It. cannot b<> detPrmined whether thi~ may be read as a retroactive
ratification of Brick'~; in~prctiou and transportation activties. There is
notlung in thP rpcord bPforr u~ to indicate that. the three-judge court was
appri~Nl of thoRP activitir~ . SPr lRO U. S App. D. C., at. 117 n . 59, 553
.F. 2.d, at 1293 11. 59.
" For a synopsis of that litigation's course, see the opinion below of
Judge Wilkey, id., at 132-133, 553 F. 2d, at 1308-1309.
n Thr variom; te:stimony refprred to in thi~ memorandum was given at the
\'OC\lltempt trial. See, e. g., n. 1, S'Uprq.
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three-judge court's safekeeping order. United States v.
McSurely, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 154-155, 473 F. 2d 1178,
1191-1192 (1972).
On the same day that they appeared before the Subcommittee, the McSurelys filed this action/ alleging that Se11ator
McClellan, Brick, Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's
General Counsel), Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's
Chief Counsel), and individual Members of the Subcommittee
had conspired to violate the McSurelys' constitutional rights.
They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $50,000
damages from each defendant. The action was stayed to permit the contempt trial to proceed. McSurely v. McClellan,
138 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 426 F. 2d 664 ( 1970). In September 1971, while the appeal of their contempt conviction wa.s
pending, the McSurelys filed an amended complaint, naming
Ratliff, McClellan, Brick, Adlerman, and O'Donnell as defendants. The amended complaint alleged in essence that the
federal defendants had conspired with Ratliff to carry out an
illegal raid in 1967, and to inspect, tran,sport, and use the seized
materials in violation of the McSurelys' constitutional and
other rights. On October 26, 1971, petitioners moved to
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the
basis of legislative immunity, failure to state a claim, and
collateral estoppel by virtue of the contempt convictiou.A The
motion was denied and petitioners appealed. 11
7 Li~h:d with the MrSurely~ as plaintiffs in thiH initial complaint were
three associations with which they were connected: the Southern Conference
Educational Fund, the Southern Student Organizing Committee, and the
Students for a Democratic Society.
~ Ratliff did not joill thi~ motion.
1' Normally the denial of a motion for ~ummar~· judgment i;; uot appealable because it is not a final decision for purposes of § 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
See generally 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ~ 56.21 [2], at. 56-1275 to
56--1286 (2d ed. 1976). The Court of Appeals. however, adopted the
reasoning of the panel opinion, which hE>Id that this particular denial had
"sufficient in,dicia of finality," 172 U. S. App. D . C. 364, 371, 521 F . 2d
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In 1974, while petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, respondents obtained
documents thought by them to indicate that the Subcommittee
had established an information-sharing relationship with the
Internal Revenue Service. These documents were lodged with
the Court of Appeals, together with affidavits suggesting that
petitioners might ha.ve exhibited the allegedly wrongfully
seized materials to agents of the Internal Revenue Service.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, en bane, affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remallded. 1 " Judge Leventhal wrote for
himself and four others, as did Judge Wilkey. Senior Jqdge
Danaher, who had sat on the panel, joined Judge Wilkey's
1024, 1031, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United Sta.tes, 370 U. S. 294, 308
(1962), to qualify as a.pJ)('alable, even t.hough it was not a. deci.~ion that
ended t.he action. The panel observed that the Speech or Debate Clause,
upon which the summary judgment motion was focused, protects Members
of Congress and their aides from the burdens of defending themselves as
well as from the consectuences of the litigation. 172 U.S. App. D. C., at 372,
521 F. 2d, at 1032, citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82,85 (1967).
Reasoning that the asserted right to be free of the burdens of a. la.wsuit,
would be irretrievably lo~t if the case procof'dcd to trial, the panel concluded that an appeal from the final judgment would come too late to provita meaningful review of that ela.im. Hence, a.s to the assertion of immunity from inquiry, the denial of summary judgment. was held a. "final
decision" for purpol:les of § 1291. 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 372, 521 F.
2d, at 10:32. Neithcr :>idE' chall<-nge:-; that. analyl:li~ hrrl'. Sec all:lo Cohen v.
Beneficial Loan Corp., :~a7 U.S. 541 (1949) .
w While thc ca~c was in 1ht> Court of Appeals, Brick and Adlcrman died.
180 U . S. App. D. C., at 104 n. 1, 55:{ F. 2d, a,t 1280 n. 1. The Court of
Appenls did not decide whether the actions against. them survived, lea.ving
that issue for the District Court 01\ remand. In August 1977, respondent
moved in the District Court to ~ubstitute t.he survivors or estates for Brick
and Adlerrnan. Petitioners oppose that. motion, arguing tha.t respondents'
delay caused t.he a.ction to abate. They nevertheless named Brick and
Adlerman as petitioners in case this opposition should fa.il. See Fed. Rule
App. Proe. 43 (a). We need not pass on the questions either of surviva.l or
· aba.tement of the actions.
Senator McClellan died while the case was pending before this Court.
His executor was substituted under Rule 48 (1) of this Courj,,

i"

76-16'21-0PINION
McADAMS v. McSURELY

7

opmiOn, but wrote a separate opinion as well. The court
unanimously reversed the refusal to dismiss that part of the
complaint relating to the original seizure of the McSurelys'
materials by Kentucky authorities. The court also agreed
unanimously that summary judgment should have been
granted as to the portion of the complaint charging unlawful
use of the material within Congress itself. 180 U. S. App.
D. C. 101, 104, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (1976). Respondents do
not dispute those actions here.
The Court of Appeals, again unanimously, affirmed what it
designated as the denial of summary judgment as to those
portions of the complaint alleging dissemination of the material outside of Congress. Ibid. 11 By an evenly divided vote,
it affirmed the denial of summru•y judgment on the allegations
that Brick had violated the McSurelys' rights by inspecting
the documents subject to the safekeeping order and transporting copies back to Washington. 12 Judge Leventhal, writing
11 .TudgP LPventhal'H opinion and the i>hort. per curiam opinion stating
the judgment both indicated that the dissemination claim was to proceed
upon remand. .Judge Wilkey's opinion agreed with that disposition.
Although Judge Danaher joined .Judge Wilkey's opinion, his separate opinion seems to call for a different resolution of the dissemination claim, sin.ce
he would have directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint entirely,
on the basis of official immunity.
12 All 10 juclgcH below appear to have agrPed f.ha.t the McSurely;; alleged
seven categories of wrongdoing:
" ( 1) The unlawful search and seizure of the McSu relys' books and
papers by Kentucky authorities;
"(2) the inspection by Brick of those unlawfully seized materials;
" (3) the transport by Brick of copies of 234 documents to Washington;
" (4) the inspection of some or all of tlwse 234 copies by the staff of the
Subcommittee;
" (5) the use of the copies, as the basis for issuance of subpoenas for some
of the documents;
" (6) the procurement of Contempt of Congress citations against the
plaintiffs by consciously withholding from the Senate the facts relating to
tn.e challenged subpoenas;
" (7) the disseminatiGiil of some or all of the 234 copies obtained lhy .Brick.
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for himself and four others, concluded that the allegations

and facts of record stated Fourth Amendment and invasion
of privacy claims. Judge Wilkey, writing for the other five
members of the court, disagreed and would have reversed and
remanded only in the allegation of dissemination outside of
Congress. Judge Danaher would have ordered the case di~
missed on the basis of official immunity. We granted certiorari. - U. S . - (1977).

II

'A
In this Court, petitioners have chosen to rely principally
upon an argument that was rejected by a.U 10 judges of the
Court of Appeals. They contend that the protection of the
Speeeh or Debate Clause extends "to [the use of] unlawful
means to achieve legitimate objectives." "1 In their view,
unla.wful activities carried out in the course of an otherwise
legitimate investigation should be completely cloaked by a
legislative immunity that "precludes judicial inquiry even into
conduct that would be illegal or unconstitutiona.l if performed
by private persons." 1 '1 Indeed, for purposes of this argument,
petitioners concede that Brick's conduct was "a violation of
the Fourth Amendment." 1" They insist, however, that legisto persons or agencies outside of the Subcommittee-particularly the
Internal Revenue Service." 180 U. S. App. D. C., a.t 108, 553 .F. 2d, at
1285 (footnote omited).
At issue here are allegations (2), (3), and (7).
·1 u Brief for Pct.Jtioncrs 15.
u !d., at 14.
1 " At oral nrgumcnt, petitioners made their concession on this issue quite
explicit:
"QUESTION : A11en't you conceding for the purpose of argument that
there was wrongdoing?
"MR. EASTERBROOK: We are conceding for the purposes of thiS;
srgument that [Brick's activity] was actionable in some way.
1
'QUEST~ON : 1:hat.'s what l thought.,

'\ .. f,:.
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lative immunity from suit is meaningful only when a Member
or a legislative aid is alleged to have engaged in conduct that
would be actionable if engaged in by a private citizen, since
an "immunity that would protect on,ly when no wrong was
alleged to have been committed would be no immunity at
all." 10
While this extreme position may have some superficial plausibility, its logic would lead to acceptance of untrammeled
l('gislative power. 17 Moreover, it has been rejected by prior
decisions of this Court. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387
U. S. 82 (1967), this Court squarely held that legislative
immunity did not shield a congressional aide charged with
"QUESTION: And also a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Yes, we are conceding for purposes of this
a.rgument." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See also id., at 29.
1 ° Brif'f for PPtitioncr 15.
1 7 In petitioners' vifw, Je~islative immunity "probably" cxtendR even to
deliberate theft and murder, so long as they occur in the course of a
congressional investiga.tion. This was made clear a.t oral argument:
"MR. EASTERBROOK : . ...
"But essentially our approach rests on the contention that the immunity
is triggered by the purposes of the activity in which the Senator or the
Senate aide was engaged. We believe that this approach was consistent
with and indeed required by the considerations that led to the establishment
of the constitutional privilege.
"QUESTION: How far does that reasoning take you? Let's say its
purposes were very clearly to aid the legislative process by aiding the
congressional committees, and in pursuance of that. pristinely protected
purpose he simply burglarized a house and stole things out of a locked
drawer or safe. Is he protected under the Speech or Debate Clause for
that ? I am talking now, by "he" I mean an aide to the committee.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Mr. Justice Stewart, that question raises a
number of complexities. My answer to it ultimately is, yes, probably he
is protected.
"QUESTION: Including murder, I suppose. Well, maybe not there.
" MR. EASTERBROOK : That, too falls within my yes, probably
answer, but I would like, if I can-this one, the answer is not. intuitively
appcalin.g, I must concede." Tr. of Oral Ar_g. 14-15. See also id., at 16-1.7.
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violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights in the
course of an otherwise legitimate investigation.'~ Similarly,
our decision in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 628629 ( 1972), held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not
immunize an aide from grand jury questioning concerning pos·sible criminal conduct in the course 'of Senate informationgathering activity. As we declared in Gravel, "no prior case
[has] held that Members of Congress would be immune if
they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out
an illegaJ arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a
hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the privacy
of a citizen. Such acts are no more essential to legislating
18 Pt>titionrns attrmpt to di~:>tinguish Dombrowski on tlw ground that
the congressional aide involved in that case was not engaged in investigative activity on behalf of Congrrss. They argue that he merely "conspired with state officials to plan and carry out a. raid to gnin evidence
for use in a state prosecution." Brief for T~etitioners, at 2!}. In their
view, summa.ry judgment in his favor was rrversed simply because the
Speech or Deba.t e Clause furnishes no protection to r~etivities not carried
·out in the course of a. congressional invPstigaA.ion. Petitioners' characterization of the fad::; in that. case is erroneous. As we observed in Gravel v.
United States, 408 U. S. 606, 620 (1972), t.hc aide in Dombrowski "was
gathering information for a, hearing." Moreover, the record in, Dombmwski mrikes clf'a.r that the aide tr::weled to Louisiana. at the behest of
Senator Eastland and in pursuance of the investigative functions of a
Senate Subcommittee. Record in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0. T. 1966,
No. 118, pp. 35, 40-41 , 87, 91-94.
Dom.b1·owslci can be read as suggesting t.h at the scope of legisla.t ive
immunity for niclcs is narrower than that for the Member. 387 U.S., a.t 85.
' 'This suggestion , however, wns laid to rest in Gravel v. United States, 408
U. S. 606 (1972), which lwld "that the Sprech or Debate Clause applies
not only to a Mrmber but abo to hi~ aides insofnr as the conduct of the
latter would be a protected legislat ive act if pNformed by the Member
l1imself." !d., nt, 618. Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 502 (1975), viewed the distinction in
Dombrowski between Member and aide not as one deriving from a
· difference in the srope of their legislntive immunities, but as one rela.ting
to the activities in which !,hey were alleged to have 'engaged ,by the:

· <~Complaint.
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than the [conspiracy] held unprotected in United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)." Gravel, supra, at 621 (footnote omitted). Conduct in the course of informal investigative activity simply does not fall within the Speech or Debate
Clause if it clearly exceeds the lawful powers of Congress.
Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), is not to the contrary. There the
Court addressed the "power to investigate and to do so through
compulsory process." ld., at 504 (emphasis added). We
refused to recognize an action to enjoin implementation of a
facially proper subpoena, holding the subpoena "an indispensable ingredient of lawmaking," 19 id., at 505. We had no
occasion, however, to consider the effect of lawless activity in
the course of informal investigative conduct. Such activity
simply is not a part of "th~ due functioning of the [legislative]
process." Um:ted States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516
(1972) (emphasis in original).
In arguing that an immunity which evaporates with the
allegation of actionable conduct is no immunity at all, peti19 In this case the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Bummary
judgment as to the claims relating to the issuance of subpoenas:
"The Subcommittee here employed proper process for information 'on
which "legiruation could be had."' We note that the subpoenas called for
materials that were at least arguably relevant to its investigation, but did
not call for the production of Mrs. McSurely's letter or any other
demonstrably irrelevant private correspondence. Under these circumstances Se1·vicemen's Fund prevents further inquiry into plaintiff's charge
that the Subcommittee's purpose was to harass and intimidate them in the
exercise of their First Amendment rights. The Subcommittee's issuance of
subpoenas is privileged activity, notwithstanding plaintiff's bare allegation
tha.t the real purpose behind the subpoenas was to 'cover-up' the earlier
improper conduct by Brick, and the further assertion that had there been
full disclosure the Subcommittee would not have issued the subpoenas, and
the Senate would not have approved the contempt cita.t ion." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 122, 553 F. 2d, at 1298 (footnotes omitted) .
No f]uestion is raised here concerning the correctness of the Court d
.f\ppeals.' judgment on this issue,

II
f
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tioners misapprehend the sweep of our prior decisions dealing
with investigative activity. When Congress employs facially
proper means of information-gathering-such as the subpoena
in Servicemen's Fund-the Speech or Debate Clause precludes
both inquiry into legislative motive and lawsuits for damages
resulting from the investigation. But when Members of
Congress or their aides resort instead to criminal or otherwise
unlawful methods of obtaining informa,tion, they exceed the
power duly vested in Congress and can expect no condonation
by virtue on the Speech or Debate Clause. This "focus on
means permits the court to afford relief 'without proof of a
legislative act.' " 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 112, 553 F. 2d, at
1288 (opinion of Leventhal, J.), quoting Gravel, 408 U.S., at
621. Legislat.ive immunity does not shield a Member or his
aide from being called to account for Fourth Amendment or
other violations committed in the course of their investigative
work in the field. Dombrowski, supra; cf. Gravel, supra. 2 0

B
Petitioners further contend that on the record in this case,
respondents' complaint should be dismissed because they have
not made the requisite showing of liability. It is clear that
when a defendant entitled to invoke Speech or Debate immunity moves for summary judgment on that basis, the Constitution requires the plaintiff to adduce evidence affording "more
than merely colorable substance" to allega.tions of actionable
conduct. Dombrowski, 387 U. S., at 84. Otherwise, the
cloak of immunity is 11ot.. lifted. and the Speech or Debate
Clause forecloses further litigation. This follows from the
established doctrine that Speech or Debate immunity protects
Members of Congress and their aides "not only from the consequences of litigation's results bnt also from the burden of
""In light of thi::: conclusion, we n('Cd not dC'termint> whether even properly conducted fi<>ld invrRtigation would fnll out side the protection of the
S!(lPCch Ol' DebatQ Cla.li,'<e.
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defending themselves." I d., at 85. Since petitioners moved
for summary judgment on the basis of the Speech or Debate
C'lause. the courts below were required to determine whether
the Do·rnbrowski threshold-evidence affording "more than
merely colorable substance" to the allegations of unimmunizecl
conduct--had been passed with respect to each defeuda11t." 1
2 .1 Rrspondrnt8 wrrr put. on noticE' quite t'xplicitly that . b~· makiug the
summary judgment motion petitioners were calling upon them to adduce
some evidence tending to connect each defendant to the alleged wrongdoing. The petitioners made that point repeatedly at the hearing on the
summary judgment motion. For example, counsel for petitioners declared
at one point as follows:
" . . . [P]art and partial [sic] of tl1e defense of legislative immunity, is the
immunity of having to suffer the burdens of extensive litigation.
"This is what the Supreme Court held in Dombrowski against EastJnnd . . . . And the on]~· refl><on that Dombrowski against Eastland was
permitted to go into some discovery-and I understand that case has been
dismissed for want of prosecution-the only reason was, there was on the
record a discrepancy of factual evidence. The documents seemed to show
some discrepancy about a date on some subpoena which lent some support
in rtrgumcnt, and the Supreme Court said, in view of this factual dispute,
we need to resolve it a little further before we can consider whether or not
legislative immunity is sufficient to protect [the Member's aide]." Tr. of
Hearing Oct. 28, 1971, at 15-16.
More succinct.ly, counsel for petitioners stated:
" ... I think t,he burden should be placed on the plaintiffs to come forward
with any evidence they may have to suggest and demonstrate that these
defendants were not acting within the scope of their legislative duties.
That would present rtn issue in which we were forewarned. That is the
function of the motion for summary judgment." /d., at 18.
Respondents made a simila.r argument. in a. mf'monwdum supporting lhPir
motion:
"Tiw affidn.v it of Senator McClellan filed in support of t lw pending
motion;; fully Pl:ltahli~lw~ t hr c·irrum~1.mJce,- b~· whi<'h the Sen at c' C'onunit tt>P
conduct!'d it>-~ inve~tigation and ;;erved the Rubpoena,; out of whirh thi,;
litigation ari~es. Aga.in, nothin(! i.n the McSnre/y~s' affidrwd fnmishcs any

facts to demonstrate that Brick, Ad/erma.11. or O'Dollnl'll 11'1'1'1' adi11g
outside the JJerimeter of their ii'(JiBlatioe functiollis." Rupplenwntal ::\femorandu!ll of Point>-~ :m<l AuthoritiN; in Support of Ddendnnt:;' Motion lG

f

i

l
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Respondents have satisfied the constitutional standard as to
allegations of Brick's misconduct. It is stipulated that Brick
inspected the documents subject to the safekeeping order in a
locked vault in Pikeville and that he transported copies of
selected ones to Washington. The court below divided evenly
as to whether, in light of the three-judge court's safekeeping
order, the stipulated facts state a claim under the Fourth
Amendment. On the 'present state of the record, however,
there is no basis for concluding that respondents failed to
state a claim, if only for invasion of privacy. 22 Some of the
facts at issue in ~he dispute as to the validity of the Fourth
Di::;mis:; or in the Altemative for Summary Judgment, Nov. 23, 1971, at 5
(emphasis added).
See also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants'
Motion t.o Dismiss or in the Altemativc for Summa.ry Judgment, Oct. 26,
1971, a.t 3-4; Reply of Defendants McClf'll::m, Adlerman, O'Donnell, and
Brick to Plaintiff's Letter to the Court Da.ted Sept. 12, 1972, Oct. 13, 1972,
at 10.
Counsel for respondents indicated that he understood the burden petitioners sought to cast upon him, although he disputed their right to do so :
"Now comes Mr. Goldbloom [coW1sel for petitioners] and says, prove to
me by f1~cts disputing Senator McClelland's [sic] affidavit that it is not
true, before you can take depositions. How can I do that.? And this is
what the trouble is with this whole posture. I am going to file an affidavit
which says he is wrong. I have to say it on information and belief. And
then he is going to come into court and say, it is just on infom1ation and
belief." Id., at 43-44.
Thus, tJ1ere can be no queRiion that rrspondents were on not.ice as to the
importance of adducing such evidence as they had with respect to each
defendant.
2 2 At oral argum<'nt , counsel for petitioners ::Lcknowledged tlJP possibility
that the complaint ma.y state a cause of action under state tort law:
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . . . There is the possibility that under District of Columbia or Kentucky law there is a common-law tort lurking in
the background of this ca.se. Tha.t 's the reason why we elected not to
·make strongly here any arguments about. the me.'tning of the Fourth
Amendment, precisely because there may be aJlegations of other bases of
. liability ba,sed on common law." Tr. of Oral Arg. 21.
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Amendment claim were obtained only after oral argument en
bane. 180 U. S. App. D. C.., at 126 n. 84, 553 F. 2d, at 1302
n. 84. There has been no opportunity to weigh the various
characteriza.tions of Brick's activity or the meaning of the
three-judge court's safekeeping order. Moreover, the record
also contains testimony by Brick that he carried to Washington a copy of at least one document that he believed to be
of no relevance to the Subcommittee's investigation of the
riots. 23 Congress possesses no general power to investigate
2 3 Brick te~tified a!' follows:
"Q. Did you tell Mr. Dotson or any of the folk with whom you met
there that there was some of that stuff that you didn't think that you
needed?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Did you give it back to them?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you need that letter signed Dearest Cucumber or address
De.o'trest Cucumber?
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant.
"THE COURT: He may answer the question.
"THE WITNESS: No. Didn't you say signed Dearest Cucumber and
when in fact it says addressed to Dearest Cucumber.
"MR. STAVIS: No, I didri't.
"THE WITNESS: Was the question, did I need that letter?
""BY MR. STAVIS:
"Q. Yes. For the performance of your duties.
·"A. No sir.
"Q. As a matter of fact, in respect. to the performance of your duties,
you didn't need most of the items in that list, did you?
"A. Some of them. There were many others in the locked vault in
the Court House that I would have obtained under the subpoena.
"Q. That what?
" A. That I would have obtained under the subpoena ha.d not the Subcommittee stopped all a.ction when the defendants went. into Court.
" Q. Did you-when I was asking my questions about this list of 234
items, there were lots of these items that you didn'1, need a.t all, correct'?
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant.
"THE COURT: I believe he has already answered the question.
"BY MR. BRESS:
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private affairs, even by subpoena; the subject of the inquiry
must always be one on which legislation could be had. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S., at 504 n . . 15. Therefore, Brick's
copying and transportation of concededly irrelevant material
is sufficient to lift legislative immunity for purposes of a summary judgment motion. Brick's testimony on that subject
ultimately may be explained aw,ay, or the inclusion of a single
irrelevant letter may be deemed de minimis. But his testimony, together with the other factors mentioned above,
is sufficient to carry respondents across the Dombrowski
threshold.
The posture of the .ot.her three federal defendants, however,
is decidedly different. The opinion of Judge Leventhal noted
that although "plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement in
possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity
to permit trial to proceed as to him, the record is silent on
the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and
O'Donnell 'in any activity that could result in liability.'"
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 123, 553 F. 2d, at 1299, quoting Dombrowski, supra, a.t 84. lu response to defendants' summary
judgment motion and Seuator McClellan's affidavit denying
any conspiracy or activities outside the scope of legislative
activity, respondents could a.ver only on information and
belief that the defendants joined in the conspiracy to drive
respondents out of Pikeville ru'ld exceeded the bounds of legis~
"Q. Wha.t was your answer?
"A. Some, yes.
"Q. Some that you did?
"A. It was"Q. Lots?
"A. I object to the use of the word lots.
" Q. A great many, a great many?
"A. Oh, I will say many. Le~ me explain. I didn't select any of these
a,s I told you ." App. 101-102.

··~

•.
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lative activity. 21 Dombrowski teaches that mere allegations
are not enough. 25 There must be facts of record tending to
connect the defendant to the alleged misconduct. Having
2 • Senator McClellan's affidavit deniPd "any conspiracy, collaboration or
any other participation of any sort in the allegedly illegal police raid
allegedJy planned and conducted by defendant Ratliff." App. 49. He also
denied that he or his aides had exceeded the legislative authority of the
Subcommittee. !d., at 50. While his affidavit contains no specific denial
of a Fourth Amendment violation by Brick with respect to the inspection
of documents in Pikeville, the general denial of exceeding legislative a.uthorit.y must be read as embracing one. It is only fair to read the affidavit
that way, since the specific theory of a separate Fourt.h Amendment violation by Brick-though supportable on the allegations of the amended
complaintr-apparently did not emerge clearly until the case reached the
Court of Appeals.
Examination of the District Court record discloses no suggestion by
appellants that Brick's activity in and of itself 'amounted to a S<'para.te
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, plaintiffs' theory of t.ht> ca;;e
was that since the Kentucky S(>arch aJJd t:lC'izure had been ntkd unconstitutional at the time of the Subcommitt('(' takeover of the documents, tho
subpoenas were the fntit of thP original Kentucky seizure. This is the only
Fourth Amendment theory set forth in thC' amended complaint. App.
32-33. Thus, in the District Court the tlwory was not. that Brick's
inspection of the documents in Pikrsville was a second violation of the
Fourth Amendment, the issue dividing Judge Wilkey and Judge Leventhal;
rather, the thC'ory then was that. Brick's inspPction, takeovPr, and tlw
subsequent subpoenas were the fruits of the original illegal search and
seizure.
In these circumstances, it hardly could be expected that Senator
McClC'!lan's affidavit would dPclare specifically that there had been no
Fourth Amendment violation by Brick. Respondents had not been
presented with that. theory of the case. Since the amended complaint ha.<:
been viewed expansively, the Senator's affidavit correspondingly must b('
tak,en a.s putting in issue all the allegations subsequently read into the
amended complaint. It denies, on bC'half of all the respondents, any
activity outside the scope of legislative authority.
To this denial, respondents could reply only "on information and belief
[that] the defendant McClellan, together with defendants Adlerman,
O'Donnell, and Brick, joined in the conspiracy of the defendant Ratlll'
.[Footnote 25 is on p . 18]
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found, properly, that the record was silent as to the involvement of McClellau, Adlem1an, and O'Donnell in any activity
that could result in liability. it was the duty of the court
below to reverse the denial of their motion for summary
judgment.
Although this standard imposes a not insubstantial burden
upon plaintiffs who srek to lift the veil of legislative immunity, it is .i ustifi0d by thr purposes scrvPd by the Speech or
Debate Clause. As noted above, it is intended to protect
Mrml)('rs of Conp;res8 all(] their aides from "the burden
of dcf0nding thrmsel Vf'R against unsubstantiated claims."
Dombrowski, supra, at 85. Even wh0rc an injuuction is not
sought. Mcmbrrs are forced "to divert their time, energy, and
attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation."
Id., at 503. Thus. the Constitution requires that motions
foundrd on legislative immunity "be given the most expeditious treatment by district courts because one branch of Government is bring asked to halt the functions of a coordinate
branch." Servicemen's Fund, supra, at 511 n. 17.

III
The Speech or Debate Claus(' docs not immunize the dissemination of allPgedly actionable material "beyond the reasonable bounds of the legislative task.'' Doe v. McMillan,
412 P. S. 306. :us (1973). Again, however, a motion for
summary judgment grounded on Speech or Debate immunity
to force us out of Pikeville. .. ." App. 55-56. See also n. 19, supra.
They nlso contested McClellan's general denial of exceeding legislative
authority, App. 56, but agn.in no fads were adduced.
2 '; ~or may thr involvrment of the l\Temb<·r or ,.:ome of hi~ aid~ br
inferred solely from the involvement of other aides. In Dombrowski, summary judgment for Senator Eastland was upheld despite an allegation of
conspiracy and the existence of facts linking his Subcommittee's chief
counsel to possible Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the mere fact
that Brick may have engaged in conduct outside the scope of legislativ~
immun.it¥ clQes not suffice to li11k tne. Qth.e.r. d~e,udants to tha.t conduct.
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requires a plaintiff to adduce evidence lending "more than
merely colorable substance" to an assertion of uulawful dis·
semination. Dombrowski, supra, at 84..
Respondents argue that they have carried this burden with
respect to their claim that petitioners exhibited to the IRS
the documents Brick obtained in Pikeville. In 1974, they
lodged with the Court of Appeals recently obtained material
indicating that the Subcommittee had permitted agents of
the IRS to inspect portions of the Subcommittee files. Specifically, respondents pointed to a letter of March 5, 1969/1;
in which Senator McClellan informed the Secretary of the
Treasury that the Subcommittee had taken certain steps in
September 1968, toward arranging meetings with Internal
Revenue agents for the purpose of exchanging information
about organizations under investigation. Respondents also
2o Thi:s

letter read as follows :
"UNITED STATES SENATE

Committee on
Government Operations
Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investiga.tions
Washington, D. C. 20510
March 5, 1969
'"Dear Mr. Secretary:
"In accordance with Executive Order 11337, da.ted March 27, 1967, a
resolution was duly adopted by the Committee on Government OperaLions on September 18, 1968, with regard to the organizations listed on the
attached pages. It should be noted that this request was made on December 16, 1968, prior to the expiration of Executive Order 11337. This is
to reaffirm the same request pursuant to Executive Order 11454 dated
February 7, 1969, and Treasury Decision 6133.
"Pursuant to this resolution, I hereby designate the following individuals, members of the Subcommittee staff, to make such examinations: Mr.
Philip R. Manuel, Mr. John E. Drass, Mr. Fred P. Miller, Mr. Perman
H. Clay, Mr. James H. Dillon, and Mr. Walter S. Fia.Jkewicz. In, this
connection, it will he appreciated if the files could be assemblro in the
district office of jurisdiction. In order to facilitate the work of the staff,.
ilt ..-otrld be fu:rt.her a:ppreciated ilf the staff designees be permi.tted to con,..
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emphasized an IRS memorandum 27 showing August 28. 1968,
as the date on which the possibility of a cooperative relationship between Subcommittee and Service was first explored.
Respondents argue that these materials tend to establish that
the defendants exhibited to the Internal Revenue agents the
Pikeville documents, which were not returned to respondents
until November 8, 1968.28
suit with Internal Revenue Agents and Auditors familiar with the content
of the respective files.
"Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated.
"Sincerely yours,
John J. McClellan
Chairman
"Honorable David M. Kennedy
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C."
App., at 70.
27 The memorandum reads in pertinent part as follows :
"FAC1' SHEET
EsTABLISHMEN1' oF SPECIAL SEnvrcE STAFF

"Allegations have been made that the Internal Revenue Service established the Special Service Staff from instructions received from White
House officials. This simply is not true. The facts are these:
"August 28, 1968. Mr. Philip Manuel, an investigator with the Permanent Committee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government
Operations, contacted the Service to say that he had a group of seven
investigators working for him on matters pertaining to certain organizations and other groups; that he had prepared a letter for the Chairman
of the Committee, Honorable John J. McClellan; and that he expected
the request to be signed sh01tly. His call was to alert us to the fa.ct that
he wanted the Committee investigators to be permitted to discuss these
matters with our District officials rather than to conduct inspection of
returns in the National Office." App., at 73.
2 " Although thE' documE'nts were' not returnE'd to thE' McSurPlyH until
November, Brick testified that he returned the Subcommittee copies to
Kentucky authorities on August 14, 1968-two weeks before ~he initial
exploration of possible cooperation between the Subcommit.tee and the·
Service. He also declared that the Subcommittee had made no additional:
eopie:~:
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The Court of Appeals, however, apparently did not view
respondents' amended complaint as presenting this belated
claim of dissemination outside the Subconunittee:
"The claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234
documents to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was
not made in the amended complaint. This claim arose
because of the disclosure of certain IRS documents,
obtained as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit,
"Q. And did they-did there come a time when you returned those
documE'Jlts?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. During the time that you had possession of the documents, were
they publicly-publicized, distributed or seen by anybody outside of the
Committee?
"A. No, sir, and not by anybody inside of the Committee, either.
"Q. Where were the documents maintained?
" A. In my personal file under lock a.nd key and the key was always
in my pocket and that was by order of Senator McClellan,.
"Q. Did Sena.tor McClellan look at those records?
"A. No, sir. He looked at one.
"Q. Did there come a time when you-after the expiration of certain
litigation between the McSurelys and the officials in Kentucky, did you
then return that batch of documents to the authorities in Kentucky?
"A. I did. I returned thE>m to Thadcus Scott on August 14, 1978.
"Q. And is the receipt that has been marked listing the 230-some docu·
mcnts, is that the receipt that you got when you returned them?
"A. That is the receipt I prepared and he signed, yes.
" Q. Did you retain any of the documents thereafter or did yon make
any copy of any documents and retain them in your file?
" A. I never made a single copy of those documents. I retained none.
I have not now and the Subcommittee has none. All the documents were
returned to Mr. Tha.deus Scott. I have never u~ed a, Xerox machiuc on
those documents, although it has been said here a number of timE's that
I did. I did not." App. 97-98.
This te::;limony was incorporated in Senator McClellan's affidavit accompanying the swnmary judgment motion. ld., at 50. Respondent,<; diF:pute it, although they have adduced no facts tending to disprove it. Sco
ll. 28, infra.
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which indicated contacts, beginning on August 28, 1968,
between members of the Subcommittee staff and the IRS
concerning formal access to each other's files." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25 (em~
phasis added).

\

The court noted further, ibid., that the complaint "also" made
two other allegations that could have been related to the
dissemination claim. First, there was a charge that Brick had
exhibited the McSurely documents "to persons whose names
are unknown to plaintiffs." App. 31-32. Second, the complaint alleged that McClellan has "used the instrumentality
of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal
vendetta between himself and a certai11 personage of prominence named in some of the private correspondence of the
plaintiff Margaret McSurely." App. 35. The court pointed
out, however, that there was "no specific allegation that Brick
embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his purported
'vendetta' by dissemination outside the Subcommittee itself.
The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress
apparently rests on access by the IRS officials." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 109 n. 23, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25.:!n In sum,
:!" Thr Court of Apprab' diHCllH~ion of tbr pari ic.,;' disputr and 1he two
allegations in the amended complai11t is as followH:
"On November 25 , 1974, plaintiffs filed a supplemental affidavit lodging
thesr rerrntly disclosed materials with the court. The federal defendants
countered on January 24, 1975, arguing that even if the IRS had ga.ined
.nccess to the Subcommittee files at some point after August 28, 1968, the
McSurelys could not, have been harmed thereby because the 234 copies
were returned to Commonwealth Detective Scott on August 14, 1968 (and
received by the McSurelys on November 8, 1968), and Brirk had testified
nt the McSurelys' contempt trial that he made no copies and that neither
·he nor the Subcommittee retained :my of the documents, D. A., II, 730.
Phtintiffs, in their reply to defendants' response, filed January 31, 1975, dispute both that the documents were turned over to Scott on August 14,
1968, anct that no copies were mude. Since we affirm the Distrirt Court'$
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the court's conclusion that the dissemination claim 11 was not
made in the amended complajnt," its distinction between that
claim and the other two claims actually made in the complaint, and its ultimate conclusion that the claim of dissemination rested solely on the newly developed theory indicate that
the Court of Appeals did not believe that the amended complaint encompassed this claim. 30
In light of this appa.r ent conclusion, it is difficult to understand the court's declaration in the same footnote that it was
affirming "the District Court's denial of summary judgment
on this claim," as well as the statement to that effect in the
per curiam opinion announcing the judgment. If the complaint did not encompass the new dissemination claim, there
had been no occasion for the District Court to pass on its
sufficiency, nor for the Court of Appeals to affirm any judgment thereon. Respondents' belated injection, of the dissemination theory into the case, standing alone, would not amount
to an amendment of the complaint, and no motion to amend
was made. Because there had been no trial, there had been
no admission of evidence to which the pleadings could be held
to conform under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 (b). Thus, it is
denial of summary judgment on this claim, we leave the resolution of this
que.stion to the District Court on remand.
"Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copies
of the 284 item,; to unknown persons causing plaintiffs damagf' and embarra.ssmcnt, and that McClellan 'used the instrumentalit.y of the [SubcommitteeJ investigation to carry out a personal vendetta between himself and
a certain perl>Onage of prominence named in some of the private correspondence of the plaintiff Margaret McSurely.' Amended and SuppL
Com pl. 1T1T 19, 28 (b) (ii), App. 45, 50. However, there is no specific allegation that Brick embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his pur·ported 'vendetta.' by dissemination outside of the Subcommittee itself. The
claim of dissemination outside of the Halls of Congrer apparently re1;!R on
'access by IRS officials." 180 U. S. App. D . C., Itt 109 n. 25, 553 F . 2rl,
at. 1285 n. 25.
" 0 Tht> panel opiuion wns uo cbtl • t' on t.hi~ tii~liP. S<' P li:? 11 . R. App.
D . C., at 373-874, and Il. 29, 521 F. 2d, at 1033- 1034, and n . 29.
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unclear whether any issue regarding dissemination, of the
McSurely materials outside Congress was properly before the
Court of Appeals.
For this reason, we must vacate the judgment of affirmance
as to that claim. ·we Pxpress no opinion as to the merits
of the dissemination theory. 3 0 On remand, the Court of
Appeals may determine whether the dissemination claim is
embraced by respondents' amended complaint, or it may take
such other steps with respect to this claim as it deems proper.

IV
The juclgnwnt of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar
as it reversed the refusal of the District Court to dismiss the
portions of the complaint relating to the original seizure of the
McSurelys' materials. 1t is also affirmed insofar as it directs
the entry of summary .iudgment. for petitioners as to claims
concerning use of the materials within Congress. With
respect to the claim concerniug Brick's inspection of the documents and transportation of copies. the judgment is affirmed
as to Brick. but reversed as to McClellan. Adlerman, and
O'Donnell. and remanded with directions to enter summary
judgment for them on that claim. Finally, the judgment is
vacated insofar as it purports to affirm the denial of summary judgment on the dissemination issue and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion ,

:MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
FROM:

Bob

RE:

Our Draft in McSurely, footnote 20

DATE:

June 14, 1978

Our present footnote 20 is the vestige of a great
long footnote we added in reply to the memo of Justice
White.

Most of it now has been omitted.

It may be

that this vestige should be omitted, too.
The footnote reserves the question whether properly
conducted field investigation is within the immunity
provided by the Speech or Debate Clause.

But a question

from the Rehnquist Chambers prompts the conclusion

----

that our opinion does not in fact leave that question
open.

Respondents are saying the following:

"The

Speech or Debate Clause does not extend to field investigations.

Hence,

fall under the Dombrowski

standard and need not make this 'more than merely colorable
showing',

as the opinion suggests."

Because our opinion

requires such a showing, we have at least implicitly
held that the Speech or Debate Clause, with the Dombrowski
gloss, applies to field investigations.

Thus, we probably

should omit this footnote.
On a broader plane, you are forced to confront the
question whether field investigation is a legislative act.
In light of Gravel and United Servicemen's Fund, I think
the answer probably is that it is.

Those cases would

2.

~
haveAfar easier to decide if the Court could simply have
said that activity in the field, unrelated to a subpoena,
is not legislative.

And it does seem to be part of the

due functioning of the legislative process, as Judge
Leventhal noted.

Hence, if you must decide the issue

in this case -- and it looks as though you must
sticking with the Leventhal approach is probably more

-

in line with the past decisions of the Court, decisions
that BRW and his crew are prepared now to recast.

\
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MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring. ~

I

join Parts I, III and IV of Mr. Justice Powell's

opinion.

While I also agree that the judgment of the Court of

Appeals must be affirmed with respect to the claim concerning

Brick's inspection of the documents and transportation of

copies, but reversed as to McClellan, Adlerrnan, and O'Donnell,

I reach this result by rationale different from that employed

by Mr. Justice Powell in Part II of his opinion.

-

Immunity,

whether of a constitutional or common-law origin, is a

substantive rather than a procedural doctrine.

According

by my Brother Powell, congressmen are liable in civil damages

for .. criminal or otherwise unlawful .. activities in the course

--------·-

--------·

- 2 of their legislative activities; the Speech or Debate Clause

merely guarantees that congressmen can avoid the burdens of

a full trial if the plaintiff is unable to "adduce evidence

affording 'more than merely colorable substance' to allegations

of actionable conduct."

Ante, at 12, quoting from Dombrowski

v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84 (1967).

Our past cases, however, provide no support for such

a heightened summary judgment standard.

Once it is established

-

that the defendant was engaged in protected activity, the only

question is whether the defendant is absolutely immune

in which case the action must be dismissed -- or only enjoys

.

qualified

~unity

-- in which case the defendant must prove

- that he acted in good faith.

Immunity, in other words, is a

-

doctrine of substantive law which determines whether a public

c::

---

..._.....

official may have a defense for tortious actions which would

otherwise subject him to liability; it is not a doctrine of

- 3 procedural law which modifies the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

I would accord Senator McClellan, Adlerrnan,

and O'Donnell ab~olute immunity and therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals as to them.

I would, how-

ever, accord only qualified immunity to Brick.
I

The purpose behind constitutional and common-law

immunity was perhaps best summarized in a now-famous opinion

by Judge Learned Hand.

•

______

..,,

•!t does ·indeed go without saying
that an official, who is in fact guilty
of using his powers to vent his spleen
upon others, or for any other personal
motive, not connected with the public good,
should not escape liability for the
injuries he may so cause; and, if it were
possible in practice to confine ~uch complaints to the guilty, it would be
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is
impossible to know whether the claim is
well founded until the case has been
tried, and that to submit all officials,
the innocent as well as the guilty, to
the burden of a trial and to the inevitable
danger of outcome, would dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again,
the public interest calls for action which
-------~· -·-

- 4 may turn out to be founded on a mistake,
on the face of which an official may
1ater find himself hard put to satisfy
a jury of his good faith. There must
indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their
duties; but that i~ quite another matter
from exposing such as have been honestly
mistaken to suit by anyone who has
suffered by their errors. As is so often
the case, the answer must be found in a
balance between the evils inevitable in
either alternative.
In this instance it
has been thought in the end better to
1eave unredressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to subject those
who try to do their duty to the constant
dread of retaliation." Gre;roire y.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (CA 2 1948).
I

A heightened standard of summary judgment would do little, if
anything, to protect public officials from unrneritous lawsuits,

while it would have the concomitant disadvantage of impairing

the important goal of uniform procedural standards in civil

cases.

p~lic

i
I

I'
I'
'

'

As Learned Hand ultimately concluded in Gregoire, honest

officials can only be protected from unmeritorious

lawsuits by substantive immunity.

- 5 Under my Brother Powell's theory, a plaintiff, to

survive summary judgment, must adduce evidence affording

"more than merely colorable substance" to allegations of actionable conduct.

This requirement would be unlikely to decrease

significantly the number of unmeritorious lawsuits.

standard is obviously open to different

The

interpretatio~s

and

undoUbtedly would be stretched and pulled according to the

proclivities of the particular district court judge before

whom the claims are brought, with little opportunity for

y
principled and meaningful appellate review.

Even assuming,

moreover, that judges were able to agree on the proper inter-

pretatian· and application of the standard, I doubt that many

litigants would find themselves unable to meet it in practice.

No more than a few experiences in the courtroom would teach

even legal neophytes exactly what sorts of affidavits would

- 6 -

lend "more than mere colorable substance" to their claims.
\

And I have little doubt thereafter that they would have
virtually no difficulty in securing such affidavits.
But even if I were more sure that a heightened standard
of summary judgment would aid in carrying out the goal of
immunity in protecting governmental officials from the time,
worry and expense of combatting unmeritorious claims and
thus unduly inhibiting them in the exercise of their official
functions, I cannot join· in the creation of a novel exception
to the normal standard of Rule 56.

The evoiution of the

----------~--~-----------------procedural aspects of the common law

from the original

forms of action, to the intermediate stage where the forms
of action were abolished but code pleading existed in some
states and law and equity were separate in most, to the present

·- - -----.

I

- 7 stage where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their
state counterparts govern virtually all civil actions -has been a monumental change for the better in my opinion.
It has taken hundreds of years to accomplish and is based
on the notion that whatever the substance of the lawsuit,
procedurally it may be litigated by following uniform rules
in the form of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
cognate state provisions.

Any attempt to modify those rules

in one area of the law will inevitably invite modification,
or at least claims for modification, in other areas of the
law which will be difficult to distinguish on any principled
basis from those which will have been created.

Such a result

w6uld be a serious setabck for what is presently a relatively
uniform system of procedure through which all of the myriad

I

!.
I

I

substantive grist of the legal mill is processed.
---- - - - -·~- ---

- 8 -

In summary, substantive immunity is the result of a
balance_. (in the case of Speech or Debate Clause nnmunity,
on the part of the framers; in the case of common-law immunity,
by the courts) of the evils involved in, on the one hand,

unpunished truancy of public officials and, on the other,
the subjection of honest officials to unmeritorious lawsuits.
While it is tempting to embrace a heightened summary judgment
standard as a theoretically morefinely tuned solution to
this trade-off, I am convinced for the reasons outlined above
that it will fail.

Rather than culling the good from the bad,

it will merely open up all public officials to unwarranted
and burdensome lawsuits at the benefit of compensating those
few plaintiffs who are actually injured.

I

l

- 9 -

II

R~spondents

allege that petitioners violated their

constitutional rights in the course of an informal field

investigation.

If such field investigations fell under the

protection of the Speech or Debate Clause, petitioners would

be absolutely immune from suit and respondents' action

would have to be dismissed.

Speech or Debate Clause immunity

does not vanish when otherwise covered legislative activities

are unlawful or unconstitutional.

See Eastland v. United

States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509-510 (1975).

Immunity which is lost once grounds for suit are made out
•

is no immunity at all.

.,,_,_____

- 10 -

Informal field investigations, however, are not comprehended

-

within the Speech or Debate Clause.

The Court, of course,

has wisely refrained from a "cramped construction" of the Speech

or Debate Clause.

Gravel v. United States, 408

u.s.

606, 618

(1972).

•[T]he Court's consistent approach has been
that to confine the p~otection of the Speech
or Debate Clause to words spoken in debate
would be an unacceptably narrow view.
Committee reports, resolutions, and the act
of voting are equally covered7 • [i]n short,
• • • things generally done in a session of
the House by one of its members in relation
to the business before it.' Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881) • • • •
Rather than giving the Clause a cramped construction, the court has sought to implement
its fundamental purpose of freeing the
·legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control
his conduct as a legislator." Id., at 617-

618.
There are limits, however, to the legislat-ive acts that are

protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

"In no case has this

Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all conduct

relating to the legislative process."

United States v. Brewster,

I

I

I

- 11 408 U.s. 501, 515

(1972)

(emphasis added).

Immunity is

extended under the Clause only for conduct which is an

•integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes.by whi~h Members
participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration
and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters
which the Constitution places within the
jurisdiction of either House." Gravel, 408
U.S., at 625: Eastland, 421 U.S., at 504.
, in my opinion,
Field investigation~do not fall within this broad core

-----

of legislative activities,

"integral" to the "deliberative and

communicative processes," that is protected by the Speech or

Debate Clause.

Cf. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).

. As the court noted in Gravel, "no prior case has held that

Members of congress would be immune [under the Speech or

Debate Clause) • • • if, in order to secure information for

a hearing,

[they) themselves seized the property or invaded

- 12 the privacy of a citizen."

408

U.s.,

at 621.

Relief could

be afforded in such a case "without proof of a legislative

act or the motives or purposes underlying such an act."

lt.

Ibid.

,,

Even though not constitutionally protected by the Speech

or Debate Clause, Congressmen and their aides who are acting
I

within the outer perimeter of their legislative authority

may still

be entitled to claim official

~unity.

The court

has previously concluded that important public officials

.

who are engaged in activities within their governmental

authority-enjoy a common-law immunity from civil damages · suits.

A1though . such immunity is not constitutionally required, it

•has been thought important that officials
of government should be free to ·e xercise their
duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage
suits in respect of acts done in the course
of those duties -- suits \l ~>. ic ~ would consume
time and energies which would otherwise be
devoted to governmental service and the threat

- 13 of which might appreciably inhibit the
fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government."
Barr v. Matteo, 360 u.s. 564, 571 (1959}.
Xn determining whether a particular governmental official

is entitled to claim. common-law immunity, "the Court has not
fashioned a fixed, invariable rule of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry into whether the contributions
of

~unity

to effective government in particular contexts

outweighs the perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens."
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.s. 306, .320 (1973).

-

Although the

Court has never expressly held that Congressmen are entitled

-

to official immunity, it has extended such immunity to of-

-

ficials of both the executive and judicial branches of the
federal

gover~ent.

2/
See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483

(cabinet officials}: Barr v. Matteo, suora (lower federal
officials): Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872)
Embler v. Pachtman, 341 U.S. 367 (1976)

(judges):

(prosecutors}.

The

- 14 court has also extended common law

~unity

to state legis-

lators alleged to have deprived a plaintiff of constitutional

rights in the course of a legislative investigation.

~enney

See

v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).

There is no reason not to accord Congressmen and their

aids the same official immunity that is enjoyed both by

--------------~---·--------------comparable members of the executive and judicial branches

and by state legislators.

an

~portant

Field investigations are today

Congressional tool.

Failure to extend immunity

from civil damages suits to Congressmen and aid.es engaged

in such investigations could "seriously cripple the proper
and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted

to the [legislative] branch of the government...

161

u.s.,

at 570.

Vilas,

The fact that the framers in 1787 chose

··---..--

~

15 to constitutionalize absolute immunity for legislative acts

that are integral to speech or debate does not mean that

they intended Congressmen to enjoy less immunity under the

common law than other governmental officials.

The impli-

cation. ,indeed, is just the reverse.

III

-

Official immunity is a purely substantive doctrine and

does not provide for a heightened standard of summary judg-

------------------~----------

-

ment.

Thus, in Butz v. Economou, slip op., at 28, the Court

emphasiz~s

that motions for summary judgment based on official

immunity should be decided only by a

11

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...

firm application of

Whether respondents •

action should proceed on towards trial depends instead on

the answer to two questions.

•

F_irst, were petitioners acting

- 16 within the outer limits of their authority?

Second, assuming

they were, are they entitled to absolute or only qualified
immunity for those actions?
The answer to the first question is clear.

Congress

certainly had the power to investigate the causes of riots
across the nation, including the one that occurred in Nashville
in 1967.

There is likewise no doubt that Congress had the

power to carry on field investigations and that the actions
taken by these federal officials, a Senator and three employees
of Congress, were in furtherance of Congress• investigative
functions.
The answer to the second question is slightly more
complex.

Because the court has not previously addressed the

application of official immunity to Congressmen and their

em~

- 17 ployees, we must work largely by analogy to the immunity

granted to similar officials of other branches or governments

and the reasons behind common-law tmrnunity.

As a general

the higher the official the

rule,

broader the immunity to which he is probably entitled.

•[T]hat is because the higher the post, the
broader the range of responsibilities and
duties, and the wider the scope of discretion
it entails. It is not the title of his office
but the duties with which the particular officer sought to be made to respond in damages
is entrusted -- the relation of the act
complained of to 'matters committed by law
to his control or supervision,' Spaldinq v.
Vilas, supra, at 498 -- which must provide
the guide in delineating the scope of the rule
which clothes the official acts of the [government] officer with ~unity from civil
defamation suits." Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.s.,
at 573-574.

Working from these principles, it is clear that Senator
•

McClellan was entitled to absolute immunity in his legislative

actions.

Pull immunity has previously been granted to state

- 18 legislators, see Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, and to the

heads of executive departments, see Spalding

supra.

v. Vilas,

The wide range of responsibi~ities and duties by

which a member of either House of Congress is burdened, combined
with the broad discretion which he must exercise in order to

execute these responsibilities and duties, calls for as full

a grant of immunity as possible.

A Congressman, like a cabinet

official, should not be forced to operate

•under an apprehension that the motives
that control his official conduct may, at
any time, become the subject of inquiry in
a civil suit for damages.
It would seriously
cripple the proper and effective administration
of public affairs as entrusted to the [legislative] branch of the government, if he were
subjected to any such restraint."
Spaldin·g "v.
Vilas, 161 u.s., at 498-499.

The degree of immunity to be accorded to officials employed

by Congress is a considerably more difficult question.

,I

In ex-

- 19 tending immunity to state legislabors in Tenney, the Court

cautioned that "this is a case in which the defendants are

members of a legislature.

Legislative privilege in such a

case deserves greater respect than where an official acting

on behalf of the legislature is sued."

Cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103

u.s.

168

u.s.,

341

{188~.

at 378.

The Court,

however, has not ltmited absolute immunity merely to the heads

of the various branches of government, and our past precedents

support the granting of absolute immunity also to Jerone

Adlerrnan, the Subcommittee's General counsel, and Donald

.v

O'Donnell, the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel.

Such officials

are delegated many of the responsibilities of Congressmen
•

themselves and operate with much the same degree of discretion.

As Justice Harlan explained for a plurality of the Court in

- 20 Barr v. Matteo, which extended official

~unity

beyond

cabinet officials to lower executive officials,

.,The privilege is not a badge or emolument
of exalted office, but an expression of a
policy designed to aid in the ·e ffective
functioning of government. The complexities
and magnitude of governmental activity have
become so great that there must of necessity
be a delegation and redelegation of· authority
as to many functions, and we cannot say that
these functions become less important simply
because they are exercised by officers of lower
rank in the executive hierarchy." 360 U ~ S.,
at 572-573.

gator for the Subcommittee, however, is a good deal different.
He held a position not merely substantially lower in the

legislative hierarchy than the other petitioners, but one

which contemplated far more routine duties.

---

There is little to

indicate that he was vested with sufficient discretion that

the threat of litigation would, to paraphrase the now familiar
words in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d., at 581,

dampen his ardor in the unflinching discharge of his duties.

{

- 21 Indeed, his investigative functions bear close resemblence

to those of police officers, who have never been granted an

absolute and unqualified immunity under the common law.

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).

v. Thompson, 102 U.S. 168 (1881).

~nly a

See also Kilbourn

Accordingly, I would

qualified, good-faith immunity.

See

rant
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A heightened summary judgment standard may well be

no answer at all for public officials who are only accorded

· qualified immunity and thus must prove that they acted in
good faith.

A plaintiff certainly could not be expected

or required to introduce counter-affidavits on the defendant's
state of mind.

Indeed, it simply

11

is not feasible to resolve

on motion for summary judgment cases involving state of
mind.

11

Wright, Law of Federal Courts 493 (1976).

See also

Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753 (CA 2 1955).

--

f

I

l

~

Although the Court has never expressly held that

Congressmen and their aides are entitled to official immunity,

the Court has implicitly acknowledged that legislative immunity

is not limited solely to the bounds of the Speech or Debate

Clause.

Thus, in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967),

where the defendants argued that they were immune under both

the Speech or Debate Clause and common-law official immunity,

the Court spoke broadly of "the doctrine of legislative

~unity,

having its roots as it does in the Speech or Debate

Clause of the Constitution," id. at 85

(emphasis added), and

relied on common-law immunity cases such as Tenney v. Brandhove,

341 U.S. 367 (1951).

See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306,

318-324 (1972); Dombrowski v. Burbank, 358 F.2d 821 (CA D.C.

1966), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Dombrowski v.

Eastland, supra.

----------

/

y
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387

u.s.

82 (1967), does not

conflict with the proposition that the chief counsel of
a Congressional committee is entitled to an absolute commonlaw immunity when

acti~g

within his authority.

The court

apparently approved of the holding of the Court of Appeals'
panel, composed of Judge McGowan and now Chief Justice Burger,
that both Senator Eastland and Chief Counsel Sourwine were
immune from those claims "which related to the take-over of
the records by respondents after the raids."
(emphasis in original).

Id. at 83-84

But the Court of Appeals had failed

to specifically address "petitioners• contention that the
record shows a material dispute of fact as to their claim
that respondent Sourwine actively collaborated with counsel
to the Louisiana committee in making the plans for the

V

(Continued) :

allegedly illegal 'raids.'"

Id. at 84.

Because there was

evidence in the record showing that the investigation into
petitioners' records had not been authorized by any member
of the Senate Committee until after the raids, it was possible

for the Court to conclude that Sourwine had acted outside the
outer perimeters of his authority and thus was not entitled
to any immunity.

Q}llltrlcf t:Irt ~b ~fattg
Jragqmgttm, ~. Q}. 2!lbf>t.;l

~uvrttttt

CHAMBEF>S OF"

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 16, 1978

Re: No. 76-1621 - McAdams v. McSurely
Dear Bill,
Please add my name to your concurring
opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist·

Copies to the Conference

SIJ.IIstlt: ~nges Throughout

1~

H

l ,,

2nd l>ltAFT
\•

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 76-1621

Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor On Writ of Certiorari
of the Estate of John L. McClellan,
to the United States
et al., Petitioners,
Court of Appeals for
v,
the District of Co~
Alan McSurely et ux.
lumbia Circuit.
'[March -, 1978]
MR. JusTICE PowELL announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the following opinion.*
This case presents important issues concerning the scope
of legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause.1
Specifically, the original petitioners-a United States Senator
and three members of a committee staff-contend that the
Clause protects them from suits based on the alleged use of
illegal means in the course of field investigations related to
congressional inquiries. They also argue that, on this record,
respondents have not adduced sufficient evidence connecting
them to the alleged illegal actions to lift the cloak of legislative immunity. For the reasons that follow, we reject the
first contention, but agree with the second argument as to·
three of the four pet.itioners.
I
In 1967, Alan and Ma.rgaret McSurely were field organizers
for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., in Pike
County, Ky. Alan McSurely also had served as a field orga*Part II of this opinion is joined only by

THE CHIEF Jus'l'ICE

and Mn .

.JusTICE BLACKMUN.
1

Article I, § 6, cl. 1, provides that "for Speech or Debate in either House,
and Itepreseni\ativet:;;J shall Mt be questioned in any other Place."'

[IS'en.a,~

'

'
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nizer for the National Conference of New Politics and
distributed literature for Vietnam Summer. On the night of
August 11, J967, under authority of a warrant charging seditious activities against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and
the United States in yiolat.ion of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 432;040,
Pike County officials arrested the McSurelys and seized a
quantity of books, pamphlet&1• and letters found in their
home. Shortly , after the raid, Thomas Ratliff, Commonwealth Attorney for Pike ·County, announced publicly that the
seized material ~buld be made available to any Congressional
Committees interested in the M~Surelys.
On September 14, 196{, a three-judge District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, one }udge dissenting~ declared
the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional on its face and
enjoined state prose(mtion of the McSurelys. M cSurely v.
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 1967). The court ordered
that all the seized material "be held by [Ratliff] in safekeeping
until final disposition of this case · by appeal or otherwise/'
App. 78.
Soon after issuance of the · District Court's order, ··Ratliff
received a telephone call froni'Lavern Duffy, Assistant Counsel
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations. ··· The Subcommittee, which was headed by Senator McClellan, was investigating the causes 'of va.rious riots across the, Nation; including
one that hRd occurred in Nashville; Tennessee, in April 1961.
Some of the' Subcommittee's information showed that the
organizations with which the McSurelys were -affiliated might
have been involved in' the' Nashville riot. Hence, Duffy
asked Ratliff whether the materials seized from the McSurelys
were in his ·custOdy. Ratliff replied that they were, and on
October 8, 1967, a Subcommittee investigator, John· Brick,
arrived in Pikeville, the county seat.
· That same evening Thadeus Scott, a Commonwealth dete.ct "tive, visited Brick's motel room and gave ~Brick ,_photocopies

•' I

.•.
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of 234 of the seized documents. The next morning, Brick
spent an hour examining the originals in a locked room at the
Pike County courthouse. Ratliff testified that he had tried
to reach the members of the three-judge court before permitting Brick to enter the locked room. He succeeded in reaching the dissenting member of the court, but what transpired
is not clear. 2
Brick also visited the Clerk of the District Court, who
allowed him to inspect the case file of the McSurelys' threejudge court action. Brick arranged to have the Clerk send
him a copy of the court's safekeeping order and the inventory
of seized items. On October 12, 1967, Brick again entered the
locked room at the county courthouse and spent four hours
taking notes on the materials. He then returned to Washington, taking with him the 234 copies that Scott had given him.
This material included at least one personal letter addressed
to Mrs. McSurely, which concededly had no relevance to
Brick's investigation. At Senator McClellan's direction, Brick
prepared subpoenas duces tecum for some of the material in
Ratliff's possession.
The McSurelys moved before the three-judge court to
prevent Ratliff from releasing the subpoenaed materials. 8 On
October 30, 1967, the court denied the motion and directed the
2

At the McSurcly's subsequent trial for contempt of Congress, see n. 5,

infra, Ratliff testified that "I had my permission" before he allowed Brick
access to the stored materials. Defendants' Appendix 407, United States
v. M cSurely, Nos. 24,812, 24,813 (DC 1971). The implication of this
statement was that the dissenting judge gave "permission," but that is not
clear. Moreover, the scope of any permission remains unexplained. Ratliff
conceded that he had not communicated with the cocustodian of the
materials, United States Marshal Archie Kraft, before permitting Brick to
inspect the materials. I d., at 407-408.
8
The McSurelys did not premise their opposition to the subpoenas upon
any allegedly unlawful activity on Brick's part in inspecting and transporting the documents, Indeed, they later testified that they did not even
become aware of Brick '~> actual role until December 5, 1967. !d., at 655~
~56,681-682, 704-705,707-709.
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parties to cooperate with the Subcommittee.4 Further Iitiga.
tion ensued,r. culminating in an order of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in July 1968, holding that since the time
for appeal from the judgment of the District Court striking
down the sedition sta.tute had expired, there was no basis for
continued court custody. The court ordered the seized materials returned to the McSurelys, McSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F. 2d
817 (CA6 1968), and noted that questions as to the validity of
the subpoenas still were open. According to· Brick, the Sub·
committee's photocopies were returned to Detective Scott on
August 14, 1968. The originals and copies were returned to
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968. Upon receipt of these
materials, the McSurelys were served with new subpoenas.
On March 4, 1969, McSurelys appeared before the Sub.
committee and refused to comply with the subpoenas. Their
refusal resulted in a conviction for contempt of Congress/ but
in December 1972, the Court of Appeals for the District -of
Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the subpoenas were
the fruit of two Fourth Amendment violations: (i) the original
seizure by Kentucky officials, and (ii) Brick's "unauthorized
search and inspection of the documents" in violation of the
4 The court's order rrad in part as follows:
"The parties to this action and the officers of this Court are directed to
cooperate with the Senate Committee in making available such of- the
materials, or copies thereof, as the Committee considers pertinent to its
inquiry; but until time for appeal is expired, this will be done in such
manner as to keep intact those materials that may be pertinent to the
appeal of this case."
It ca,nnot be determined whether this may be read as a retroactive
ratification of Brick's in~pection and trant>portation activties. There is
nothing in thr rrcord brforr us to indicate that thr three-judge court wal:!
apprit>rd of tho~e activities. See 180 U. S. App. D . C., at 117 n. 59, 5M
F. 2d, at 1293 n. 59.
5 For a synopsis of that litigation's course, see the opinion below of
Judge Wilkey, id., at 132-133, 553 F. 2d, at 1308-1309.
6 The variou~ tlli3timony ,!e!rrrrd to in thls opinion wa;:; givrn at the
ttontempt trial. See, e. g.,
II?Zpra,

nt,

.:l,
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three-judge court's safekeeping order. United States v.
McSurely, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 141, 154-155, 473 F. 2d 1178,
1191-1192 (1972).
On the same day that they appeared before the Subcommittee, the McSurelys filed this action,' alleging that Senator
McClellan, Brick, Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's
General Counsel), Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's
Chief Counsel), and individual Members of the Subcommittee
had conspired to violate the McSurelys' constitutional rights.
They sought declara.tory and injunctive relief and $50,000
damages from each defendant. The action was stayed to permit the contempt trial to proceed. M cSurely v. McClellan,
138 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 4~6 F. 2d 664 (1970). In September 1971, while the appeal of their contempt conviction was
pending, the McSurelys filed an amended complaint, naming
Ratliff, McClellan, Brick, Adlerman, and O'Donnell as defendants. The amended complaint alleged in essence that the
federal defendants had conspired with Ratliff to carry out an
illegal raid in 1967, and to inspect, tran,sport, and use the seized
materials in violation of the McSurelys' constitutional and
other rights. On October 26, 1971, petitioners moved to
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the
basis of legislative immunity, failure to sta.t e a claim, and
collateral estoppel by virtue of the contempt conviction. 8 The
motion was denied and petitioners appealed.9
7 Listed with the McSurelys as plaintiffs in this initial complaint were
three associations with which they were connected: the Southern Conference
Educational Fund, the Southern Student Organizing Committee, and the
Students for a Democratic Society.
8 Ratliff did not join this motion.
9
Normally the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not appealable because it is not a final decision for purposes of § 28 U.S. C. § 1291.
See generally 6 J . Moore, Federal Practice ~ 56.21 [2], at 56-1275 to
56-1286 (2d ed. 1976). The Court of Appeals, however, adopted the
reasoning of the panel opinion, which held that this particular denial had
·"&uffi.cient i.o.djcia a:f finality," 1(2 U. S. App. D. C. 364, 371, 521 F. 2d
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In 1974, while petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, respondents obtained
documents thought by them to indicate that the Subcommittee
had established an information-sharing relationship with the
Internal Revenue Service. These documents were lodged with
the Court of Appeals, together with affidavits suggesting that
petitioners might have exhibited the allegedly wrongfully
seized materials to agents of the Internal Revenue Service.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, en bane, affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.l 0 Judge Leventhal wrote for
himself and fom· others, as did Judge Wilkey. Senior Judge
1024, 1031, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 308
(1962), to qualify as appealable, even though it was not a. decision that
ended the action. The panel observed that the Speech or Debate Clause,
upon which the summary judgment motion was focused, protects Members
of Congress and their aides from the burdens of defending themselves as
well as from the consequences of the litigation. 172 U.S. App. D. C., a.t 372,
521 F. 2d, at 1032, cit.ing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967).
Reasoning that the asserted right to be free of the burdens of a la.wsuit
would be irretrievably lost if the case proceeded to tria.l, the panel coneluded that a.n appeal from the final judgment would come too la.t.e to provide meaningful review of tha.t claim. Hence, as to the as;;ertion of immunity from inquiry, the denial of summary judgment was held a "final
decision" for purposes of § 1291. 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 372, 521 F .
2d, at 1032. Neither ~ide challlenges that analysis here, and we see no
reason to depart from it. St'e abo Cohen v. Beneficial Loa:n Corp., 337
u. s. 541 (1949) .
10 While the ca~e was in 1he Cour1 of Appeals, Brick and Adlerman died .
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 104 n. 1, 553 F. 2d, at 1280 n. 1. The Court of
Appeals did not decide whether the a.ctions against them survived, lea.ving
that issue for the District Court on remand. In August 1977, respondent
moved in the District Court to substitute the survivors or estates for Brick
and Adlerman. Petitioners oppose that motion, arguing that respondents'
delay caused the action to abate. They nevertheless named Brick and
Adlerman as petitioners in case this opposition should fail. See Fed. Rule
App. Proc. 43 (a) . We need not pass on the questions either of survival or
nba.tement of the actions.
Senator McClellan died while the case was pending before this Court.
His executor was substituted under Rule 48 (1) of this Court.

I
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Danaher, who had sat on the panel, joined Judge Wilkey's
opinion, but wrote a separate opinion as well. The court
unanimously reversed the refusal to dismiss that part of the
complaint relating to the original seizure of the McSurelys'
materials by Kentucky authorities. The court also agreed
unanimously that summary judgment should have been
granted as to the portion of the complaint charging unlawful
use of the material within Congress itself. 180 U. S. App.
D. C. 101, 104, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (1976) . Respondents do
not dispute those actions here.
The Court of Appeals, again unanimously, affirmed what it
designated as the denial of summary judgment as to those·
portions of the complaint alleging dissemination of the material outside of Congress. Ibid. 11 By an evenly divided vote,.
it affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the allegations·
that Brick had violated the McSurelys' rights by inspecting·
the documents subject to the safekeeping order and transporting copies back to Washington. 12 Judge Leventhal, writing·
n Judge !Rventhal'~ opinion and the short per curiam opinion stating
the j"ud'gment "Doth indicated that the dissemination claim was to proceed·
upon remand. Judge Wilkey's opinion agreed with that disposition.
Although Judge Danaher joined Judge Wilkey's opinion, his separate opinion seems to call for a different resolution of the dissemination claim, since
he would have directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint entirely,
on the basis of official immunity.
12
All 10 judgeHbt'low appear to have agreed that the McSurelys alleged
seven categories of wrongdoing:
" ( 1) The unlawful search and seizure of the McSurelys' books and'
papers by Kentucky authorities ;
" (2) the inspection by Brick of those unlawfully seized materials ;
" (3) the transport by Brick of copies of 234 documents to Washington ;
" (4) the inspection of some or all of these 234 copies by the staff of theSubcommittee ;
" (5) the use of the copies, as the basis for issuance of subpoenas for some
'of the documents;
·u (&) the procurement of QQntempt a· Conpe:lll citations ag;1inst tht:
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for himself and four others, concluded that the allegations
and facts of record stated Fourth Amendment and invasion
of privacy claims. Judge Wilkey, writing for the other five
members of the court, disagreed and would have reversed and
remanded only in the allegation of dissemination outside of
\ Congress. Judge Danaher 'would have ordered the case dismissed on the basis of 'official immunity. We granted cer•
tiorari. - U . S . - (1977),

II
1\
In this Court, petitioners have chosen to rely principally
upon an argument that was rejected by all 10 judges of the
Court of Appeals. They contend that the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause extends "to [the Use of] unlawful
means to achieve legitimate objectives." 13 In their view,
unlawful activities carried out in the course of an otherwise
. legitimate investigatiqn should be completely· cloaked by a
legislative immunity tha.t "precludes judicial inquiry e,ven into
conduct that would he illegal or unconstitutional if performed
by private persons." 14 Indeed, for purposes of this argument,
petitioners concede that Brick's conduct was "a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.•" 15 They insist, however, that legisplaintiffs by consciously withholding from the Senate the facts relating to
the challenged subpoenas;
"(7) the dissemination of some or all of the 234 copies obtained by Brick
to persons or agencies outside of the Subcommittee-particularly the
Internal Revenue Service/' 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 108, 553 F. 2d, at
1285 (footnote omitOO) .
At issue here are allegations (2), (3), and (7).
1a Brief for Petitioners 15.
14 !d., at 14.
u At oral argument, petitioners made their concession on this issue quite
explicit:
. "QUESTION: Aren't you conceding for the purpose of argument that
' there was wrongdoing?

I

•

..
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lative immunity from suit is meaningful only when a Member
or a legislative aid is alleged to have engaged in conduct that
would be actionable if engaged in by a private citizen, since
an "immunity that would protect on,ly when no wrong wa.s
alleged to have been conunitted would be no immunity at
all." 1.o
While this extreme position may have some superficial plausibility, its logic would lead to acceptance of untrammeled
legislative power. 17 Moreover, it has been rejected by prior
decisions of this Court. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387
U. S. 82 (1967), this Court squarely held that legislative
immunity did not shield a congressional aide charged with
"MR. EASTERBROOK: We are conceding for the purposes of this
·argument that [Brick's activity] was actionable in some way.
"QUESTION: That's what I thought.
"QUESTION: And also a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Yes, we are conceding for purposes of this
argument." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See also id., at 29.
1.o Brief for Petitioner 15.
"1 7 In pet-itioners' view, legislative immunity "probably" extends even to
deliberate theft and murder, so long as they occur in the course of a
congressional investiga.tion. This was made clear at oral argument:
"MR EASTERBROOK: ....
"But essentially our approach rests on the contention that the immunity
is triggered by the purposes of the activity in which the Senator or the
Senate aide was engaged. We believe that this approach was consistent
with and indeed required by the considerations that led to the establishment
of the constitutional privilege.
"QUESTION: How far does that reasoning take you? Let's say its
purposes were very clearly to aid the legislative process by aiding the
congressional committees, and in pursuance of that. pristinely protected
purpose he simply burglarized a house and stole things out of a locked
drawer or safe. Is he protected under the Speech or Debate Clause for
that? I am talking now, by "he" I mean an aide to the committee.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Mr. Justice Stewart, that question raises a
number of complexities. My answer to it ultimately is, yes, probably he
is protected.
"QUESTION: Including murder, I suppose. Well, maybe not there.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: That, too falls within my yes, probably

76- 1621-0PINION
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violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights in the
course of an otherwise legitimate investigation.18 Similarly,
'our decisio'ri in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 628answer, but I would like, if I can-this one, the answer is not intuitively
'appealing,·! must concede.'1 Tr. of Oral Arg,. 14-15.. See also {d., at 16-17.
18 Petitioners attempt to distinguish Dombrowski on the ground that
the congressiorutl aide involved in that case was not engaged in investigative activity on behalf of Congress. They argue that he merely "conspired with state officials to plan . a.tid carry out a raid to gain evidence
for use in a state prosecution." Brief for Petitioners, at 29. In their
view, summa.ry .iudgment in his favor was reversed simply because the
· Speech ,or Deba.te Clause furnishes, no protection to activities not carried
out in the cours~ of a congressional investigation. Petitioners' characterization of the facts in that case is erroneous. As we observed in Gravel v.
United States, 408 U. S. 60Q, 620 (1972), the aide in Dombrowski "was
gathering informatiop_ for a. hearing." Moreover, the record in Dombrowski makes clear that the aide traveled to Louisiana at the behest of
Senator · Eastland and in pursuance of the investigative functions of a
Senate Subcommittee. Record in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0. T. 1966,
No. 118, pn. 35, 40-41 , 87, 91-94. Indeed, the Court of Appeals in Dombrowski explicitly statrd thRt ;'the subpoena. was expressly authorized in
the first instance by the Chairman of the [congressional] committee ...."
Dombrowski v. Burbank, U. S. App. D. C. - , 358 F .. 2d 821, 825
(1966) . The is:sue as to th<' di~puted date of the subpoenn in that caseupon which MR. JU!:ITICE REHNQUI!l'l' relies for the proposition that the
allegntion in Dombrowski wa~ that the rudC' simply ma.y have been acting
outside the aegis of n. congre~sional committee, ante, at n. 2-was
relevant not. to tlw aide'~ rongrr~sional authorizai ion to issue the subpoena, but to the qut>stion of his participation in the alleged conspiracy
to mount t.he challenged raids. Sre Brief for thP Respondents in Opposition, Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0 . T. 1966, No. 118, pp. 9-11; Brief for
Petitioners, id., pp. 10, 67-68.
Dombrowski can be read as suggesting that the scope of legislative
immunity for aides is narrower than that for the Member. 387 U.S., at 85.
'This suggestion, however, wa.s laid to rest in Gmvel v. United States, 408
U. S. 606 (1972), which held "that the Speech or Debate Clause applies
not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the
latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member
'himself." !d., at 618. Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen:s Fund, 421 U .. S. 491, .502 (1975), viewed the distinction in
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629 (1972), held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not
immunize an aide from grand jury questioning concerning possible criminal conduct in the course 'of Senate informationgathering activity. As we declared in Gravel, "no prior case
[has] held that Members of Congress would be immune if
they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a
hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the privacy
of a citizen. Such acts are no more essential to legislating
than the [conspiracy] held unprotected in United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)." Gravel, supra, at 621 (footnote omitted). Conduct in the course of informal investigative activity simply does not fall within the Speech or Debate
Clause if it clearly exceeds the lawful powers of Congress.
Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), is not to the contrary. There the
Court addressed the "power to investigate and to do so through
compulsory process." !d., at 504 (emphasis added). We
refused to recognize an action to enjoin implementation of a
facially proper subpoena, holding the subpoena "an indispensable ingredient of lawmaking," tu id., at 505. We had no
Dombrowski between Member and aide not as one deriving from a
difference in the scope of their legislative immunities, but as one relating
to the activities in which they were alleged to have engaged by the
complaint.
19 In this case the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of summary
judgment as to the claims relating to the issuance of subpoenas:
"The Subcommittee here employed proper process for information 'on
which "legislation could be had."' We note that the subpoenas called fot
materials that were at least arguably relevant to its investigation, but did
not call for the production of Mrs. McSurely's letter or any other
demonstrably irrelevant private correspondence. Under these circumstances Servicemen's Fund prevents further inquiry into plaintiff's charge
that the Subcommittee's purpose was to harass and intimidate them in the
exercise of their First Amendment rights. The Subcommitt~'s issuance of
subpoenas is privileged activity, notwithstanding plaintiff's bare allegation
·~h!,tt ~h~ real purtlose b~hind the sub.I?oena!:; was to 'cQver-up' the earlier

76-1621-0PINION

12

McADAMS v. McSURELY

occasion, however, to consider the effect of lawless activity in
the course of informal investigative conduct. Such activity
simply is not a part of "the due functioning of the [legislative]
process." Um:ted States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516
(1972) (emphasis in original) .
In arguing that an immunity which evaporates with the
allegation of actionable conduct is no immunity a~ all, petitioners misapprehend the sweep of our prior decisions dealing
with investigative activity. When Congress employs facially
proper means of information-gathering-such as the subpoena
in Servicemen's Fund-the Speech or Debate Clause precludes
both inquiry into legislative motive and lawsuits for damages
resulting from the investigation. But when Members of
Congress or their aides resort instead to criminal or otherwise
unlawful methods of obtaining information, they exceed the
power duly vested in Congress and can expect no condonation
by virtue of the Speech or ·Debate Clause. This "focus on
means permits the court to afford relief 'without proof of a
legislative act.' " 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 112, 553 F. 2d, at
1288 (opinion of Leventhal, J.), quoting Gravel, 408 U.S., at
621. Legislative immunity does not shield a Member or his
aide from being called to account for Fourth Amendment or
other violations committed in the course of their investigative
work in the field. Dombrowski, supra; cf. Grave~, supra.'lo
improper conduct by Brick, and the further assertion that had there been
full disclosure the Subcommittee would not have issued the subpoenas, and
the Senate would not have approved the contempt citation." 180 U. S.
App. D . C., at 122, 553 F . 2d, at 1298 (footnotes omitted) .
No question is raised here concerning the correctness of the Court of
Appeals' judgment on this issue.
~H MR . .JUSTICE REHNQlTIH'r',; roneurring opinion would dispose of th<:>
ca~E' on the ba~iH of a nt>wly formulatt>cl doctrinE> of official immunity.
Apart from the fact that thi:; i~sue was ne1ther embraced by tht> question::;
presented in tht> petitiou for rertioran nor argut>cl or briefPd, adherence
to that view would rrquire the sub silentio overruling of Dombrowski v.
Eastla:nd. That ra:se involvPd a lt>gislative official, CommittE>e Counsel
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B
Petitioners further contend that on the record in this case,
respondents' complaint should be dismissed because they have
not made the requisite showing of liability. It is clear that
when a defendant entitled to invoke Speech or Debate immunity moves for summary judgment on that basis, the Constitution requires the plaintiff to adduce evidence affording "more
than, merely colorable substance" to allegations of actionable
conduct. Dombrowski, 387 U. S., at 84. Otherwise, the
cloak of immunity is not. lifted, and the Speech or Debate
Clause forecloses further litigation. This follows from the
established doctrine d1at Speech or Debate immunity protects
Members of Congress and their aides "not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of
defending themselves." !d., at 85. Since petitioners moved
for summa.r y judgment on the basis of the Speech or Debate
Clause, the courts below were required to determine whether
the Dombrowski threshold-evidence affording "more than
merely colorable substance" to the allegations of unimmunized
conduct-had been passed with respect to each defendant. 21
Sourwine, of pr£ci~ely the same rank as two of the petitioners to whom
MR. JUt;'l'ICE REHNQUIS1' today would accord absolute official immunity.
Sourwine argued in thi~ Court. that he was entitled tol official immunity
under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (r893), and Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 ( 1959), Brief for Repondents, Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0. T. 1966, No. 118, pp. 38-41. Nevertheless, the Dombrowski
Court permitted the case to proceed as to him. Hence, Dombrowski must
be read as rejecting thr proposition that the contours of any distinct
official legislative immunity depart from those of the Speech or Debate·
Clausr. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 324 (1973). Moreover, it
would be difficult to reconcile MR. JusTICE REHNQUIS1''s view of the scope·
of~ immunity with the holding in Butz v. Economou, No. 76~709,
decided Jlme -, 19i8.
n Respondents were put on notice quite explicitly that by making the
summary judgment motion petitioners were calling upon them to adduce
some evidence tending to connect eaeh defendant to the alleged wrong<doing. The petitioners made that point repeatedly a.t the hearing on the

c.\.so\"-\'c
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Respondents have satisfied the constitutional standard as to
allegations of Brick's misconduct. It is stipulated that Brick
inspected the documents subject to the safekeeping order in a
summary judgment motion. For example, counsel for petitioners declared
at one point as follows:
" ... [P]art and partia.I [sic] of the defense of legislative immunity, is the
immunity of having to suffer the burdens of extensive litigation.
"This is what the Supreme Court held in Dombrowski against East)and . . . . And the only reason that Dombrowski against Eastland was
,permitted to go into some discovery-and I understand that case has been
dismissed for want of prosecution-the only reason was, there was on the
record a discrepancy of factual evidence. The documents seemed to show
some discrepancy about. a date on some subpoena which lent some support
in argument, and the Supreme Court said, in view of this factual dispute,
we need to resolve it a little further before we can consider whether or not
legislative immunity is sufficient to protect [the Member's a.ide]." Tr. of
Hearing Oct. 28, 1971, at 15-16.
More succinctly, counsel for petitioners stated:
...... I think the burden should be placed on the plaintiffs to come forward
with any evidence t.hey may have to suggest and demonstra.te that these
·defendants were not acting within the scope of their legislative duties.
That would present an issue in which we were forewarned. That is the
function of the motion for summary judgment." I d., at 18.
Petitioners made a similar argument in a memorandum supporting their
motion:
"The affidavit of Senator McClellan filed in support of the pending
motions fully establishes the circumstances by which the Senate Committee
conducted its investigation and served the subpoenas out of which this
litigation arises. Again, nothing in the McSurelys' affidavit fw-nishes any
facts to demon<~trate that Br·ick, Adler-man, or 0' Donnell were acting
o·utside the perimeter of their legislative function<~." Supplemental Memorandum of Poipts and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Nov. 23, 1971, at 5
'(emphasis added) .
See also Memorandum of Point;; a.nd Authorities in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment , Oct. 26,
1971, at 3-4; Reply of Defendants McClellan, Adlerman, O'Donnell, and
Brick to Plaintiff's Letter to the Court Dated Sept. 12, 1972, Oct. 13, 1972,
:at 10.
Counsel for respondents indicated that he understood the burden peti-

'76- 1621-0PINIO'N
'

\.

··'
McADAMS v. McSURELY

15

locked vault in Pikeville and that he transported copies of
selected ones to Washington. The court below divided evenly
as to whether, in light of the three-judge court's safekeeping
order, the stipulated facts state a claim under the Fourth
Amendment. On the present state of the record, however,
there is no basis for concluding that respondents failed to
state a claim, if only for invasion of privacy. 22 Some of the
facts at issue in the dispute as to the validity of the Fourth
Amendment claim were obtained only after oral argument en
bane. 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 126 n. 84, 553 F. 2d, at 1302
n. 84. There has been no opportunity to weigh the various
characteriza.tions of Brick's activity or the meaning of the
three-judge court's safekeeping order. Moreover, the record
also contains testimony by Brick that he carried to Washington a copy of at least one document that he believed to be
of no relevance to the Subcommittee's investigation of the
riots. 23 Congress possesses no general power to investigate
tioners sought to cast upon him, although he disputed their right to do so:
"Now comes Mr. Goldbloom [counsel for petitioners] and says, prove to
me by facts disputing Senator McClelland's [sic] affidavit that it is not
true, before you can take depositions. How can I do tha.t? And this is
what the trouble is with this whole posture. I am going to file an affidavit
which says he is wrong. I have to say it on information and belief. And
then he is going to come into court and say, it is just on information and
belief." ld,, at 43-44.
Thus, there can be no qut'Sf ion th:1l respondents were put on notice as
lo the importance of adduring such evidence as they had with respect to
c!lch defendant.
22 At oral argument, counsel for petitioners acknowledged the possibility
that the complaint may state a cause of action under state tort law:
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . . . There is the possibility that under District of Columbia or Kentucky law there is a common-law tort lurking in
the background of this case. That's the reason why we elected not to
make strongly here any arguments about the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, precisely because there may be allegations of other bases of
liability based on common law." Tr. of Oral Arg. 21.
23 Brick testifiE>d ai" follows :
~'Q. Did ~ou, tell Mr. DQtsQn or any rof th.~ fQlk with whom you met.

l

l

l
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' private affairs, even by subpoena; the subject of .the inquiry
must always be one on which legislation could be had. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S., at 504 n. 15. Therefore, Brick's
there that there was some of that stuff that you didn't think that you
needed?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Did you give it; back to them?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you n'eed that letter signed Dearest Cucumber or address
Dearest Cucumber?
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant.
"THE COURT : !Ie may answer the question.
"THE WITNESS: N(). Didn't you say signed Dearest Cucumber and
when in fact it §ays addressed to Dearest Cucumber.
"MR. STAVIS: No, I didn't.
"THE WITN:Ji;SS: Was the question, did I need that letter?
"BY MR. STAVIS :'
"Q. Yes:, For the performance of your duties.
"A. No sir..
"Q. As a matter of fa.ct, in respect to the performance of your duties,
you didn't need 'most of the items in that list, did you?
"A. Some of them. There were ma.ny others in the locked vault in
the Court House that I would have obtained under the subpoena.
"Q. That what?
"A. · That I would have obtained under the subpoena had not the Subcommittee stopped all action when the defendants went into Court.
"Q. Did you-when I was asking my qu('_stions about this list of 234
· ~terns, there were lots of these items that you didn't need at all, correct?
· "MR. BRESS : Objection. Irrelevant.
"THE COURT: I believe he has already answered the question.
"BY MR. BRESS :
"Q. What was your answer ?
"A. Some, yes.
''Q. Some that you did ?
'-'A. It was"Q. Lots?
"A. I object to the use of the word lots.
''Q. A great marw, a great many?
"A. Oh, I will say many. Let me explain. I didn't select any of these
:as I told you.''' App. 101- 102.

,.
'
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copying and. transportation of concededly irrelevant material
are sufficient to lift legislative immunity for purposes of a summary judgment motion. Brick's testimony on tha.t subject
ultimately may be explained away, or the inclusion of a single
irrelevant letter may be deemed de minimis. But his testimony, together with the other factors mentioned above,
is sufficient to carry respondents across the Dombrowski
threshold.
The posture of the other three federal defendants, however,
is decidedly different. The opinion of Judge Leventhal noted
that although 11plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement in
possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity
to permit trial to proceed as to him, the record is silent on
the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and
O'Donnell 'in any activit.y that could result in liability.'"
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 123, 553 F. 2d, at 1299, quoting Dombrowski, S'Upra, at 84. In response to defendants' summary
judgment motion and Senator McClellan's affidavit denying
any conspiracy or activities outside the scope of legislative
activity. respondents could aver only on information and
belief that the defendants joined in the conspiracy to drive
respondents out of Pikeville and exceeded the bounds of legislative activity.24 Dombrowski teaches that mere allegations
H Sencttor McClellan's aJridavit denied "any conspiracy, collaboration or
any other part.icipa.tion of any sort in the allegedly illegal police raid
allegedly planned and conducted by defendant Ratliff." App. 49. He also
denied that he or his aides had exceeded the legislative authority of the
Subcommittee. !d., at 50. While his affidavit contains no specific denial
of a Fourth Amendment violation by Brick with respect to the inspection
of documents in Pikeville, the general denial of exceeding legislative authority must be read as embracing one. It is only fair to read the affidavit
th1~t way, since the specific theory of a separate Fourth Amendment violation by Brick-though supportable on the allegations of the amended
complaint-apparently did not emerge clearly until the case reached the
Court of Appeals.
F.#Cam.ination of the District, Co\.ll't record discloses no suggestion by

,,
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are not e11ough.~ There must be fa~ts of record tending to
connect the defendant to the alleged misconduct. Having
found, properly, that the record was silent as to the involvement of-McClellan, Adlerman, and O'Donnell in any activity
'
\
that could result in liability, it was the duty of the court
'

appellants tha.t. Brick's nctivit.y in a.ncl of itself amounted to a separate
violation of the Fomih Amendment . In::;tend, plt~intiffs' theory of the cnse
was that ~:>ince the Kentucky HC'arrh and ~:;eizurr had been ruled unconstitu·
tional at the timr of the Subcommittee tak<>ovrr of the documents, the
subpoenas werr the f;,tit of the original Kentucky seizure. This is the only
Fourth Amendmrnt theory set forth in tht' nrnended rompJajnt. App.
'32-33. Thus, in the District Court the theory wns not that Brick's
impPction of the doettmPntK in Pike:svill(~ was a second violation of the
Fourth AmPnclment, thP is:snr dividing Judge Wilkey and Judge Leventhal ;
rn.ther, the throry then was that Brick':,; inspection, takeover, and the
subl;equent subpoenas wPre tl1e fruits of the original illegal SC<'I.rch and
seizure.
In these circumstances, it Jw.rdly could be expected that Sena.tor
McClellan's affidavit would declare S)Wcifically that there had been no
FourtJ1 Amendment violation by Brick Respondents had not been
presented with tha.t theory of the case. Since the amended compla.i nt has
'been viewed expaJ1sively, the Senntor'l:l affidavit correspondingly must be
taken as putting in issue all the allegatioru; subsequently read into the
amended complrunt. It Mnies, on behalf of all the respondents, any
activity outside the scope of lPgislative mlthority.
To this denial, respondents could reply only "on information and belief
[that] the defendan,t McClellan, together with defendants Adlerman,
O'Donnell, and Brick, joined in the conspiracy of the defendant Ratliff
to force u;;; out of Pikevillr . . . ." App. 55-56. See also n . 21 , S'Upr-a.
They also contested McClellan's general denial of exceeding legislative
authority, App. 56, but agrun no facts were adduced.
2 6 Nor mny the involvement of the Member or some of his aides be
inferred solely from the involvement of other aides. In Dombrowski, summary judgment for Senator Eastland was upheld despite an allegation of
conspiracy and the existence of facts linking his Subcommittee's chief
counsel to possible Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the mere fact
that Brick may have engaged in conduct outside the scope of legislative
immunity does not suffice to link the other defendants to that conduct.
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below to reverse the denial of their motion for summary
judgment.
Although this standard imposes a not insubstantial burden
upon plaintiffs who seek to lift the veil of legislative immunity, it is justified by the purposes served by the Speech or
Debate Clause. 20 As noted above, it is intended to protect
Members of Congress and their aides from "the burden
of defending themselves against unsubstantiated claims."
Dombrowski, supra, at 85. Even where an injunction is not
sought, Members are forced "to divert their time, energy, and
attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation."
Id., at 503. Thus, the Constitution requires that motions
founded on legislative immunity "be given the most expeditious treatment by district courts beca.use one branch of Government is being asked to halt the functions of a coordinate
branch." Servicemen's Fund, supra, at 511 n. 17.

III
The Speech or Deba.te Clause does not immunize the dissemination of allegedly actionable ma.terial "beyond the reasonable bounds of the legislative task." Doe v. McMillan,
412 U. S. 306, 315 ( 1973). Respondents argue that they have
made an adequate showing of improper dissemination. They
rely on the lodging with the Court of Appeals in 1974 of recently obtained material indicating that the Subcommittee
had permitted agents of the IRS to inspect portions of the
Subcommittee files. Specifically, respondents pointed to a
26 Whilf' MR. ,lu~o;TICJ~ HEHNQUJ:sT 's coucf'rn with maintaining "uniform
procednra ~tandard~ in civil rases," post, at 4, is understandable, it
should not be pPrmittf'd to owmde thE' dictates of thE' Speech or Debate
Clau:;e. Dornbrowsl.·i makes it clPar that motions foundf'd on the Clause
can be defea.t ed only b~· a ,;bowing of "more than merPly colorable ~>ub
stance" to the allPgation~ of unimmunizPd conduct. 487 U. S., at 84.
This requiremE'nt ,;tern~ directly from the Constitution; a motion for sum·mary judgmf'nt undPr FN!. Rule Civ. Proc . 56 is merely the vehicle for
'effectuating the independent policies of the SpePch or DebatE' Clause.

I
t
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letter of March 5. 1969,2 7 in which Senator McClellan in...
formed the Secretary of the Treasury that the Subcommittee
had taken certain steps in September 1968, toward arranging
meetings with Internal Revenue .agents for the purpose of exchanging information about organizations under investigation.
'2 7

Thi:s letter rf'ad

a~

follows: .
"UNITED STATES SENATE

.,,

Committee on
Government, Operations
Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on lnvestigatiops
Washington, D. C. 20510
March 5, 1969
''Dear Mr. Secretary: '
"In accordance with Executive Order 11337, dated March 27, 1967, a
resolution was duly adopted by the Committee on Government Operations on September 18, 1968, with rega.rd to the organizations listed on the
attached pages. It should be noted that this request was made on December 16, J968, prior to the expiration of Executive Order 11337. This is
to reaffirm the ·same request pursuant to Executive Order 11454 dated
Februa.ry 7, 1969, and.Treasury Decision 6133.
"Pursuant to this resolution, I hereby designate the following individuals, members of the Subcommittee staff, to make such examinations: MT.
Philip R. Manuel, Mr. John E. Drass, Mr. Fred P. Miller, Mr. Perman
H. Clay, Mr: James H. Dillon, and Mr. Walter S. Fialkewicz. In, this
connection, it will be appreciated if the files could be assembled in the
district office of jurisdiction. In order to facilitate the woi:k of the staff,
it would be further appreciated if the staff designees be permitted to consult with Internal Revenue Agents and Auditors familiar with the content
of the respective files .
"Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated.
"Sincerely yours,
·- John ,J. McClellan
· Chail'Illlin

"Honorable David M. Kennedy
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C."
. . . A:pp., a.t 70.

76-1621-0PINION
McADAMS v. McSURELY

21

Respondents also emphasized an IRS memorandum 28 showing
August 28, 1968, as the date on which the possibility of a
cooperative ralationship between Subcommittee and Service
was first explored. Respondents argue that these materials
tend to establish that. the defendants exhibited to the Internal
Revenue agents the Pikeville documents, which were not returned to reSpondents until November 8, 1968.20
2

~

The memorandum reads in pertinent part as follows :
"FACT SHEET
Es'l'ABLISHMENT oF SPECIAL SERVICE STAFF

"Allegations have been made that the Internal Revenue Service established. the Special Service Staff from instntctions received from White
House officials. This simply is not tnte. The facts are these:
"August 28, 1968. Mr. Philip Manuel, an investigator with the Permanent Committee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government
Operations, contacted. the Service to say that he had a group of seven
investigators working for him on matters pertaining to certain organizations and other groups; that he had prepared a letter for the Chairman
of the Committee, Honorable John J. McClellan; and tha,t he expected
the request to be signed shortly. His call was to alert us to the fact that
he wanted. the Committee investigators to be permitted. to discuss these
matters with our District officials rather than to conduct inspection of
returns in the National Office." App., at 73.
'20 Although the documents were not returned to the McSurelys until
November, Brick testified that he returned the Subcommittee copies to
Kentucky authorities on August 14, 1968-two weeks before the initial
exploration of possible cooperation between the Subcommittee and the
Service. He also declared that the Subcommittee had made no additional
copies :
"Q. And did they-did there come a time when you returned those
documents?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. During the time that you had possession of the documents, were
they publicly-publicized, distributed or seen by anybody outside of the
Committee?
"A. No, sir, and not by anybody inside of the Committee, either.
" Q. Where were the documents maintained?
"A. In my personal file under lock and key and the key was always
'in my pocket and tha.t jwas by order o( Senator McClellan.

'
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The Court of Appeals, however, apparently did not view
respondents' amended complaint as presenting this belated
claim of dissemination outside the Subcommittee:
"The claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234
documents to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was
not made in the amended complaint. This claim arose
because of the disclosure of certain IRS documents,
obtained as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit,
which indicated contacts, beginning on August 28, 1968,
between members of the Subcommittee staff and the IRS
concerning formal access to each other's files." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25 (emphasis added).
The court noted further, ibid., that the complaint "also" made
two other allegations that could have been related to the
dissemination claim. First, there was a cha.rge that Brick had
exhibited the McSurely documents "to persons whose names
"Q. Did Senator McClellan look at those records?
"A. No, sir. He looked at one.
"Q. Did there come a time when you-after the expiration of certain
litigation between the McSurelys and the officials in Kentucky, did you
then return that batch of documents to the authorities in Kentucky?
"A. I did. I returned them to Thadeus Scott on August 14, 1978.
"Q. And is the receipt that has been marked listing the 230-some docu_•) nents, is that the receipt tha.t you got when you returned them?
"A. That is the receipt I prepared and he signed, yes.
"Q. Did you retain any of the documents thereafter or did you make
!lJIY copy of any documents and retain them in your file?
"A. I never made a single copy of those documents. I retained none.
I have not now and the Subcommittee has none. All the documents were
returned to Mr. Thadeus Scott. I have never used a Xerox machine on
those documents, although it has been said here a number of times that
t did'. T did not." App. 97-98.
This testimony was incorporated in Senator McClellan's affidavit accompanying the summary judgment motion: /d., at 50. Respondents dispute it, although they have adduced no facts tending to disprove it. See
n. 30, infra.
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are unknown to plaintiffs." App. 31-32. Second, the complaint alleged that McClellan has "used the instrumentality
of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal
vendetta between himself and a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private ~orrespondence of the
plaintiff Margaret McSurely." App. 35. The court pointed
out, however, that there was "no specific allegation that Brick
embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his purported
'vendetta' by dissemination outside the Subcommittee itself.
The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress
apparently rests on access by the IRS officials." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 109 11. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 11. 25. 30 In sum,
The Court of Appeals' di~ruo;l:'ion of the partiE's' dio;pute and the two
allegations in the amended complaint is as follows:
"On November 25, 1974, plaintiffs filed a supplemental affidavit lodging
these recently disclosed materials wit.h the court. The federal defendants
.countered on January 24, 1975, arguing that even if the IRS had gained
access to the Subcommittee files at some point after August 28, 1968, the
McSurelys could not have been harmed thereby because the 234 copies
were returned to Commonwealth Detective Scott on August 14, 1968 (and
reCBived by the McSurelys on November 8, 1968), and Brick had testified
at the McSurelys' contempt trial tha.t he made no copies and that neither
he nor the Subcommittee retained any of the documents, D. A., II, 730.
Plaintiffs, in their reply to defendants' response, filed January 31, 1975, dispute bot.h that the documents were turned over to Scott on August 14,
1968, and that no copies were made. Since we affirm the District Court's
denial of summary judgment on this claim, we leave the resolution of this
question to the District Court on remand.
"Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copies
of the 234 items to unknown persons causing plaintiffs damage and embarra.ssmei~t, and that McClellan 'used the instrumentality of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal vendet.ta between himself and .
a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private correspondence of the plaintiff Margaret McSurely.' Amended and Suppl.
19, 28 (b) (ii), App. 45, 50. However, there is no specific alle'Com pl.
gation that Brick embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his pur·ported 'vendetta.' by dissemination outside of the Subcommittee itself. The
<el!l-in!. Qf 4!EJEJeminatiop outsidl:l of th(:l HallE! of Congress apparently rests ·On
30

mf
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the court's conclusion that the dissemination claim "was not
made in. the amended complaint," its distinction between that
claim and the other two claims actually made in the complaint, and its ultimate conclusion that the claim of dissemination rested solely on the newly developed theory indicate that
the Court of Appeals did not believe that the amended complaint encompassed this claim. ~ '
In light of this apparent conclusion, it is difficult to under.,.
stand the court's declaration in the same footnote
that it was
'
affirming "the District Court's denial of summary judgment
on this claim," as well as ~e statement to that effect in the
per curiam opinion announcing the judgment. If the complaint did not encompass the new dissemination claim, there
had been no occasion for the District Court to pass on its
sufficiency, nor for the Court of Appeals to affirm any judgment thereon. Respondents' belated injection, of the dissemination theory into the case, standing alone, would not amount
to an amendment of the complaint, and no motion to amend
was made. Becau~ there had been no trial, there had been
no admission of evidence to which the pleadings could be held
to conform under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15' (b). · Thus, it is
u~clear wheth-er any issue regarding dissemination of the
McSurely materials outside Congress was properly befote the
Court of Appeals.
For this reason, we must vacate the judgment of affirmance
as to that claim. We express no opinion as to the merits
of the dissernination theory. On remand, the Court of Appeals may determine whether the dissemination claim is
embraced by respondents' amended complaint, or it may take
such other steps with respect to this claim as it qeems proper•.
'

..

access by IRS officials." 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d,
at 1285 n. 25.
3 1 The pan PI opinion wa:s no c]parer on this i~;sue.
See 172 U. S. App.
~D. C., at 373-374, and n. 29, 521 F. 2d, at 1033-:1034, and n. 29.

,•
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IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar
as it reversed the refusal of the District Court to dismiss the
portions of the complaint relating to the original seizure of the
McSurelys' materials. It is also affirmed insofar as it directs
the entry of summary judgment. for petitioners as to claims
concerning use of the materials within Congress. With
respect to the claim concerning Brick's inspection of the documents and transportation of copies, the judgment is affirmed
as to Brick, but reversed as to McClellan, Adlerman , and
O'Donnell, and remanded with directions to enter summary
judgment for them on that claim. Finally, the judgment is
vacated insofar as it purports to affirm the denial of summary judgment on tlw dissemination issue and is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 76-1621
Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States
of the Estate of John L. McClellan,
et al., Petitioners,
Court of Appeals for
v.
the District of Co~
Alan McSurely et ux.
lumbia Circuit.
'[March -, 1978]
MR. JusTICE PowELL announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the following opinion.*
This case presents important issues concerning the scope
of legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause.1
SpecificaUy, the original petitioners-a United States Senator
and three members of a committee staff-contend that the
Clause protects them from suits based on the aUeged use of
illegal means in the course of field investigations related to
congressional inquiries. They also argue that, on this record,
respondents have not adduced sufficient evidence connecting
them to the alleged illegal actions to lift the cloak of legislative immunity. For the reasons that follow, we reject the
first contention, but agree with the second argument as to
three of the four petitioners.
I
In 1967, Alan and Margaret McSurely were field organizers
for the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., in Pike
County, Ky. Alan McSurely also had served as a field orga*Part II of this opinion is joined only by

THE CHIEF .JusTICE

and MR.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN.
1

Article I,§ 6, cl. 1, provideo that "for Speech or Debate in either House,
and Represent,ativeS;J shall mot be questioned in any other Place."'

[Sen.aM~rs

~·
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nizer for the National Conference of New Politics and
distributed literature for Vietnam Summer. On the night of
August 11, J967, under authority of a warrant charging seditious activities against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and
the United States in yiolat.ion of Ky. "ftev. Stat. § 432:040,
Pike County officials arrested the McSurelys and seized a
quantity of books, pamphlets-,. and letters found in their
home. Shortly after the raid, Thoma~ Ratliff, Commonwealth Attorney for Pike ·County, announced publicly that the
seized material ~buld be made available to any Congressional
Committees interest~d in the M~Surelys.
On September 14, 196{, a three-judge District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, one judge dissenting~ declared
the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional on its face and
enjoined state prose~mtion of the McSurelys. M cSurely v.
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (ED Ky. 1967). The court ordered
that all the seized material "be held by [Ratliff] in safekeeping
until final disposition of this case · by appeal or otherwise/'
App. 78.
Soon after issuance of the · District Court's otder, ··Ratliff
received a telephone call fronfLavern Duffy, Assistant Counsel
to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations. ... The Subcommittee, which was headed by Senator McClellan, was investigating the causes "of various riots across the, Nation; including
one that had occurred in Nashville; Tennessee, in April 1967.
Some of the Subcommittee's information showed that the
organizations with which the McSurelys were -affiliated might
have been involved in· the· Nashville riot. Hence, Duffy
asked Ratliff whether the materials seized from the McSurelys
were in his ·custody. Ratliff replied that they were, and on
October 8, 1967, a Subcommittee investigator, John· Brick,
arrived in Pikeville, the county seat.
· That same evening Thadeus Scott, a Commonwealth dete.c' ~ive, visited Brick's motel room and gave ~Brick ,_photocopietJ

' j
[
I
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of 234 of the seized documents. The next morning, Brick
spent an hour examining the originals in a locked room at the
Pike County courthouse. Ratliff testified that he had tried
to reach the members of th<' three-judge court before permitting Brick to enter the locked room. He succeeded in reaching the dissenting member of the court, but what transpired
is not clear.2
Brick also visited the Clerk of the District Court, who
allowed him to inspect the case file of the McSurelys' threejudge court action. Brick arranged to have the Clerk send
him a copy of the court's safekeeping order and the inventory
of seized items. On October 12, 1967, Brick again entered the
locked room at the county courthouse and spent four hours
taking notes on the materials. He then returned to Washington, taking with him the 234 copies that Scott had given him.
This material included at least one personal letter addressed
to Mrs. McSurely, which concededly had no relevance to
Brick's investigation. At Senator McClellan's direction, Brick
prepared subpoenas duces tecurn for some of the material in
Ratliff's possession.
The McSurelys moved before the three-judge court to
prevent Ratliff from releasing the subpoenaed materials. 3 On
October 30, 1967, the court denied the motion and directed the
2 At the McSurely's subsequent trial for contempt of Congress, see n. 5,
infra, Ratliff testified that "I had my permission" before he allowed Brick
access to the stored materials. Defendants' Appendix 407, United States
v. McSurely, Nos. 24,812, 24,813 (DC 1971). The implication of this
statement was that the dissenting judge gave "permission," but that is not
clear. Moreover, the scope of any permission remains unexplained. Ratliff
conceded that he had not communicated with the cocustodian of the
materials, United States Marshal Archie Kraft, before permitting Brick to
inspect the materials. Id., at 407-408.
8 The McSurelys did not premise their opposition to the subpoenas upon
any allegedly unlawful activity on Brick's part in inspecting and transporting the document s, lndePd, they later te;;tified that they did not even
become aware of Brick '~ actual role until December 5, 1967. Id., at 655~
~56,681-682, 704-705,707-709.
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parties to cooperate with the Subcommittee.4 Further litiga.
tion ensued," culminating in an order of the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in July 1968, holding that since the time
for appeal from the judgment of the District Court striking
down the sedition statute had expired, there was no basis for
con:tinued court custody. The court ordered the seized materials returned to the McSurelys, M cSurely v. Ratliff, 398 F. 2d
817 (CA6 1968), and noted that questions as to the validity of
the subpoenas still were open. According to· Brick, the Subcommittee's photocopies were returned to Detective Scott on
August 14, 1968. The originals and copies were returned to
the McSurelys on November 8, 1968. Upon receipt of these
materials, the McSurelys were served with new subpoenas.
On March 4, 1969, McSurelys appeared before the Subcommittee and refused to comply with the subpoenas. Their
refusal resulted in' a conviction for contempt of Congress, 6 but
in December 1972, the Court of Appeals for the District -of
Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the subpoenas were
the fruit of two Fourth Amendment violations: (i) the original
seizure by Kentucky officials, and (ii) Brick's "unauthorized
search and inspection of the documents" in violation · of the
4

The court's order read in part as follows:
"The parties to tins action and the officers of this Court are directed to
cooperate with the Senate Committee in making available such of- the
ma,teria.Is, or copies thereof, as the Committee considers pertinent to its
inquiry; but until time for appeal is expired, this will be done in such
manner as to keep intact those materials that may be pertinent to the
appeal of this case."
H ca,nnot be determined whether this may be read as a retroactive
ratification of Brick's in~pection and tran~porta.tion activties. There is
nothing in tlw rrcord beforr u~ to indicate that th!:' thr!:'e-judge court was
nppri~ed of tho~e activities. See 180 U.S. App. D . C., at 117 n. 59, 553
F. 2d, at 1293 n. 59.
5 For a synopsis of that litigation's course, see the opinion below of
Judge Wilkey, id., a.t 132-133, 553 F. 2d, .a t 1308-1309.
u The variou;; tE>.~timoi_1X ,;.e!erred to in this opinion was given at the<
~emtempt trial. See, e. g., n." 1, 8Upra.
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three-judge court's safekeeping order. United States v.
McSurely, 154 U.S. App. D. C. 141, 154-155, 473 F. 2d 1178,
1191-1192 (1972).
On the same day that they appeared before the Subcommittee, the McSurelys filed this action/ alleging that Senator
McClellan, Brick, Jerome S. Adlerman (the Subcommittee's
General Counsel), Donald F. O'Donnell (the Subcommittee's
Chief Counsel), and individual Members of the Subcommittee
had conspired to violate the McSurelys' constitutional rights.
They sought decla.ra.tory and in,junctive relief and $50,000
damages from each defendant. The action was stayed to permit the contempt trial to proceed. M cSurely v. McClellan,
138 U.S. App. D. C. 187, 426 F. 2d 664 (1970). In September 1971, while the appeal of their contempt conviction was·
pending, the McSurelys filed an amended complaint, naming
Ratliff, McClellan, Brick, Adlerman, and O'Donnell as defendants. The amended complaint alleged in essence that the
federal defendants had conspired with Ratliff to carry out an
illegal raid in 1967, and to inspect, tran-sport, and use the seized
materials in violation of the McSurelys' constitutional and
other rights. On October 26, 1971, petitioners moved to
dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment on the
basis of legislative immunity, failure to state a claim, and
collateral estoppel by virtue of the contempt conviction. 8 The
motion was denied and petitioners appealed. 9
7 Listed with the McSurely:: as plaintiffs in this initial complaint were
three associatjons with which they were connected: the Southern Conference
Educational Fund, the Southern Student Organizing Committee, and the
Students for a Democratic Society.
8 Ratliff did not join thi:; motion.
0 Normally the denial of a motion for :;ummary judgment i:; not appealable because it is not a final decision for purposes of § 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
See generally 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ~ 56.21 [2], at 56- 1275 to
56-1286 (2d ed. 1976) . The Court of Appeals, however, adopted the
reasoning of the panel opinion, which held that this particular denial had
'"$.utlicient indicia O:f finality," 172 U. S. App. D. C. 364, 371, 521 F . 2d

~·.
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In 1974, while petitioners' appeal was pending in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, respondents obtained
documents thought by them to indicate that the Subcommittee
had established an information-sharing relationship with the
Internal Revenue Service. These documents were lodged with
the Court of Appeals, together with affidavits suggesting that
petitioners might have exhibited the allegedly wrongfully
seized materials to agents of the Internal Revenue Service.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals, en bane, affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and rema.nded.1.o Judge Leventhal wrote for
himself and four others, as did Judge Wilkey. Senior Judge
1024, 1031, quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 308
(1962), to qualify as appealable, even though it was not a decision that
ended the action. The panel observed that the Speech or Debate Clause,
upon which the summary judgment motion was focused, protects Members
of Congress and their aides from the burdens of defending themselves as
well as from the consequences of the litigation. 172 U.S. App. D. C., at 372,
521 F. 2d, at 1032, citing Dombmwski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82,85 (1967) .
Reasoning that the asserted right to be free of the burdens of a. la.wsuit
would be irretrievably lost if the case proceeded to trial, the panel coneluded that an appt>111 from the final judgment would come too late to provide meaningful review of lhR.t claim . Hence, as to the assertion of immunity from inquiry, the denial of summary judgment was held a "final
decision" for purposes of § 1291. 172 U. S. App. D. C., at 372, 521 F .
2d, at 1032. Neither side challlmges that analysis here, and we see no
reason to depart from it.. s~·e also Cohen V. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337
U. S. 541 (1949) .
Jo While the case wRs in tht> Cour1 of Appeals, Brick and Adlerman died.
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 104 n. 1, 553 F. 2d, at 1280 n. 1. The Court of
Appeals did not decide whether the actions against them survived, leaving
that issue for the District Court on, remand. In August 1977, respondent
moved in the District Court to substitute the survivors or estates for Brick
and Adlerman. Petitioners oppose that motion, arguing that respondents'
delay caused the action t,o abate. They nevertheless named Brick and
Adlerman as petitioners in case this opposition should fail. See Fed. Rule
App. Proc. 43 (a). We need not pass on the questions either of survival or
abatement of the actions.
Senator McClellan died while the case was pending before this Court.
!lis executor was substituted.under Rule 48 (1) of this Court,

'1\
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Danaher, who had sat on the panel, joined Judge Wilkey's
opinion, but wrote a separate opinion as well. The court
unanimously reversed the refusal to dismiss that part of the
complaint relating to the original seizure of the McSurelys;.
materials by Kentucky authorities. The court also agreed
unanimously that summary judgment should have been
granted as to the portion of the complaint charging unlawfut
use of the material within Congress itself. 180 U. S. App ..
D. C. 101, 104, 553 F. 2d 1277, 1280 (1976) . Respondents do'
not dispute those actions here.
The Court of Appeals, again unanimously, affirmed what it
designated as the denial of summary judgment as to those·
portions of the complaint alleging dissemination of the material outside of Congress. Ibid. 11 By an evenly divided vote,.
it affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the allegations·
that Brick had violated the McSurelys' rights by inspecting
the documents subject to the safekeeping order and transporting copies back to Washington. 12 Judge Leventhal, writing·
n Judge Leventhal '~ opinion and the short per curiam opinion stating
the judgment both indicated that the dissemination claim was to proceed·
upon remand. Judge Wilkey's opinion agreed with that disposition.
Although Judge Danaher joined Judge Wilkey's opinion, his separate opinion seems to call for a different resolution of the dissemination claim, since
he would have directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint entirely,
on the basis of official immunity.
12 All 10 judges below appear to have agreed that the McSurelys alleged
seven categories of wrongdoing:
" ( 1) The unlawful search and seizure of the McSurelys' books and'
papers by Kentucky authorities;
" (2) the inspection by Brick of those unlawfully seized materials;
" (3) the transport by Brick of copies of 234 documents to Washington ;
" (4) the inspection of some or all of these 234 copies by the staff of the
Subcommittee;
" (5) the use of the copies, as the basis for issuance of subpoenas for some
'of the documents;
·" (6.] the vrocurement of C®temiJt Qf Cont~~ citations agp,inst thee
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for himself and four others, concluded that the allegations
and. facts of record stated Fourth Amendment an:d invasion
of privacy claims. Judge Wilkey, writing for the other five
members of the court, disagreed and would have reversed and
remanded only in the ailegation of dissemination outside of
Congress. Judge Danaher 'would have ordered the case dismissed on the basis of 'official immunity. We granted certiorari. -U.S.- (1977).

II
~

In this Court, petitioners have chosen to rely principally
upon an argument that was rejected by all 10 judges of the
Court of Appeals. They contend that the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause extends "to [the use of] unlawful
means to achieve legitimate objectives." 13 In their view,
unlawful activities carried out in the course of an otherwise
legitimate investigation should be completely· cloaked by a
legislative immunity that "precludes judicial inquiry e~ven into
conduct that would be illegal or unconstitutional if performed
by priva.t e persons." 14 Indeed, for purposes of this argument,
petitioners concede that Brick's conduct was "a violation of
the Fourth Amendment." w They insist, however, that legis-

'.

plaintiffs by consciously withholding from the Senate the facts relating to
the challenged subpoenas ;
" (7) the dissemination of some or all of the 234 copies obtained by Brick
to persons or agencies outside of the Subcommittee-particularly the
Internal Revenue Service/' 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 108, 553 F . 2d, at
1285 (footnote omitoo) .
At issue here are allegations (2), (3), and (7).
1 a Brief for Petitioners 15.
11 !d., at 14.
15
At oral argument, petitioners made their concession on this issue quite
explicit:
. "QUESTION : A11en't you conceding for the purpose of argument that
' there was w1·ongdoing ?

·~
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lative immunity from suit is meaningful only when a Member
or a legislative aid is alleged to have engaged in conduct that
would be actionable if engaged in by a private citizen, since
an "immunity that would protect on,ly when no wrong was
alleged to have been committed would be no immunity at
all." to
While this extreme position may have some superficial plausibility, its logic would lead to acceptance of untrammeled
legislative power. 17 Moreover, it has been rejected by prior
decisions of this Court. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387
U. S. 82 (1967), this Court squarely held that legislative
immunity did not shield a congressional aide charged with
"MR. EASTERBROOK: We are conceding for the purposes of this
argument that [Brick's activity] was actionable in some way.
"QUESTION: That's what I thought.
"QUESTION: And also a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Yes, we are conceding for purposes of this
argument." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See also id., at 29.
111
Brief for Petitioner 15.
1 7 In petitioners' view, legislative immunity "probably" extends even to
deliberate theft and murder, so long as they occur in the course of a
congressional investigation. This was made clear at oral argument:
"MR. EASTERBROOK: .. . .
"But essentially our approach rests on the contention that the immunity
is triggered by the purposes of the activity in which the Senator or the
Senate aide was engaged. We believe that this approach was consistent
with and indeed required by the considerations that led to the establishment
of the constitutional privilege.
"QUESTION: How far does that reasoning take you? Let's say its
purposes were very clearly to aid the legislative process by aiding the
congressional committees, a.nd in pursuance of that pristinely protected
purpose he simply burglarized a house and stole things out of a locked
drawer or safe. Is he protected under the Speech or Debate Clause for
that? I am talking now, by "he" I mean an aide to the committee.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: Mr. Justice Stewart, that question raises a
number of complexities. My answer to it ultimately is, yes, probably he
is protected.
"QUESTION: Including murder, I suppose. Well, maybe not there.
"MR. EASTERBROOK: That, too falls within my yes, probably

'.
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violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights in the
course of an otherwise legitimate investigation? 8 Similarly,
'our decision in Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 628answer, but I would like, if I can-this one, the answer is not intuitively
'appealing,·! must concede.'1 Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15. See also (d., at 16-17.
18 Petitioners attempt to distinguish Dombrowski on the ground tha.t
the congressional aide involved in that case was n.ot engaged in investigative activity on behalf of Congress. They argue tha.t he merely "conspired with state officials to plan. . a{ld carry out a raid to gain evidence
for use in a state prosecution.'' Brief for Petitioners, at 29. In their
view, summary judgment in his favor was reversed simply because the
Speech ,or Deba.te Clause furnjshes_ no protection to activities not carried
out in the cours¢ of a. congressional investigation. Petitioners' characterization of the facts in that case is erroneous. As we observed in Gravel v.
United States, 408 U. S. 606, 620 (1972), the aide in Dombrowski "was
gathering informatiop. for a. hearing." Moreover, the record in. Dombrowski makes clear that the aide traveled to Louisiana. at the behest of
Senator Eastland and in pursuance of the investigative functions of a
Senate Subcommittee. Record in Domb1'0wski v. Eastland, 0. T. 1966,
No. 118, pp. 35, 40-41, 87, 91-94. Indeed, the Court of Appeals in Dombrowski explicitly stat('([ that "H1e subpoena was expressly authorized in
the first in::;tance by t lw Chairman of the [congressional] committee ...."
Dombrowski v. Burbank, U. S. App. D. C. - , 358 F .. 2d 821, 825
(1966). The issu!' as to the disputed date of the. subpoena in that case-upon which MR. Jms'l'ICE REHNQUIS'l' relies for thP proposition that the
allegation in Dombrowski wa,; that the a1de simply may have been acting
out8ld~ th(• aPgi~ of a. eongre::;sional committee, ante, at n. 2'-was
relevant not. to thr aidP's congres::;ion::tl authorization to issue the subpoena, but to thP qu<'stion of his participation in thr alleged conspiracy
to mount the challenged raids. See Brief for th<' Respondents in Oppo;;itiou, Dombrowsh v. Eastlaud, 0 . T. 1966, No. 118, pp. 9-11; Brief for
Petitioners, id., pp. 10, 67-68.
Dombrowski can be read as suggesting that the scope of legislative
immunity for aides is narrower than that for the Member. 387 U.S., a.t 85.
This suggestion, however, was laid to rest in Gravel v. United States, 408
U. S. 606 (1972), which held "that t.he Speech or Debate Clause applies
not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the
latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member
l1imself." !d., at 618. Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen:s Fund, 421 U. S. 491, 502 (1975), viewed the distinction in

1".
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629 ( 1972), held that the Speeeh or Debate Clause did not
immunize an aide from grand jury questioning concerning possible criminal conduct in the course ·of Senate informationgathering activity. As we declared in Gravel, "no prior case
[has] held that Members of Congress would be immune if
they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out
an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a
hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the privacy
of a citizen. Such acts are no more essential to legislating
than the [conspira~y] held unprotected in United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966)." Gravel, supra, at 621 (footnote omitted). Conduct in the course of informal investigative activity simply does not fall within the Speech or Debate
Clause if it clearly exceeds the lawful powers of Congress.
Our decision in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), is not to the contrary. There the
Court addressed the "power to investigate and to do so through
compulsory process." Id., at 504 (emphasis added). We
refused to recognize an action to enjoin implementation of a
facially proper subpoena, holding the subpoena "an indispensable ingredient of lawmaking," 111 id., at 505. We h!lld no
Dombrowski between Member and aide not as one deriving from a
difference in the scope of their legislative immunities, but as one relating
to the activities in which they were alleged to have engaged by the
complaint.
111
In this case the Court of Appeali:i revNi:ied the denial of summa.ry
judgment as to the claims relating to the issuance of subpoenas:
"The Subcommittee here employed proper process for information 'on
which "legislation could be had."' We note that the subpoenas called for
materials that were at least arguably relevant. to its investigation, but did
not call for the production of Mrs. McSurely's letter or any other
demonstrably irrelevant private correspondence. Under these circumstances Servicemen's Fund prevents further inquiry into plaintiff's charge
that the Subcommittee's purpose was to harass and intimidate them in the
exercise of their First Amendment rights. The Subcommittee's issuance of
subpoenas is privileged activity, notwithstanding plaintiff's bare allegation
·~lwt ~he real pur.(lose behind the sub.I?oenas was to 'cover-up' the earlier
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occasion, however, to consider the effect of lawless activity in
the course of informal investigative conduct. Such activity
simply is not a part of "thfl due functioning of the [legislative]
process." United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 516
( 1972) (emphasis in original) .
In arguing that an immunity which evaporates with the
allegation of actionable conduct is no immunity at all, petitioners misapprehend the sweep of our prior decisiqns dealing
with investigative activity. When Congress employs facially
proper means of information-gathering-such as the subpoena
in Servicemen's Fund-the Speech or Debate Clause precludes
both inquiry into legislative motive and lawsuits for damages
resulting from the investigation. But when Members of
Congress or their aides resort instead to criminal or otherwise
unlawful methods of obtaining information, they exceed the
power duly vested in Congress and can expect no condonation
by virtue of ·the Speech or 'Debate Clause. This "focus on
means permits the court to afford relief 'without proof of a
legislative act.' " 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 112, 553 F. 2d, at
1288 (opinion of Leventhal, J.), quoting Gravel, 408 U.S., at
621. Legislat.ive immunity does not shield a Member or his
aide from being called t.o account for Fourth Amendment or
other violations committed in the course of their investigative
work in the field. Dombrowski, supra; cf. Gravel, supra.20
improper conduct by Brick, and the further assertion that had there been
full disclosure the Subcommittee would not have issued the subpoenas, and
the Senate would not have approved the contempt citation." 180 U. S.
App . D . C., at 122, 553 F. 2d, at 1298 (footnotes omitted) .
No question is raised here concerning the correctness of the Court of
Appeals' judgment on this issue.
~o MR. JusTICE REHNQUlsT's concurring opinion would dispose of the
case on the basil:i of a newly formulatE-d doctrinE' of olficial immunity.
Apart from the fact that thi~ i ~,;ue was neit hPr Pmbraced by the que:stwn,;
pre:sented in the pctitiou for certiorari nor arguPd or briefed, adherence
to that viPw would rpquirP the sub silentio overruling of Dombrowski v.
Eastland. That case involved a lE-gislative oflirial, Committee Counsel
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Petitioners further contend that on the reQord in this case,
respondents' complaint should be dismissed because they have
not made the requisite showing of liability. It is clear that
when a defendant entitled to invoke Speech or Debate immunity moves for summary judgment on that basis, the Constitution requires the plaintiff to adduce evidence affording "more
than merely colorable substance" to allegations of actionable
conduct. Dombrowski, 387 U. S., at 84. Otherwise, the
cloak of immunity is not. lifted, and the Speech or Debate
Clause forecloses further litigation. This follows from the
established doctrine that Speech or Debate immunity protects
Members of Congress and their aides "not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of
defending themselves." I d., at 85. Since petitioners moved
for summa.r y judgment on the basis of the Speech or Debate
Clause, the courts below were required to determine whether
the Dombrowski threshold-evidence affording "more than
merely colorable substance" to the allegations of unimmunized
conduct-had been passed with respect to each defendant. 21
Sourwine, of pricbely the same rank as two of the petitioners to whom
MR. Jus·rrcE REHNQUfS'I' today would accord absolute official immunity.
Sourwine argued in this Court that he was entitled tofofficial immunity
nndt>r the doctrinE' of Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (i893), and Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), Brief for Repondents, Dombrowski v. Eastland, 0. T . 1966, No. 118, pp. 38-41. Nevertheless, the Dombrowski
Court permitted the caHe to proceed as to him. Hence, Dombrowski must
be read as rt>jectiug thr proposition that the contours of any distinct
official legislative immunity depart from those of the Speech or Debate·
Clau~;r. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 324 (1973). Moreover, it
would be difficult to reconcile MR. JusTICE REHNQUit;T's view of the scope
of~ immunity with the holding in Butz v. Economou, No. 76-709,
decidei:l June -, 1978.
21 Respondents were put on notice quite explicitly that. by making the
summary judgment motion petitioners were calling upon them to adducesome evidence tending to connect each defendant to the alleged wrongdoing. The petitioners made that point repeatedly at the hearing on the-

·.
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Respondents have satisfied the constitutional standard as to
allegations of Brick's misconduct. It is stipulated that Brick
inspected the documents subject to the safekeeping order in a
summary judgment motion. For example, counsel for petitioners declared
at one point as follows:
" ... [P]art and partial [sic] of the defense of legislative immunity, is the
immunity of having to suffer the burdens of extensive litigation.
"This is what ihe Supreme Court held in Dombrowski against Easthnd . . . . And the only reason that Dombrowski against Eastland was
,permitted to go into some discovery-and I understand that case has been
dismissed for want of prosecution-the only reason was, there was on the
record a discrepancy of factual evidence. The documents seemed to show
some discrepancy about a date on some subpoena which lent some support
in argument, and the Supreme Court said, in view of this factual dispute,
we need to resolve it a little further before we can consider whether or not
legislative immunity is sufficient to protect [the Member's aide]." Tr. of
Hearing Oct. 28, 1971, at 15-16.
More succinctly, counsel for petitioners stated:
·" .•. I think the burden should be placed on the plaintiffs to come forward
with any evidence they may have to suggest and demonstrate that these
·defendants were not acting within the scope of their legislative duties.
That would present an issue in which we were forewamed. That is the
function of the motion for summary judgment." I d., at 18.
Petitioners made a similar argument in a memorandum ;;upporting their
motion:
"The affidavit of Senator McClellan filed in support of the pending
motions fully establishes the circumsta,nces by which the Senate Committee
conducted its investigation and served the subpoenas out of which this
litigation arises. Again, nothing in the McSurelys' affidavit furnishes any
facts to demonstrate that Brick, Adlerman, or O'Donnell were acting
o·utside the perimeter of their· legislative functions." Supplementru Memorandum of Poirts and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Nov. 23, 1971, at 5
'(emphasis added).
See also Memorandum of Point,; and AutJ10rities in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, Oct. 26,
1971, at 3-4; Reply of Defendants McClellan, Adlerman, O'Donnell, and
Brick to Plaintiff's Letter to the Court Dated Sept. 12, 1972, Oct. 13, 1972,
:at 10.
Counsel for respondents indicated that he understood the burden peti-

"
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locked vault in Pikeville and that he transported copies of
selected ones to Washington. The court below divided evenly
as to whether, in light of the three-judge court's safekeeping
order, the stipulated facts state a claim under the Fourth
Amendment. On the present state of the record, however,
there is no basis for concluding that respondents failed to
state a claim, if only for invasion of privacy. 22 Some of the
facts at issue in the dispute as to the validity of the Fourth
Amendment claim were obtained only after oral argument en
bane. 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 126 n. 84, 553 F. 2d, at 1302
n. 84. There has been no opportunity to weigh the various
characterizations of Brick's activity or the meaning of the
three-judge court's safekeeping order. Moreover, the record
also contains testimony by Brick that he carried to Washington a copy of at least one document that he believed to be
of no relevance to the Subcommittee's investigation of the
riots. 23 Congress possesses no general power to investigate
tioners sought to cast upon him, although he disputed their right to do so:
"Now comes Mr. Goldbloom [counsel for petitioners] and says, prove to
me by facts disputing Senator McClelland's [sic] affidavit that it is not
true, before you can take depositions. How can I do that? And this is
what the trouble is with this whole posture. I am going to file an affidavit
which says he is wrong. I have to say it on information and belief. And
then he is going to come into court and say, it is just on information and
belief." !d., at 43-44.
Thus, there can be no q11rstion that respondents wert> put on noticE' as
to the importancE' of adducing such evidence as they had with rt>Spect to
each dt>fendant.
22 At oral argument, coum;t>l for petitioners acknowledged the possibility
that the complaint may state a cause of action under state tort law:
"MR. EASTERBROOK: . . . There is the possibility that under District of Columbia or Kentucky law there is a common-law tort lurking in
the background of this case. That's the reason why we elected not to
make strongly here any arguments about the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, prec·isely because there may be allegations of other bases of
liability based on common law." Tr. of Oral Arg. 21.
23 Brick testified a!' follows :
~ 'Q. Did yo\1 teU Mr. DQtsQn or any ,of the fQlk with whom you met.
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' private affairs, even by subpoena; the subject of the inquiry
must always be one on which legislation could be had. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S., at 504 n. 15. Therefore, Brick's
there that there was some of that stuff that you didn't think that you
needed?
· ·
'
"A. Yes.
"Q. Did you give it back to them?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you need that letter signed Dearest Cucumber or address
Dearest Cucumber?
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant.
"THE COURT: He may answer the question.
"THE WITNESS: N~. Didn't you say signed Dearest Cucumber and
when in fact 'it says addressed to Dearest Cucumber.
"MR. STAVIS:. No, I didn't.
"THE WITNESS: Was the question, did I need that letter?
"BY MR. STAVIS :'
"Q. Yes. For the performance of your duties.
"A. No sir.
"Q. As a matter of fact, in respect to the performance of your duties,
you didn't need most of the items in that list, did you?
"A. Some of them. There were many others in the locked vault in
~he Court House that I would have obtained under the subpoena.
" Q. That what?
"A. · That I would have obtained under the subpoena had not the Subcommittee stopped all action when the defendants went into Court.
"Q. Did you-when I was asking my questions about this list of 234
~terns, there were lots of these items that you didn't need at all, correct?
"MR. BRESS: Objection. Irrelevant.
"THE COURT: I believe he has already answered the question.
"BY MR. BRESS :
"Q. What was your answer?
11
A. Some, yes.
''Q. Some that you did?
''A. It was11Q .
Lots?
11
A. I object to the use of the word lots.
"Q. A great many, a great many?
11
A. Oh, I will say many. Let me explain. I didn't select any of these
:as I told you."· App. 101-102.
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eopying and transportation of concededly irrelevant material
are sufficient to lift legislative immunity for purposes of a summary judgment motion. Brick's testimony on that subject
ultimately may be expla.ined away, or the inclusion of a single
irrelevant letter may be deemed de minimis. But his testimony, together with the other factors mentioned above,
is sufficient to carry respondents across the Dombrowski
threshold.
The posture of the other three federal defendants, however,
is decidedly different. The opinion of Judge Leventhal noted
that although "plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement in
possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity
to permit trial to proceed as to him, the record is silent on
the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and
O'Donnell 'in any activity that could result in liability.'"
180 U. S. App. D. C., at 123, 553 F. 2d, at 1299, quoting Dombrowski, supra, at 84. In response to defendants' summary
judgment motion and Senator McClellan's affidavit denying
any conspiracy or activities outside the scope of legislative
activity, respondents could aNer only on information and
belief that the defendants joiued in the conspiracy to drive
respondents out of Pikeville and exceeded the bounds of legislative activity.21 Dombrowski teaches that mere allegations
H Senator McClellan '~ affidavit denird "any conspiracy, collaboration or
any other participatiOn of any sort in the allegedly illegal police raid
allegedly planned and conducted by defendant Ratliff." App. 4\}. He also
denied that he or his aides had exceeded the legislative authority of the
Subcommittee. !d., at 50. While his affidavit contains no specific denial
of a Fourth Amendment violation by Brick with respect to the inspection
of documents in Pikeville, the general denial of exceeding legislative authority must be read as embracing one. It is only fair to read the affidavit
that way, since the specific theory of a separate Fourth Amendment violation by Brick-though supportable on the allegations of t.he amended
complaint-apparently did not emerge clearly until the case reached the
Court of Appeals
Examination of the Di~tri.ct Coll.rt rrcord di:;clos<'::i no suggestion by-
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are not enough.~r. There must be fa~ts of record tending to
connect the defendant to the alleged misconduct. Having
found, properly, that the record was silent as to the involvement of.McClellan, Adler:man, and O'Donnell in any activity
that could result in liability, it was the duty of the court
'

.

\

appellants tha.t Brick's activit.y in and of itself nmounted to a sepa.rate
violation of the Fomih Amendment . Instead, plaintiffR' theory of the case
w11s that ~ince the Kentucky ;:enrch nnd ;.;eizure had been n1led unconstitutionaJ at t.Jw time of 1hr Subcommittee tak('over of the documents, the
subpo<'nas were the fmit of the original Kentucky seizure. This is the only
Fourth Amendment theory set forth in tlw nmended complaint. App.
'32-33. Thus, in the Dist.rict Court the theory wns not that Brick's
inspec·tion of the documents in Pikesville was a S<'cond violation of the
Fourth Amendment, the issue dividing .Judge Wilkey and Judge Leventhal ;
rat.her, the tht:>ory then was thnt. Brick'" inspection, takeover, and the
subsequent subpoenas were t.he fruits of the original illegal search and
seizure.
In these circumstances, it hardly could be expected that Sena.tor
McClellan's affidavit wotrld declare specificnJly that there had been no
Fourth Amendment violn.tion by Brick. Respondents had not been
presented with tha.t theory of the case. Since the amended complaint has
'been viewed expansively, the Senator's affidavit correspondingly must be
taken as putting in issue all the allegations subsequently read into the
amended complaint.. It denies, on behalf of all the respondents, any
activity outside the scope of legislative atlthority.
To this denial, respondents could reply only "on information and belief
[that] the defendant McClellan, together with defendants Adlerman,
O'Donnell, and Brick, joined in the conspiracy of the defendant Ratliff
to force us out of Pikevill(' . . . ." App. 55-56. See also n. 21 , s'Upra.
They also contested McClellan's general denial of exceeding legislative
authority, App. 56, but again no facts were adduced.
2 5 Nor may thr involvement of the Member or some of his aides be
inferred solely from the involvement of other aides. In Dombrowski, summary judgment for Senator Eastland was upheld despite an allegation of
· conspiracy and the existence of facts linking his Subcommittee's chief
counsel to possible Fourth Amendment violations. Thus, the mere fact
that Brick may have engaged in conduct outside the scope of legislative
immun,ity does not suffice to link the other defendants to that conduct.
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below to reverse the denial of their motion for summary
judgment.
Although this standard imposes a not insubstantial burden
upon plaintiffs who seek to lift the veil of legislative immunity, it is justified by the purposes served by the Speech or
Debate Clause. 2 n As noted above, it is intended to protect
Members of Congress and their aides from "the burden
of defending themselves against unsubstantiated claims."
Dombrowski, supra, at 85. Even where an injunction is not
sought, Members are forced "to divert their time, energy, and
attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation."
Id., at 503. Thus, the Constitution requires that motions
founded on legislative immunity "be given the most expeditious treatment by district courts because one branch of Government is being asked to halt the functions of a coordinate
branch." Servicemen's Fund, supra, at 511 n. 17.

III
The Speech or Debate Clause does not immunize the dissemination of allegedly actionable material "beyond the reasonable bounds of the legislative. task." Doe v. McMillan,
412 U. S. 306, 315 ( 1973). Respondents argue that they have
made an adequate showing of improper dissemination. They
rely on the lodging wit.h the Court of Appeals in 1974 of recently obtained material indicating that the Subcommittee
had permitted agents of the IRS to inspect portions of the
Subcommittee files. Rpecifically, respondents pointed to a
2 o While MR. ,lusTICE HEHNQ.l'Hi'I''H concern with maintaining "uniform
procednra :>tandard~ m civil rasrs," post, at 4, is understandable, it
should not be permitted to owmde the dictates of the Speech or Debate
Clau,;e. Dombrowski makC'S it rlear that motions founded on the Clause
can be defea.ted onl~ ' by a ~howing of "more than merely colorable substance" to the allegationi' of unirnmunized conduct. 487 U. S., at 84.
This requirement stem~ din,ctly from the Constitution ; a motion for sum·mary judgment under FNl. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 is merely the vehicle for
'effectuating the independent policies of the Speech or Debate Clause.
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letter of March 5, 1969/ 7 in which Senator McClellan informed the Secretary of the Treasury that the Subcommittee
had taken certain steps in September 1968, toward arranging
meetings with Internal Revenue agents for the purpose of exchanging information about organizations under investigation"
'2 1

Thi:-; letter rf'ad as

follow~:> :

.

"UNITED STATES SENATE

Committee on
Government, Operations
Senate Pel'Ilk'tnent Subcommittee
on Investigations
Washington, D. C. 20510
March 5, 1969
''Dea.r Mr. Secretary:
"In accordance with Executive Order 11337, dated March 27, 1967, a
resolution was duly adopted by the Committee on Government Operations on September 18, 1968, with regard to the organizations listed on the
attached. pages. It should be noted that this request was made on December 16, ,1968, prior to the expiration of Executive Order 11337. This is
to reaffirin the same request pursuant to Executive Order 11454 dated
February 7, 1969, and .Treasury Decision 6133.
"Pursuant to this resolution, I hereby designate the following individuals, members of the Subcommittee staff, to make such examinations: Mr.
Philip R. Manuel, Mr. John E. Drass, Mr. Fred P. Miller, Mr. Perman
H. Clay, Mr. James H. Dillon, and Mr. Walter S. Fia.Ikewicz. In, this
connection, it will be appreciated if the files could be assembled in the
district office of jurisdiction. In order to facilitate the wo'rk of the staff,
it would be further appreciated if the staff designees be permitted to consult with Interna.I Revenue Agents and Auditors familiar with the content
of the respective files.
"Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated.
"Sincerely yours,
·- John J . McClellan
· Chairman
"Honorable David M.' Kennedy
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C."
A:pp., at 70.
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Respondents also emphasized an IRS memorandum 28 showing
August 28, 1968, as the date on which the possibility of a
cooperative ralationship between Subcommittee and Service
was first explored. Respondents argue that these materials
tend to establish that. the defendants exhibited to the Internal
Revenue agents the Pikeville documents, which were not returned to reSpondents until November 8, 1968.29
28

The memorandum reads in pertinent

p~trt

as follows :

"FACT SHEET
ES1'ABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL SERVICE STAFF

"Allegations have been made that the Internal Revenue Service established the Special Service Staff from instmctions received from White
House officials. This simply is not tme. The facts are these:
"August 28, 1968. Mr. Philip Manuel, an investigator with the Permanent Committee on Investigations, Sena.te Committee on Government
Operations, contacted the Service to say that he had a group of seven
investigators working for him on matters pertaining to certain organizations and other groups; that he had prepared a letter for the Chairman
of tl1e Committee, Honorable John J. McClellan; and that he expected
the request to be signed shortly. His call was to alert us to the fact that
he wanted the Committee investigators to be permitted to discuss these
matters with our District officials rather than to conduct inspection of
returns in tl1e National Office." App., at 73.
'20 Although the documents were not returned to the McSurelys until
November, Brick testified that he returned the Subcommittee copies to
Kentucky authorities on August 14, 1968-two weeks before the initial
exploration of possible cooperation between the Subcommittee and the
Service. He also declared that the Subcommittee had made no additional
copies :
"Q. And did they-did there come a time when you returned those
documents?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. During the time that you had possession of the documents, were
they publicly-publicized, distributed or seen by anybody outside of the
Committee?
"A. No, sir, and not by anybody inside of the Committee, either.
" Q. Where were the documents maintained?
"A. In my personal file under lock and key and the key was always
'in my pocket and that; was by order of Senator McClell~.
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The Court of Appeals, however, apparently did not view
respondents' amended complaint as presenting this belated
claim of dissemination outside the Subcommittee:
"The claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234
documents to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was
not made in the amended complaint. This claim arose
because of the disclosure of certain IRS documents,
obtained as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit,
which indicated contacts, beginning on August 28, 1968,
between members of the Subcommittee staff and the IRS
concerning formal access to each other's files." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F . 2d, at 1285 n. 25 (emphasis added).
The court noted further, ibid., that the complaint "also" made
two other allegations that could have been related to the
dissemination claim. First, there was a charge that Brick had
exhibited the McSurely documents "to persons whose names
"

"Q. Did Senator McClellan look at those records?
"A. No, sir. He looked at one.
"Q. Did there come a time when you-after the expiration of certain
litigation between the ·McSurelys and the officials in Kentucky, did you
then return that batch of documents to the authorities in Kentucky?
" A. I did. I returned them to Thadeus Scott on August 14, 1978.
"Q. And is the receipt that has been marked listing the 230-some docuh nents, is that the receipt that you got when you returned them?
"A. That is the receipt I prepared and he signed, yes.
"Q. Did you retain any .of the documents thereafter or did you make
any copy of any documents and retain them in your file ?
"A. I never made a single copy of those documents. I retained none.
I have not now and the Subcommittee has none. All the documents were
return ed to Mr. Thadeus Scott. I have never used a Xerox ma.chine on
those documents, although it has' been said here a number of times that
! did~ I did not." App. 97- 98.
This testimony was incorporated in Senator McClellan's affidavit accompanying the summary judgment motion: ld., at 50. Respondents dispute it, although t hey have adduced no facts tending to disprove it. See
n . 30, infra .

76-1621-0PINION
McADAMS v. McSURELY

23

a.re unknown to plaintiffs." App. 31-32. Second, the complaint alleged that McClellan has "used the instrumentality
of the [Subcommittee] investigation to carry out a personal
vendetta between himself and a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private correspondence of the
plaintiff Margaret McSurely." App. 35. The court pointed
out, however, that there was "no specific allegation that Brick
embarrassed plaintiffs or that McClellan pursued his purported
'vendetta' by dissemination outside the Subcommittee itself.
The claim of dissemination outside the Halls of Congress
apparently rests on access by the IRS officials." 180 U. S.
App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d, at 1285 n. 25.;< 0 I11 sum,
so The Court of Appral!~' di::;cus;;ion of the parties' d1~:>pute and the two
allegations in the amended complaint is as follows:
"On November 25, 1974, plaintiffs filed a supplemental affida.vit lodging
these recently disclosed materials with the court. The federal defendants
-countered on January 24, 1975, arguing that even if the IRS had gained
access to the Subcommittee files at some point after August 28, 1968, the
McSurelys could not have been harmed thereby because the 234 copies
were returned to Commonwealth Detective Scott on August 14, 1968 (and
received by the McSurelys on November 8, 1968), and Brick had testified
at the McSurelys' contempt tria.] that he made no copies and that neither
he nor the Subcommittee retained any of the documents, D. A., II, 730.
Plaintiffs, in their reply to defendtmts' response, filed January 31, 1975, dispute both that the documents were turned over to Scott on August 14,
1968, and that no copies were made. Since we affirm the District Court's
denial of summary judgment on this claim, we leave the resolution of this
question to the District Court on remand.
"Plaintiffs' amended complaint also alleges that Brick exhibited copies
of the 234 items to unknown persons causing plaintiffs damage and embarrassment, and that McClellan 'used the instrumentality of the [Subcommittee] inve&-tigation to carry out a personal vendetta between himself and
a certain personage of prominence named in some of the private correspondence of the plaintiff Margaret McSurely.' Amended and Suppl.
Com pl.
19, 28 (b) (ii), App. 45, 50. However, there is no specific allegation that Brick embarrassed plajntiffs or that McClellan pursued his pur-ported 'vendetta' by dissemination outside of the Subcommittee itself. The
oclaim Qf gj~~minatiop outside of th~ Hall~ of Congress apparently rests ·OU

mf
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the court's conclusion that the dissemination claim "was not
made in the amended complaint," its distinction between that
claim and the other two claims actually made in the complaint, and its ultimate co~clusion that the claim of dissemination rested solely on the newly developed theory indicate that
the Court of Appeals did not believe that the amended complaint cncompassf'u this claim."'
In light of this appa.rent conclusion, it is difficult to under.,.
stand the court's declaration in the same footQot~ that it was
affirming "the District Court's denial of summary judgment
on this claim," as well as the statement to that effect in the
'
per curiam opinion announcing the judgment. If the complaint did not encompass the new dissemination claim, there
had been no occasion for the District Court to pass on its
sufficiency, nor for the Court of Appeals to affirm any judgment thereon. Respondents' belated injection, of the dissemination theory into the case, standing alone, would not amount
to an amendment of the complaint, and no motion to amend
was made. Becau~ there had been no trial, there had been
no admission of evidence to which the pleadings could be held
to conform under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15 (b). · Thus, it is
u~clear whether any issue regarding dissemination of the
McS'urely materials outside Congress was properly before the
Court of Appeals.
For this reason, we must vacate the judgment of affirmance
as to that claim. We express no opinion as to the merits
of the dissemination theory. On remand, the Court of Appeals may determine whether the dissemination claim is
embraced by respondents' amended complaint, or it may take
such other steps with respect to this claim as it deems proper•.
access by IRS officials." 180 U. S. App. D. C., at 109 n. 25, 553 F. 2d,
at 1285 n. 25.
aJ The panrl opinion wa~ no clrarPr on this issue. See 172 U. S. App.
~D . C., at 373-374, and n. 29, 521 F. 2d, at 1033-:1034, and n. 29.
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IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar
as it reversed the refusal of the District Court to dismiss the
portions of the complaint relating to the original seizure of the
McSurelys' materials. It is also affirmed insofar as it directs
the entry of summary judgment, for petitioners as to claims
concerning use of the materials within Congress. With
respect to the claim concerning Brick's inspection of the documents and transportation of copies, the judgment is affirmed
as to Brick, but reversed as to McClellan, Adlerman, and
O'Donnell, and remanded with directions to enter summary
judgment for them on that claim. Finally, the judgment is
vacated insofar as it purports to affirm the denial of summary judgment on tlw dissemination issue and is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion .

So ordered.

-.

~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
FROM:

Bob

RE:

Justice White's Draft in McAdams v. Mc.Surely, No.

DATE:

June 19, 1978·

Part I of BRW's opinion is devoted to establishing
that field investigations are not within the protection
of the Speech or Debate Clause.

He reads Gravel v. United

States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), as establishing the principle that field investigation is not within the p
of the Speech or Debate Clause's protection.
the case never says that.

u·

n ,

In actuality,

It uses rather hazy language

to dance all around the point, eg.:

the immunity is una-

vailable ._ where legislators "engaged in illegal conduct that was not entitl~d
to
..._..
protection."

408 U.S., 620.

our holding as well as BRW's.

Speech or Debate Clause
That language could fit
We could add a one-line

footnote somewhere in our draft .t stating that Gravel

_______

would have been a much easier case .& if its holding
,__

~

-

----------------------

had been that field invest}gation wasn't covered.

All

that the case held was that the congressional aide coul
be questioned about tlll..ll.'l his knowlegge of the
criminal activity concerning the obtaining of the Penta
gon Papers.

Certainly the holding of the case does

---------------------------

not go beyond • our holding in this case.

Part II of the opinion takes on our summary judgment
holding and is rather persuasive in that regard.

BRW

b~ically makes the sa~points I unsuccessfully tried to

2.

sell last February.

I don't think there is a great

deal that we can say to him in reply, since most of
the arguments to be made have already been inserted
in response to fue memo he circulated in March.

We

do stretch the pleadings in favor of McClellan,
and we do read them very narrowly against the
plaintiffs, for which BRW takes us to task.

Our

only answer

and one that is already made

the opinion

is that the Speech or Debate Clause

i~

dictates those procedures.
In Part III, Justice White argues with our interpretation of the Leventhal opinion insofar as it deals
with the dissemination claim.

Again, I dorlt think

that there is anything to say that we have not said
already.

In the second part of Part III, BRW anticipates

Justice Stevens' position and argues that there is
no privilege for exhibition of these sorts of materials
to executige agencies.

Since we do not address that

issue, we have no need of reply there.

To: Tho Chi ef J us tice
Mr . Jus t ice Brennan
Mr. Jus t lce Stnwart
Mr . Jus ti ce Uarshall
],lr~ u sttc0 Blackmun
~ Just i0;J Po we ll

Mr . J ust i ce R ~hn quist
Mr. Jus t i ce Stevens
From: Mr. Justice White
Circulated:

6/19/78

Recirculated: __________
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MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
This is an interesting study of the Supreme Court
at work.
The petition for certiorari which we granted
pressed two claims:

first, even if Brick violated the

Fourth Amendment (which petitioners concede that he
did for the purposes of this case), petitioners are
immune from liability under the Speech or Debate Clause,
and second,

t~1at

the Clause also protects them from

liability for disseminating to other branches of the
Government.
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The Court unanimously rejects the claim that the Speech
or Debate Clause protects against liability for constitutional
infringements by congressional investigators, six of us because field investigations are not legislative acts entitled
to Speech or Debate Clause immunity; and three of us because
the Clause does not protect against constitutional violations
by congressional investigators, the latter ground also being
the basis for the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Under

any ordinary application of our rules that we do not deal
with questions not presented by the petition for certiorari,
one would expect that the Court would therefore affirm this
part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals,which had also
concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause did not protect
against constitutional wrongs by congressional investigators.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is nevertheless
reversed as to three of the petitioners.
divided among themselves.

The majority is

As MR. JUSTICE POWELL and two other

members of the Court read the record, respondents failed adequately to respond to petitioners' summary judgment motion
in the trial court; petitioners are thus entitled to judgment.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by MR. JUSTICE STEWART, reverses
because petitioners are absolutely immune from damages liability,
not because of the Speech or Debate Clause, but because of
common-law official immunity.

No. 76-1621

As I shall explain later, MR. JUSTICE POWELL's ground
for reversal is not fairly included in or subsumed by the
questions presented here.

Indeed, the Court of Appeals,

having ruled that the Speech or Debate Clause did not protect
against constitutional transgressions, remanded the case to
the trial court, among other things to permit the petitioners
to make a new motion for summary judgment, if they cared to
do so, addressed to the very issue of whether petitioners

LL

were sufficiently implicated in the alleged transgressions.
Petitioners never claimed in the District Court or in the
Court of Appeals that if they were wrong on their Speech or
Debate Clause argument they were nevertheless entitled to
judgment.

As for the official immunity ground for reversal,

that issue is not raised by the petition, has not been briefed
or argued and, as MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST concedes, it is a
novel question that has never been decided or dealt with by
this Court.
Of course, this Court has the power to reach and eliminate
plain error appearing in the record, even though not raised by
the petition for certiorari.

But the disposition of this case

is all the more remarkable because the position espoused by
MR. JUSTICE POWELL and those who join him, which leads him to
deal with the summary judgment issue, is rejected by a majority
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As I shall explain later, MR. JUSTICE POWELL's ground
for reversal is not fairly included in or subsumed by the
1/
questions presented here.Indeed, the Court of Appeals,

/

having ruled that the Speech or Debate Clause did not protect
against constitutional transgressions, remanded the case to
the trial court, among other things to permit the petitioners
to make a new motion for summary judgment, if they cared to do
so, addressed to the very issue of whether petitioners were

2/

sufficiently implicated in the alleged transgressions.-

Petitioners never claimed in the District Court or in the
Court of Appeals that if they were wrong on their Speech or
Debate Clause argument they were nevertheless entitled to
judgment.

As for the official immunity ground for reversal,

that issue is not raised by either of the questions presented
in the petition, has not been briefed or argued in any meaningful sense and, as MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST

concedes~

it is a

novel question that has never been decided or dealt with by
this Court.
Of course, this Court has the power to reach and
.eliminate plain error appearing in the record, even though not
raised by the petition for certiorari.

But the disposition of

this case is all the more remarkable because the position espoused by MR. JUSTICE POWELL and those who join him, which leads
him to deal with the summary judgment issue, is rejected by a

No. 76-1621
4 .-

majority of the Court:

that is, the Speech or Debate Clause

is not to be applied, as they would have it, to informal investigations by Congress.

A majority of the Court likewise

rejects MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's position that highly placed
officials in the Government should be free deliberately and
knowingly to violate the law because the adversary processes are
so unreliable and erratic that they cannot be trusted rapidly to/
distinguish between innocent or negligent mistakes of law or
fact and those that are knowing and deliberate and because it

\

would be distracting for high officials to have to defend themselves at all.

Although trustworthy enough to sort out those who

are subject to the death penalty and those who are not, even
though intent and purpose may be critical elements in such determinations, judges and juries are, in MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's
view, quite inadequate to give the Attorney General, assistant
Attorneys General and other Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers, the
breathing room they require if they are to be effective public
servants.

That position has been rejected in Butz v. Economou,

___ U.S. ___ (1977), but nevertheless forms the basis for two of
the determinative votes to reverse in this case.
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of the Court:

that is, the Speech or Debate Clause is not

to be applied, as they would have it, to informal investigations by Congress.

A majority of the Court likewise rejects

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's position that highly placed officials
in the Government should be free deliberately and knowingly
to violate the law because the adversary processes are so unreliable and erratic that they cannot be trusted to distinguish
between innocent or negligent mistakes of law or fact and those
that are knowing and deliberate.

Although trustworthy enough

to sort out those who are subject to the death penalty and
those who are not, even though intent and purpose may be
critical elements in such determinations, judges and juries
are, in MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's view, quite inadequate to
give the Attorney General, assistant Attorneys General and
other Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers, the breathing room
they require if they are to be effective public servants.
That position has been rejected in Butz v. Economou,

u.s.

(1977), but nevertheless forms the basis for tt-70

of the determinative votes to reverse in this case.
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In dissent, I shall first state my reasons for
concluding that the Speech or Debate Clause does not extend
its protections to congressional investigators in the field.
As I have said, six members of the Court agree with this result, if not with the reasoning to reach it.

I shall then,

with all due respect, express my disagreement as to the
grounds employed for reversing the investigative phase of
the Court of Appeals' judgment.

I shall also disagree with

the reversal of the judgment as to the dissemination issue.

No. 76-1621

I

The initial question posed by this case is whether
the gathering of information by means other than the use of
formal process is within the scope of the immunity provided
by the Speech or Debate Clause.

The Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia agreed with the Government that
investigative activities conducted in the field, as well as
the more formal functions of conducting hearings and obtaining information by means of subpoena, are protected by the
Clause.

It went on to hold, however, that the employment of

unlawful means to perform otherwise proper legislative activities is not essential to legislating and that if Brick
violated the Fourth Amendment, neither he nor anyone who acted
in complicity with him in such illegal conduct ,.;ould be im-

2/

mune. --

MR. JUSTICE POWELL agrees with the Court of Appeals

that legislative immunity does not shield Members of Congress
or their agents from liability for violations of law

con~itted

during the course of field investigations, but finds it unnecessary to reach the question of "whether even properly
conducted field investigation would fall outside the protection
of the Speech or Debate Clause."

Ante, at 12 n. 20.

Although

I agree that the illegal acts alleged by respondents are not
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, I reach this conclusion by a somewhat different analysis.

In my view, our past

f)
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cases clearly establish that the Speech or Debate Clause
immunizes even violations of law committed in the course of
performing functions covered by the Clause but that investigative activities other than by means of formal process are
not protected by the Clause.
A

Our past cases clearly establish that "once it is
determined that Members are acting within the 'legitimate
legislative sphere' the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute
bar to - interference."

Eastland v. United States Servicemen's

Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975).

It should be obvious that an

immunity that would only protect when no illegality was alleged
would be absolutely useless.

Immunity from suit or criminal

prosecution is of assistance only when a Member of Congress or
a legislative aide is alleged to have engaged in activities
that would violate the law if done by a private citizen.

For

this reason, we have held that "Congressmen and their aides are
immune from liability for their actions within the 'legislative
sphere,' Gravel v. United States [408 U.S. 606, 624-625 (1972)],
even though their conduct, if performed in other than legislative
contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes."
306, 312-313 (1973).

Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S.
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B

Nevertheless, the allegations that petitioners
illegally inspected and transported to Washington the
documents seized from respondents clearly relate to conduct
outside the coverage of the Speech or Debate Clause.

This

aspect of the case is governed by Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606 (1972), which held that the informal gathering
of information, even at the direction of a Member of Congress
for valid legislative purposes, is not itself a legislative
act within the meaning of the Speech or Debate Clause.

Of

course, there can be no doubt that the obtaining of information by informal means for legitimate legislative purposes is
a proper and appropriate activity.

But as Gravel recognized:

'~hat Senators generally perform certain acts
in their official capacity as Senators does not
necessarily make all such acts legislative in
nature. • • •

"Legislative acts are not all-encompassing.
The heart of the Clause is speech or debate in
either House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other matters, they must be an
integral part of the deliberative and communi cative processes by which Members participate
in committee and House proceedings with respect
to the consideration and passage or rejection
of proposed legislation or with respect to other
matters which the Constitution places within the
jurisdiction of either House." 408 U.S., at 625.
See also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966).

,,
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Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S.
491 (1975), which held that Members and their aides are immune
from liability for acts relating to the issuance of subpoenas,
did not in any way impair the vitality of . Gravel's holding that
investigatory activities are normally outside the scope of the
Speech or Debate Clause.

The Court in Servicemen's Fund care-

fully distinguished Gravel on the ground that it dealt with
investigative activities which, unlike the use of compulsory
process, are not essential to legislating.

Although

Ser~icernen's

Fund probably goes further than any of our cases in protecting
activities removed from the actual deliberative processes of
Congress, which constitute the core of what the Speech or Debate
Clause protects, it did not purport to limit the holding in
Gravel that investigatory activities not involving the issuance
of formal process are not so essential to legislating as to come
within the protection of the Clause.
This distinction between the exercise of the power to
obtain information by means of subpoena and the use of other less
formal modes of investigation is supported by important considerations which are implicit, though perhaps not fully articulated,
in Gravel and Servicemen's Fund.

First, the subpoena power, unlike

informal investigative methods, is essential to the
information required to enact legislation.

gathe~ing

of

If Congress were de-

prived of all means of acquiring information other than by means
of compulsory process, it would still be able to perform its

I

f
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legislative functions, though perhaps less expeditiously.
Without the power to acquire information by means of subpoena,
however, the ability of Congress to fulfill its legislative
responsibilities would be seriously curtAiled.

Second, although

the use of the subpoena power is subject to abuse, its inclusion
within the Speech or Debate Clause does not place it completely
beyond judicial control.

Unlike the legality of activities such

as the seizure of materials involved here, even though Speech
or Debate Clause immunity applies, the legality of a sut.poena may
be judicially tested by its recipient if an effort is made to
enforce it against him.

If petitioners are immune for the in-

vestigative acts here alleged, however, respondents and those
similarly situated would have no means whatsoever of challenging
conduct which impinges upon their legal rights.

Finally, the

issuance of a subpoena is a formal act which generates an official
record.

It may be expected that these considerations, particu-

larly the fact that the use of the subpoena power will frequently
be exposed to the scrutiny of the public and of other legislators,
will generally persuade legislators to exercise the subpoena power
with restraint.

These considerations persuade me that Gravel and

Servicemen's Fund drew the appropriate line between investigatory
activities which the Speech or Debate Clause does and does not
immunize at the point separating the use of the subpoena power and
other conduct related to the gathering of information.

21
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c
The United States makes the additional argument that
even if the actual inspection and transportation to Washington
of the McSurelys' documents are not legislAtive acts for Speech
or Debate Clause purposes, nevertheless Senator McClellan may
not be held liable consistent with the Clause for doing no more
than authorizing these acts.

It does not question that under

the ordinary rules of liability for common law and constitutional
torts one who orders or conspires with others to violate the law
stands in the same shoes as those who physically commit the violation but urges that legislative immunity shields Members of
Congress from liability for directing the actions of others.

This

conclusion is said to be compelled by Kilbourn v. Thompson , 103 U.S.
168 (1881), which held that although Congress lacked power to punish
a witness for contempt and that therefore those who participated in
Kilbourn's arrest were liable, the Speech or Debate Clause protected
House Members who merely voted for the resolution authorizing
Kilbourn's arrest.

But the activity it held to be protected in

Kilbourn was not that of ordering or authorizing but rather only that
of voting.

Significantly, the Court predicated its holding upon the

assumption that the Members themselves "did not in any manner assist
in the arrest of Kilbourn or his imprisonment, nor did they order or
direct the same, except by their votes and by their participation
as members in the introduction of, and assent to, the official acts
and proceedings of the House . • • • "

(Emphasis added.)

{I

103 U.S.,

-·
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at 200.
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I .-f

Indeed, the clear implication of Kilbourn is that

the Court would have held House Members liable if they had
personally advised or instructed the sergeant-at-arms in
connection with the actual making of the

~rrest.

Subsequent cases have interpreted Kilbourn as standing
only for the proposition that voting is so integral to the
legislative process as to be, at least absent extraordinary
circumstances, privileged regardless of the invasion of rights
resulting from it.

In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, the

Court on the authority of Kilbourn dismissed the action against
House Members who did no more than vote for the resolution
barring Representative Powell from the House, but held that it
could be maintained against those employees of the House who
took or threatened to take actions to prevent Powell from taking
his seat.

Indeed, Powell, like Kilbourn, reserved the question

of whether even the act of voting was privileged under all circumstances by declining to reach the question "whether under the
Speech or Debate Clause petitioners would be entitled to maintain
this action solely against the Members of Congress where no agents
participated in the challenged action and no other remedy was
available."

395 U.S. , at 506 n. 26.

!LI

See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. ,

at 204-205.
Even if the matter were previously in doubt, Gravel clearly
established that the Speech or Debate Clause does not provide Members
with immunity for complicity in illegal actions to which immunity

.,

')
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would not otherwise attach just because they only directed
or authorized the actions.

First, Gravel held that the

Speech or Debate Clause is concerned with activities rather
than persons and that Senators have no more immunity than
their aides.

Secondly, Gravel did not restrict inquiry into

conduct by Senator Gravel and his aide to acts of a physical
nature or to acts which implemented broad directives.

The

Court concluded that conduct by a Senator or his aide not
integral to the legislative process was outside the protection
of the Speech or Debate Clause even if it consisted of no more
than the issuance of orders and requests or the entering into
of arrangements which were ultimately implemented by others.
It specifically held that Senator Gravel's arrangements with
Beacon Press to publish the Pentagon Papers was not protected
speech or debate and that inquiry could be made into any such
arrangement.

This holding forecloses the contention that com-

munications between Gravel and Beacon Press or between Gravel and
his aides would have been protected if they consisted of no more
than orders or requests relating to the publication of the Penagon
Papers which were later carried out by others.

Similarly, Gravel

permitted inquiry into any activities of or knowledge possessed
by Gravel or his aide relevant to determining how the Pentagon
Papers came into the Senator's possession.

Again, it is clear that

the Court did not regard any conduct by Gravel relating to the

,

·.
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obtaining of the Pentagon Papers -- even a telephone call
from him to a third party requesting their production or an
order to an aide to do the same -- as being within the scope
of the Speech or Debate Clause.

Gravel stands for the prop-

osition that Speech or Debate Clause immunity protects acts
integral to the legislative process such as voting and speech
during formal proceedings, but does not attach to individual
member functions such as authorizing aides and supervising them

5/

with respect to an infinite variety of activities.--

It is thus sufficiently clear to me that absolute
legislative immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause does not
attach to investigators such as Brick who are sent into the fie ld
to gather papers, evidence or information, or interrogate individuals or representatives of organizations.

It is incredible to me

that congressional investigators should have absolute immunity
under the Clause from any liability for investigative acts in the
field, no matter how invasive of privacy or injurious to persons
or property, although for the same acts their counterparts in
other agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the
Internal Revenue Service would not be entitled to absolute immunity but only to a qualified immunity.
It also follows for me that Senator McClellan would have
been immune if he did no more than subpoena the materials in
question from the McSurelys or Ratliff, or if he had merely voted

., r.·
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for a resolution instructing Brick to act as he did.

The

latter situation would have been analogous to Kilbourn.

To

hold, however, that field investigations are covered by the
Speech or Debate Clause and that Members 8f Congress who
actually order or urge the commission of illegal acts by means
other than voting, debating, and otherwise participating in
formal floor or committee sessions are therefore immune from
liability would represent a major and unwarranted extension of
the coverage of the Speech or Debate Clause.

f!
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II
This conclusion, as I see it, should end the "investiga··
tion" phase of this case and to that extent the judgment of
the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

·Unfortunately, that

is not the case.
A

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and two other

Justices ·~

conclude that although respondents have alleged conduct on
the part of all four petitioners which is outside the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court of Appeals
erred in not entering summary judgment in behalf of petitioners
McClellan, O'Donnel, and Alderman.

As I have said, I doubt

very much that this issue is properly before the Court.
First, the issue is not subsumed within either of the ques.
t 1ons

• pet1t1oners
• •
I
•
• ~
presente d 1n
pet1"t"1on f or cert1orar1.

Only the first question is remotely related to the claim, and
it raises only the issue of whether the Speech or Debate Clause
"bars a private suit for damages against a Senator and his
aides, alleging that some of their investigatory activities.
were improper or unconstitutional." (Emphasis added.)

The

additional claim now addressed by MR. JUSTICE POWELL that

No. 76-1621

even if such a suit is not barred three of the petitioners
were nevertheless entitled to summary judgment on the basis
of the record before the Court of Appeals is not comprised
within that question.

Secondly, petitioners failed to raise

this issue in either the District Court or the Court of
Appeals.

Their motion to dismiss in the District Court,

like Question One presented here, raised only the issue of
whether the Speech or Debate Clause afforded absolute

immunity~ 1

Nor was the present proposition that even on the Court of
Appeals view of the Speech or Debate Clause, petitioners were
entitled to summary judgment on the basis of affidavits submitted presented in the Court of Appeals.

Since three Justices

nevertheless are prepared to enter judgment in favor of three
of the petitioners on the basis of this contention, however,
I proceed to address it.
B

I agree that under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56 if a defendant
comes forward with affidavits specifically denying the allegations in complaint, the plaintiff must come forward with
specific factual allegations which create a material issue
of fact, or adequately justify his inability to do so, if he
is to avoid the entry of summary judgment.

But no principle

I

I

l
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is more basic to summary judgment procedure than that a
defendant is not entitled to relief unless he demonstrates
that he "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Rule 56(c).

See Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144,

159-161 (1970).
silent.

This is true even if a plaintiff remains

On the record before us, the defendants in the

trial court, petitioners here, were not entitled to summary
judgment because they failed to even allege facts which
would constitute a defense to the charge that they had
complicity in the inspection and transportation to Washington of the McSurelys' documents.
The only affidavit submitted by any of the petitioners
was that of Senator McClellan, and it basically did no more
than state that the acts complained of were done as part of
a properly authorized investigation.

Significantly, the

Senator did not deny respondents' allegations that he was
responsible for and involved in Brick's allegedly illegal
inspection and transportation of the relevant documents.

All that he denied was "any conspiracy, collaboration or
any other participation of any sort in the allegedly illegal
police raid allegedly planned and conducted by defendant
Ratliff."

App., at 49, ,[ 11.

As a result of the Court of

No. 76-1621

Appeals' decision, however, no question concerning the
federal defendants' complicity in the initial police seizure
of the documents remains in the case, but only issues relating to their complicity in the subsequent inspection, transportation, and dissemination of the documents.

As to these

matters, Senator McClellan was completely silent.

Nor does

Senator McClellan's affidavit say anything concerning the
involvement of Alderman or O'Donnell.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL recognizes that the Senator's affidavit fails

to specifically deny respondents' allegations

of Fourth Amendment violations, but argues that the Senator's
general assertion that all actions by himself and the other
petitioners in relation to the McSurelys "were taken pursuant
to a lawful congressional investigation within the legislative
authority of the Senate of the United States as assigned to
said Subcommittee," app. 50,

~

11, must be read broadly as

denying all of respondents' charges because at the time it
was filed Senator McClellan could not have been expected to
understand the nature of respondents' allegations.
17 n. 24.

I find this untenable.

Ante, at

If Senator McClellan did

not understand the nature of respondents' allegations of
Fourth Amendment violations, he was hardly in a position to

I
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deny them.

:.n

There is no support whatsoever for the

proposition that a court may enter summary judgment on the
basis of speculation concerning what defendant would have
denied or alleged under circumstances other than those on
the basis of which he filed his sworn statement.

In any

event, one could as readily speculate that if Senator
McClellan had denied the charges, respondents would have
come forward with affidavits creating material issues of
fact.

Furthermore, apart from general principles of sum-

mary judgment procedure, Senator McClellan's assertion that
he and the other petitioners engaged only in legislative
acts cannot be plausibly construed

as a .broad denial

of committing illegal acts, because it has been the position
of petitioners at every stage of this proceeding that all of
the illegal acts with which they were charged were within
the scope of their legislative duties and, under their view
of the law, absolutely protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause regardless of their legality.
On this record, therefore, I cannot agree that summary
judgment should be entered for petitioners.

That issue

should be first dealt with on remand to the District Court,
as the Court of Appeals ordered.

' ""
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III
MR. JUSTICE POWELL would remand respondents' claim
that petitioners illegally disseminated some of the seized
materials to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to the
Court of Appeals for consideration of whether it is within
the scope of the amended complaint.

But in my view it is

quite clear that the Court of Appeals has already passed
upon thts matter.

Otherwise one must believe that the

Court of Appeals unanimously held that the claim of dissemination should not be dismissed on the ground of Speech or
Debate Clause even though it "did not believe that the
amended complaint encompassed this claim."

Ante, at 23.

There is nothing in the opinion below which supports such
an unlikely supposition.
Paragraph 19 of the amended complaint alleges that
Brick "exhibited [the McSurely documents] to persons whose
• t•ff
names are unk nown t o th e p 1a~n
~
s . . . . II

App. 31-32.

Footnote 25 of the Court of Appeals opinion, which I agree
is the key to the matter, begins by stating that "[t]he
claim of dissemination of some or all of the 234 documents
to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was not made in the
amended complaint."

It is clear, however, that the court

'
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was not stating that the complaint did not encompass
dissemination to the IRS but only that it did not mention
the IRS in haec verba.

Indeed, this very same footnote

goes on to state that "[p]laintiffs' amended complaint
also alleges that Brick exhibited copies of the 234 items
to unknown persons . . . . The claim of dissemination outside
the Halls of Congress apparently rests on access by IRS
officials."

The logical conclusion to draw from this,

particularly the last sentence, is that the Court of Appeals
did not view the claim of dissemination to the IRS as being
outside the scope of the complaint but rather as being the
only specific claim pressed by plaintiffs which supported
the broad allegation of dissemi.nation set forth in ,[ 19 of
the amended complaint.

Moreover, I see little point in

straining to find that the Court of Appeals acted in a selfcontradictory fashion, because there can be no doubt that
the allegation of dissemination in the amended complaint
is broad enough to encompass dissemination to the IRS.
On the merits, I agree with the unanimous conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606 (1972), and Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973),
foreclose the contention that dissemination of materials
to an agency of the Executive constitutes a legislative

'
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act within the scope of the Speech or Debate

Clause.~

Gravel held that the dissemination of the Pentagon Papers
by means of private publication and the arrangements made
with respect to this dissemination were not privileged.
Again, the Court did not question that the Senator's dissemination of the Pentagon Papers was related to his official duties and performed in his official capacity but
nevertheless concluded that immunity was not available
because the dissemination of information outside of Congress
is "in no way essential to the deliberations" of Congress.
408 U.S., at 625.

Doe v. McMillan went further and held

that the Speech or Debate Clause does not immunize from
private suit those who, even wi.th the formal authorization
of Congress, distribute materials which infringe upon the
rights of individuals.
The only conceivable distinction between the disseminations alleged in Gravel and Doe v. McMillan and that alleged
here is that the former were directrd toward the general
public while the latter is directed toward an agency of the
Executive.

The holding in neither case, however, was limited

to public dissemination.

Both types of dissemination un-

doubtedly serve .many valuable functions.

But Gravel and

Doe v. McMillan stand for the proposition that the Speech

I
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or Debate Clause does not generally protect conduct
relating to or in aid of the legislative process but only
acts integral to the actual enactment of legislation.

See

also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 514-516.
Moreover, I am unable to discern any reason for concluding,
and petitioners advance none, that the dissemination of information to agencies of the Executive is more integral to
the enactment of legislation than the communication of information to the general public.

As Doe v. McMillan explained

during the course of its discussion of why the dissemination
of information beyond the confines of the Congress was not
privileged:

"Members of Congress may frequently be in touch

with and seek to influence the Executive Branch of Government, but this conduct 'though generally done, is not protected legislative activity."'

412 U.S., at 313, quoting

from United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S., at 625.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals in its entirety.
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FOOTNOTES

McAdams v. McSurely

The Court of Appeals said:

Although plaintiffs have alleged Brick's involvement
in possible actionable conduct with sufficient factual particularity to permit trial to proceed as to him, the
record at present is silent on the involvement of defendants McClellan, Adlerman and O'Donnell "in any activity
that could result in liability." Dombrowski '1..'. Eastland,
387 U.S. at 84. Plaintiffs allege that the latter defendants
were acting in concert with Brick in the actions that
are pertinent. If that is so, they enjoy no greater im. munity for conduct not "essential to legislating" than
Brick, their agent. Of course, an allegation is not proof.
But at this stage of the case, given that the argument
of parties thus far has been drawn in terms of whether
or not the Speech or Debate Clause erects a complete
barrier to this action, we are unable to say on the basis
of the undisputed facts that the other federal defendants are constitutionally entitled to summary judgment
excusing them from further inquiry, even tbough Brick
is not. The path remains open for these defendants to
make a renewed motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the McSurelys have failed to adduce specific facts "which afford more than merely colorable substance," Dornb1·owski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. at 84, to
the assertion of concert with Briel\: iri conduct that survives the legislative immunity bar. Since the Speech
or Debate Clause acts as an exclusionary rule and testimonial privilege, as \Yell as substantive defense, plaintiffs must prove their case through evidence ·which ''does
not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant Member of Congress [and his aides] or [their] motives for performing them.'«"United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. at 526, quoting United States v. Johnson, 383
11
U.S. at 185.

l
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FOOTNOTES

__I_/ (continued)

McAdams v. McSurely

The Court of Appeals ordered on

remand that the District Court, among other things, make the
"necessary detennination 11 as to "whether any other federal
defendants acted in concert with Brick in action for which
he enjoys no legislative innnunity."

FOOTNOTES
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McAdams v. McSurely

553 F.2d 1277, 1286-1288, 1303 n. 3

Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), provides no support for petitioners' contention that investigations conducted by means other than formal process are
protected by the Clause.

In that case, the Court held only

that members of a congressional committee and their aides
were immune insofar as they engaged in the acts of introducing
materials at committee hearings, referring a committee report
to the Speaker of the House, and voting for the publication
of the report.

This conclusion was predicated upon the hold-

ing in Gravel that the Senator was immune from the imposition
of liability for any actions which occurred during the meeting of a sub.cqmmittee, including the reading of the Pentagon
Papers.

Doe did no more than once again recognize that

"'voting by Members and committee reports are protected' and
'a member's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although
subject to judicial review in various circumstances, as is
legislation itself, may not be made the basis for a civil or
criminal judgment against a Member because that conduct is
within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity."'"
Doe, 412 U.S., at 311-312, quoting from Gravel, 408 U.S., at
624.

Significantly, Doe also held that the Speech or De-

bate Clause does not immunize from private suit those who,

FOOTNOTES
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~/ (continued)

McAdams v. McSurely

even with authorization from Congress,

distribute materials which allegedly infringe upon the rights
of individuals.

See supra, pp.

All that Doe immunized

were formal proceedings at the core of the legislative process.

~/

The clear implication of Dombrowski v. East-

land, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), is also that Members are not
immune from liability for membership in a conspiracy designed
to violate the legal rights of others.

Although the Court

held that the complaint against Senator Eastland should be
dismissed, it did so only on the ground that he was entitled
to summary judgment because of his lack of participation in
the conspiracy alleged.

_f_!

See infra, p.

In Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), the

Court held on the basis of Kilbourn and Gravel that House
Members and their employees could not be held liable for introducing materials at a committee hearing, referring the
report which contained the materials to the · Speaker of the
House, and voting for publication of the report.
however, Kilbourn

Again,

was interpreted not as protecting Members

of Congress from. liability for ordering or supervising the
commission of illegal acts but rather as immunizing acts
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21 (continued) integral to the legislative function
such as voting and other forms of conduct by Members on the
floor or during legislative committee hearings, even though
such formal actions actually authorized unconSitutional
conduct.

~/

The auestions presented in the petition, Pet. for

Cert. 2., and repeated in petitioners' brief are:

"1. Whether the Speech or Debate Clause bars
a private suit for damages against a Senator and
his aides, alleging that some of their investigatory
activities, in connection with a subject on which
legislation may be had, were improper or unconstitutional.
2. Whether the court of appeals properly
ruled on an allegation of dissemination of documents
that was not presented to or decided by the district
court."

II

App. 45-46.
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553 F.2d 1277, 1285-1286, 1303.
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

Although I concur in substantially everything in MR.
JUSTICE WHITE's opinion, I am uncertain about the proper
disposition of a portion of the dissemination claim.

~he

Speech or Debate Clause protects the internal distribution of
legislative materials but not their general, public
dissemination.

Doe v. McMillan, 412

u.s.

306, 317.

Distribution is internal, and therefore protected, even when
the materials "are available for inspection by the press and bv
the public."

Id.

In this case, I am unable to discern from

the record whether the materials that were assertedly made
available to the Internal Revenue Service are on the protected
or unprotected side of the line identified in McMillan.

I

would therefore leave the issue open to be addressed in the
first instance by the District Court.

With the understanding

that this issue was not foreclosed by the Court or Appeals, I
would affirm its judgment.
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No. 76-1621 McAdams v. McSurely,
Rider, p. 11, after "1966" new footnote 19:
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MR. JUSTICE WHITE refers to Gravel as

"holding that investigatory activities are normally
outside the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause."
WangDraft at 9.

Post,

This reading of Gravel has not yet been

adopted by the Court.

The Court in that case was careful

to speak in terms of illegal activities, not field
investigation in general, as falling outside the scope of
the Clause.

For example, in explaining the reach of prior

cases, including Dombrowski v. Eastland, the Gravel Court
emphasized the presence of illegal conduct:
[I]mmunity was unavailable because [congressional
aides] engaged in illegal conduct that was not
entitled to Speech or Debate Clause protection.
The • . • cases reflect a decidedly jaundiced
view towards extending the Clause so as to
privilege illegal or unconstitutional conduct
beyond that essential to foreclose executive
control of legislative speech or debate and
associated matters such as voting and committee
reports and proceedings." 408 U.S., at 620
(emphasis added) .
This emphasis would not have been necessary if the Court
had been of the view that field investigations simply are
not covered by the Clause at all.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE also suggests that the Court
in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421

u.s.

491 (1975), distinguished Gravel on the basis that it
involved field investigations outside the scope of the

2.

Speech or Debate Clause.

Post, at WangDraft 9.

The

Servicemen's Fund Court, however, referred to Gravel
merely as dealing with "actions which were not 'essential
to legislating.'"
original).

421 U.S., at 508 {emphasis in

Nowhere did the Court draw the distinction for

which MR. JUSTICE WHITE now contends.

!
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Rider, p. 19, line 2, after "judgment," new footnote 26:

26.

We agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE, post, at

WangDraft 11 and n.4, that a Member of Congress who
conspires with aides to violate the constitutional rights

,,

of others should stand in the same shoes as those who

,,

physically commit the violation.

It is precisely this

holding, however, which necessitates the rule of
Dombrowski requiring that allegations of such conspiracies
be supported by facts lending them more than merely
colorable substance.

In the absence of such a rule, bare

allegations of conspiracy would serve to subject Members
of Congress and their aides to burdens of litigation, in
derogation of the policies of the Speech or Debate Clause.
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JUSTI C E LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

June 21, 1978

No. 76-1621 McAdams v . McSure1y

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I plan to make the attached changes in my opinion
at the points indicated.

L.F . P., Jr.
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June 22, 1978

PLEASE RETURN
ITO f"\l

No. 76-1621 McAdams v. Surely

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I have concluded that we should give serious
consideration to dismissing this case as improvidently
granted.
On yesterday, I reviewed the several opinions that
have been filed. The Court is about as badly fragmented on
the Speech or Debate Clause central issue (Part II) as if
we were three separate panels in disagreement on a Court of
Appeals, producing a disabling intracircuit split. Our
opinions will afford no guidance to other courts, and are
not likely to be reassuring to the members of the Congress
in terms of their knowing the boundaries of their
constitutional privilege.
Moreover, we have Bakke and the capital cases in
which the Court also speaks with several voices. But the
law will not be left in the same degree of confusion by
either of these cases as it will be with ~espect to Speech
or Debate if we bring down McSurely.
I am persuaded that the Court will be disserved
institutionally if all three of these cases are brought
down at the end of a Term, with divisions among us as
sharply divided as they happen to be.
Although I still feel as strongly as ever that the
McSurely litigation is wholly without merit as to at least
three of the four defendants, and that 11 years in the
courts in a frivolous vendetta is enough. Normally, I
would think that our first duty, once we take a case, is to
do justice to the parties. But I believe that if we DIG
this case, the injustice will be limited to one additional
final hearing in the District Court. Although I think CADC

A

I

-2-

erred in remanding rather than disposing of the case, Judge
Leventhal's opinion makes it rather clear that he shares my
own view as to the lack of substance to the McSurely
claims, at least as to the three Washington defendants. A
District Court, on remand, will have this guidance.
In sum~ I am motivated to suggest a DIG by genuine
concern as to of this Court's duty to afford guidance and
stability on major constitutional issues. But I also
believe that in the end a just result probably will be
reached if we allow this case simply to run its tortuous
course.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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l
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I have concluded that we should give serious
consideration to dismissing this case as improvidently
granted.

~

On yesterday, I reviewed the several opinions that
have been filed. The Court is about as badly fragmented on
the Speech or Debate Clause central issue {Part II) as if
we were three separate panels in disagreement on a Court of
Appeals, producing a disabling intracircuit split. Our
opinions wiJJ. afford no guidance to other courts, and are
not likely to be reassuring to the members of the Congress
in terms of their knowing the boundaries of their
constitutional privilege.
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Moreover, we have Bakke and the capital cases 1n
which the Court also speaks with several voices. But the
Jaw will not be left in the same degree of confusion by
either of these cases as it will be with respect to Speech
or Debate if we bring down McSureJy.
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I am persuaded that the Court will be disserved
institutionally if all three of these cases are brought
down at the end of a Term, with divisions among us as
sharply divided as they happen to be.
.~
Although I still feel as strongly as ever that the
McSurely litigation is wholly without merit as to at least
three of the four defendants, and that 11 years in the
courts in a frivolous vendetta is enough. Normally, I
would think that our first duty, once we take a case, is to
do justice to the parties. But I believe that if we DIG
this case, the injustice will be limited to one additional
final hearing in the Dlstri.ct Court. Although I think CADC
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erred in remanding rather than disposing of the case, Judge
Leventhal's opinion makes it rather clear that he shares my
own view as to the Jack of substance to the McSurely
claims, at least as to the three washington defendants. ~ A
District Court, on remand, will have this guidance.
~
In sum, I am motivated to suggest a DIG by genuine
concern as to of this Court's duty to afford guidance and
stability on major constitutional issues. But I also
believe that in the end a just result probably will be
reached if we allow this case simply to run its tortuous
course.
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No. 76-1621 McAdams v. McSurely
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Dear Chief:
I

agree.
Sincerely,
''',l

-/'i'li

The Chief
lfp/ss
cc:

The
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.f.r 1-1;

~o:

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr .

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Mr.

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Brennan
Stewart
White
Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquiat
Stevens

F..rom: The Chief Justice
C1roulated : JU

ul ted:
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UNITED STATES

No. 76-.-1621
Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor On Writ of Certiorari
to the Unitecl States
of the Estate of John L. McCl~llan,
Court of Appeals for
e~ al., Petition~rs,
v.
the District o{ CoAlan;McSurely et ux.
lumbia Circuit.
[June -, 1978]
PER CURIAM.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed a,s improvidently granted.

r

-~C~
curl of fltt %tifth .®faftg

gttm 10. <!f. 20&1'!~
CH AM BERS OF

.JUSTICE WM . ..J . B R E NNAN, .JR.

June 23, 1978

RE: No. 76-1621
Dear Chief:
I agree.

Sincerely,
I.

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

To: Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice tewart
Mr. Justic w t
Mr. Justice
rs 11
Mr. Justic B
mun
Mr. Justice owell
J.fr. Justice Rehnqutst
Mr. Justice Stevens
om: The Chie:f Justice
Circulated:~N 2 3 1978
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UNITED STATES

No. 76--1621
Herbert H. McAdams, III, as Executor On Writ of Certiorari
of the Estate of John L. McCl~llan,
to the United States
et al., Petitioners,
Court of Appeals for
v.
the
District of CoI
Alan McSurely et ux.
lumbia Circuit.
[June -, 1978]
Pl<JR CuRIAM.

The writ of certiorari is dismissed ll-S improvidently granted.
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